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TEE FIRST DETAILED ACCOUNT OF TEE STRUGGLE OF TEE
FIRST ARMY IN TEE MANGE RA VINE,
COLONEL N. L. WALEORD.
United Service .Institution
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION, WOOLWICH
BY
FRITZ HOENIG.
WITH TWO MAPS.
“It is impossible to bear the torch of truth through the throng without singeing some*
body’s beard.”— Lichtenberg .
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS
MOLTKE’S STRATEGY,
DISPLAYED AND EXPLAINED PROM THE
BATTLES OF GRAVELOTTE AND ST. PBIvAT
PREFACE.
The work which follows was prepared for printing after the death of
Field-marshal von Moltke ; but shortly before the date at which I
proposed to hand it over to the printer it transpired that a manuscript
“ History of the War of 1870-71 ” had been found among the literary
remains of the Field-marshal, while somewhat later it was stated that
its publication was already in preparation. When this information
was corroborated I delayed the appearance of my work, in order to
await the publication of Moltke’s book, which would, I supposed, have
given a full account of the events, which occurred in the space of time
which I have here considered. These hopes and expectations have
been but very partially fulfilled. The Field-marshal describes and
criticizes his advice, conceptions, and acts from the point of view of a
Chief of the General Staff, and all this must be received with respect ;
but, nevertheless, with regard to the time between the issue of the
order for the operations of 2 p.m. on the 17th August up to the issue
of the order for the battle of 10.30 a.m. on the 18th, there is a gap,
which might, in the future as in the past, offer to the enemies of
Moltke’s strategy material for depreciatory criticism. But it is not
only these who have unfavourably criticized the action of these hours ;
there are even some among Moltke’s admirers who cannot on this
point “ understand ” him.
What was then done or left undone by the head-quarters can
certainly not in every case be approved, but, taking the day as a
whole, I consider its achievements to have formed the culminating
point of Moltke’s career as Chief of the General Staff*, and it is my
intention to prove it to be so in this work.
After I had read Moltke’s account of the war of 1870-71, 1 said
myself that the publication of this book was now not only
was even necessary from the point of view of History and
m
iv PREFACE.
As regards the rest, I desire only to lay stress upon the fact that my
work was completed before I saw that of Moltke, and that, after
looking through the latter, I found that the two books differed only
in two points, namely, with respect to the action of the 9th Corps, and
with regard to the use made of the 2nd Corps, concerning which I will
say more at the proper places.
So much concerning the Strategy of these hours.
The tactical events of the battle of Gravelotte — I draw attention
to the fact that I distinguish between the battle of Gravelotte and
that of St. Privat — have not been up to the present related as a whole,
since what we know regarding them can be a source of satisfaction to
no one. All this is still virgin ground. If we realize that the battle
of Gravelotte exhibits a lamentable number of tactical mistakes and
omissions, we may further logically conclude that a critical account of
it must be very instructive. Perhaps this is the reason why no one
has as yet bestirred himself with regard to the tactics of this battle.
But, since the great improvement of firearms, there is so much the
more occasion for this, in order that we may deduce from a correct
description of those events, accompanied with critical investigation,
what in the future the attack on “ prepared ” positions will be like.
The war of 1877-78 certainly contained several such struggles, but not
one on such a large scale, nor is there in it an example of a whole
army extending from a single narrow road under the fire of the
enemy’s artillery and infantry, in order to bring about a tactical
decision without (up to 7 p.m.) any previous preparation by infantry
fire, and without (after 7 p.m.) any support whatever from either
infantry or artillery fire.
I know that courage and the labour of many years are necessary
in order to treat this great event in an exhaustive manner whose
depth may make it worthy of attention. Where I have not succeeded
as regards this, I hope that more skilful pens may complete my work ;
at any rate, I shall have thus given an impulse to the elucidation of
these (tactically) most important hours of the great war, hours whose
importance does not seem to have been up to the present recognized
to its full extent.
The reader Will here and there meet with “ variations ” which
sound like repetitions of some idea or another. I have intentionally
allowed this, since it appeared to me to be only in this manner possible
to prove the correctness or incorrectness of theoretical rules, as well as
yL, i ?
a V '
PREFACE.
v
to point out the limits where we must depart from principles ; this is
the ease with respect to the statements with regard to the head-
quarters, the introduction of the battle, the scouting, the reconnais-
sance, the simultaneousness of the attacks, etc.
My relation of the tactical events of the 18th of August at
Gravelotte must lose some little weight from the fact that I did not
myself take part in these struggles. I can therefore only judge from
what the present condition of Military History offers to me. The
filling in of the picture is given from protracted personal investiga-
tions on the actual ground, and from numerous statements by various
persons who took part in these events, and who have placed their
observations at my disposal. I have therefore, while writing, been
obliged in many places to endeavour to see with the eyes of others, in
order to get nearer to the actual facts. I am convinced that, for this
reason, I have not been able, with regard to these facts, to attain that
degree of certainty which I could have wished.
FRITZ HOENIG.
Fuiedenau, IS th August „ 1891.
Ifii
CONTENTS.
Preface
PAET I.
CHAP.
1. Introduction ...
Origin of the Work
The “ dark ” point in the life of Moltke
Gravelotte and St. Privat were two battles ...
The positions of the two forces in the early afternoon of the 17th of August
The importance of the strategical and tactical events in the Mance Ravine
The original cause of the mistakes
II. Concerning the Head-quarters and the Positions of the Leaders during
the Battle ... ... ... ... ...
The head-quarters before a battle ... ... ... ... ...
The influence of age upon the selection of accommodation for the head-quarters
Considerations with regard to the position of head-quarters during a battle
Ought the geueral in command to make a reconnaissance in person?
Can battles such as Gravelotte-St. Privat be conducted by one man?
III. The Objects which the French proposed to attain by their Movements
and by the Battle. Their Dispositions for both
The general position on the evening of the 16th of August.
the interruption of the march to Yerdun
The decision to retire on Metz ...
The signification of the march on Metz
The points of view from which the position was to be selected
The retirement is left unmolested ... * ...
Bazaine’s object in the battle ... ... ...
Bazaine’s opinions and dispositions ...
The execution of the retirement
The occupation of the position generally ... ...
Inconsistency of Bazaine’s objects in the battle ...
Criticism of the position with reference to Bazaine’s objects
The reason for
IY. The Objects which the Germans proposed to attain by their Movements
AND BY THE BATTLE. ThEIR DISPOSITIONS FOR BOTH
The general position on the morning of the 17th of August
Order for the movements of the 18th of August ... ... ...
Criticism of this order. Effect of the king’s age ... ...
Probability and improbability of the objects of the enemy
Choice of the post for the head-quarters ... ... ... ...
Omission of the commander of the 1st Army ... ... ...
Wj
CONTENTS.
?nr i
Orders to the 2nd Army ... •••
No mention of the task of the cavalry ... *•* **• ...
The order a work of genius
The space available
The explanation ... ... •*.* ***
The order for the operations, and General von fetemmetz ... ...
Dispositions of General von Steinmetz for the morning of the 18th ot August
Reports from General von Steinmetzto Moltke ... ^ ... ^ P
Historico-strategical importance of Moltke’s answer of 4 a.m. on the loth or
August ... ... ••• ... **• **•
Gravelotte as a pivot and as a point of attack ... ... *••
Criticism of the dispositions and of the decisions of General von fetemmetz
Arrival of General von Steinmetz at Gravelotte ... ... ... •••
Arrival of Prince Frederic Charles at Mars la Tour. Advance ot the -net
Army . ... ■ ... ...
The first idea of the head-quarters ...
The second idea of the head-quarters ... ... •*• .
The third idea of the head-quarters. The order for the battle ...
The order for the attack of the 9th Corps ... ***,
The post of the French right flank fixed
Precis of the orders from head-quarters .. .
The consequences of the neglect to reconnoitre . ... . »*“
The enemy must either have retired or have remained in position •••
Criticism of the order for the battle
Simultaneousness of the attack
The 1st Army is to attack in front and on the flank ... ...
Prince Frederic Charles's direction of the battle ...
The direction of the battle by the head-quarters
The direction of the battle by General von Steinmetz
PART II.
Y. The Ground in the Mancb Ravine
Character of the rows of heights
Character of the woods
Relation of the heights on each side to each other
The weather ... ...
The road Rezonville-Gravelotte-Metz, with its lateral communications ...
Point du Jour, Moscou, and St. Hubert ...
St. Hubert and the gravel-pits
Why was not St. Hubert destroyed ?
Character of the slope of the heights
Depth of the position ...
Selection of the position for the reserve
The forts of St. Quentin and Plappeville
Advantages of command of site
The ground with reference to the attack
The Mance Valley as the point of departure of an attack from the west ...
Approaches to the point of departure
Exits from the point of departure ... _ ...
Reasons for the tactical necessity for artificial communications
Direction and position of the communications
Fire-position for the infantry ...»
Why St. Hubert ccmld be held
Reasons for the possibility of the formation of a fire-position
Quarries of Rozerieulles and the height 1081
YI. The Occupation of the Position from Moscou to Ste. Ruffine
Composition and strength of the 2nd French Army-Corps
Composition and strength of the other French troops of the 3rd, 5th, and
Guard Corps
Occupation of the position
Fighting strength of the Germans ...
■ . .
CONTENTS.
The Struggles in the Mange Ravine
A. Up to the Capture of St. Hubert (3 p.m.) and of the Southern portion of the
JRozeneulles Quarries ... ... ... ...
As to the sequence of command ... ... ... ...
The mixed character of the troops
Beginning of the battle of Gravelotte
Distribution of the troops of the 7th Corps shortly after 1 p.m., and its con-
sequences ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Distribution of the troops of the 8th Corps after 1 p.m.
Value of the ground in front of the position ... ... ...
Goeben’s position ... ... ... ...
Goeben’s attack ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Direction of the attack of the 15th Division
First joint artillery fight of the 7th and 8th Corps ... ... ...
Advance of the 29th Brigade. Capture of the wood to the south of the main
road
Extension and first advance of the 3Uth Infantry Brigade ...
Capture of the wood .to the north of the main road
Arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division and of the 16th Division
Advance of the artillery. Arrival of the corps-artillery of the 8th Corps
Second advance of the 30th Infantry Brigade ... ... ...
The 28th Regiment driven back ... ...
Capture of the ground in front of St. Hubert, to the north of the main road
by the 8th Jagers and the 67th ... ... ...
Advance of the 29th Infantry Brigade. Capture of the gravel-pits ...
Attack of the 60th ... ... ... ... ... ^ ...
Capture of the ground in front of St. Hubert to the south of the main road ..
Capture of St. Hubert
Distribution of troops in the position ... ... ...
Events on the flanks. First storming of the quarries of Rozerieulles ...
Attacks on Moscou
Disposition of the infantry of the 7th Corps at 3.30 p.m.
Omissions and confusion of mind of General von Steinmetz
Passage for artillery
The staffs
The 15th Division after 3 p m.
The French at 3.30 p.m.
The method of leading of the German brigades
The method of leading of the smaller units
B. From the Capture of St. Hubert to 5 p.m. ...
Goeben’s idea at 3 p. m.
The feeling in the artillery position of the 7th Corps ...
Impression of General von Steinmetz ...
Goeben’s dispositions at 3 p.m. ... ... ...
Dispositions of General von Steinmetz ... *.*
Dispositions of General von Zastrow
The catastrophe
The passage through the Malice defile
1. The cavalry
2. The artillery of the 14th Division
3. The corps-artillery ...
The arrival at St, Hubert ...
1. The leading battery (Trautmann)
2. The second battery (Hasse)
3. The third battery (Gniigge)
4. The fourth battery (Lemmer) ...
The deployment of the 4th Plans
Losses of the troops
The moral and material reaction from the attempt
Ideas of the French with regard to taking the offensive
Frossard’s offensive. Recapture of the quarry ...
The details of the reinforcement of the 15th Division ...
• ■ ;
: ;-V
CONTENTS.
CHAP,
Arrival of the 39 fch
Mixture of the infantry of the 7th and 8th Corps
. From 5 p.m.\to 7 p.m. ... ... ... ... ...
Pause in the action. Interruption of the German attack
Attitude of the French ... ... ... ... ...
Want of harmony between the head-quarters and the 1st Army
Events at head-quarters after 5 p.m.
The 2nd Corps under the orders of General von Steinmetz
The 32nd Brigade come into action ... ... ...
Order for the attack on Point du Jour ... ...
Attack of the French...
The first panic ...
Attack of the 32nd Infantry Brigade ...
Advance of the 9th Hussars
The second panic ...
. Up to the End of the Battle ... ... ... ...
The orders of the King to General von Steinmetz and the 2nd Corps
Moltke’s objections and advice ... ... ... ...
Execution of the order of the king by General von Steinmetz
Measures of General von Zastrow ...
Action of General von Franzecky
Reflections concerning the frontal attack
Attack of the 3rd Division
Extension of the 2nd Jiigers ... ... ... .1.
Extension of the 54th ... ... ... ...
The third panic ...
The second capture of the quarries of Rozerieulles, and the fight there
Arrival of the 2nd Jagers and the 54th
Arrival of the 73rd ...
The catastrophe of Mogador
Arrival of the main body of the 3rd Division
Arrival of the 4th Division
Assembly of the 7th and 8th Corps
The attack of the 7th Corps
The enemy abandons the position ... ...
Moltke after the Battle
Moltke’s feelings
Prince Frederic Charles, General von Steinmetz, and Moltke’s original idea
St. Privat-Gravelotte was a strategical battle
Moltke in Rezonville
IX. Tactical Conclusions
X. Strategical Conclusions
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS
MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
PART I
INTRODUCTION.
During the seventies I revisited the battle-fields of the Franco- Origin of
German War. When (in 1876) after having examined the battle-field the Work '
of Gravelotte, I went on to Tarasp in the Engadine, it chanced that I
there met General von Franzecky, who happened to be staying at that
place at the same time. Since this officer had commanded the 2nd
Corps at Gravelotte, 1 naturally spoke to him of my new researches
and impressions. The lively interest which he took in them was one
of the causes which induced me to work at my inquiries, with a view
to their publication. I gave up the winter of 1876-77 to this task,
and the following pages, which I now offer to the public, contain
these researches, which in the course of time have certainly been
much increased, corrected, and extended. Since then the book has
been read by many persons who were prominently concerned in some
or other of the events narrated ; they advised me to let the matter
alone for a time. I found great difficulty in inducing myself to do so,
since the strategical and tactical events of the 17th and 18th of
August seemed to me to be the most important of the whole war, and
have, moreover, in my opinion — more out of personal considerations
than for any real reason — been up to the present recorded in a
manner which is in some respects confused and in others incomplete.
I determined, therefore, to first ascertain how the public would
receive an inquiry which should contain an, as far as possible,
exhaustive description of these events, and with this object I
published in the “ Neue Militarische Blatter ” an introduction to this
book, entitled, “The German and French Cavalry around Metz, from
the evening of the 16th of August to the evening of the 18th of
August, 1870 ; ” this appeared between September, 1882, and February,
2 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
. . thus discovered that the time for the production oi the
T Sa mKritl^»work had not yet arrived, since, while the men who did the
i*- Ttfrdiaadft frwere still sensitive about them, those who had belittled the
’ * deeds done were more sensitive still, and the most touchy of all were
those who seemed to have accepted all that was written as gospel.
The more I thought over previous representations of facts, and the
oreater the opportunity which I found, in the course of years, to
search into the hearts of those who had manipulated these tacts, the
more I felt it to be laid upon me as a duty, to observe, to listen, and
to watch, in order to arrive at a record as far as possible complete. I
have not, up to the present, thanks to the success of these efforts,
regretted that this work has been so long in appearing, and I have
I further, while relating everything, intentionally withheld myself, as
far as possible, from taking part in any discussions on the subject. _ If
any one wishes to answer me, I will gladly give him the opportunity
of doing so ; but one thing I will declare, namely, that in the year
1970 no one will comprehend all that was written a hundred years
earlier on the subject of the battle of Gravelotte.
The ' it requires but a slight knowledge of the_ critics, and an equally'
DofnUn slight knowledge of military literature, to induce us to form the
the life opinion that the 17th and 18th of August, 1870, present one dark spot
of Moitke. in 2 j£ e 0 f Field-Marshal von Moltke, and show several dark spots
in the lives of some other people ; and that for this reason it may be
undesirable to touch upon these failures and omissions. We have no
right, it is said, to jeer at our own glory ; we are cavilling at men
wjho have done well ; it is unpatriotic and unwise to discuss matters
which must be unpleasant to some one or other, etc., etc. But at the
present day no difference of opinion can any longer prevail as to
where we have acted with wisdom and tact, for has not von Moltke
himself been compelled to leave behind him a history of the war.of'
1870-71, in order to confute the frequent errors made by our wise
and sagacious writers.
Our literature shows plainly that we are afraid to closely examine
the events of the 17th and 18th of August. This fear is founded not
so much upon lack of knowledge or the absence of formed opinion, as
upon personal considerations which, although they were, and are,
neither fully stated nor well founded, are yet at least in some degree
intelligible, considering the spirit which at one time prevailed. Is
man, then, a mere molecule of the spirit of his time ?
Moreover, careful study with an open mind enables us soon to
recognize that there is here no dark spot on the life of Moltke, and
that these days, as they were the most full of care, were also the
S eatest in the career of the Chief of the General Staff, since he had
en to struggle with difficulties and sensibilities, and had to consider
the peculiarities and the prejudices of men who, though doubtless of
merit, could not always understand the Field-Marshal. He wished,
and was obliged, moreover, at the same time to avoid everything
which might annoy his royal master, and had also to bring on a
serious battle at the exact moment when the operations were ripe for
a tactical decision.
INTRODUCTION.
In consequence of previous events and omissions, and of the
pressing demand for action from the leader of the 1st Army ; in con-
sequence of the fact that the tactical combats of all three armies had
in part followed a course which was not intended ; in consequence of
the knowledge that, as Moltke himself saw, the 2nd Army had, since
7 p.m. on the 17th, not understood his object, a feeling of irritation
had, even in the highest quarters, reached such a stage that all
Moltke’s greatness of soul, generalship, calm, and discretion were
required in the whirling hubbub of “ will ” and “ can,” in order to
enable him to preserve from danger his great idea, namely, “ to
maintain first the separation of the enemy’s armies, which had
resulted from previous events, and then, by turning to the south
around Metz, to work against Bazaine on interior lines.” It was
moreover due to M.oltke’s tact, to his confidence in his own capability,
to his patriotism, and to the rare energy of his mind, that he was not
crushed between the gigantic revolving mill-stones, and his idea thus
ground to atoms with him. During these hours he fought and strove,
not only as a general by the grace of God, with men who could not
see as far as he, but also as a hero with strength of character, courage,
wisdom, patience, and humility, against vanity, historic greatness,
popularity and seniority in the service, while remaining throughout
faithfully attached to his royal master. May we not say that under
such conditions any other man would have been simply crushed ?
Any one who considers these things, and takes into account not
only their military but their human side, must arrive at the conclusion
that von Moltke, both as a general and as a man, was never really
greater than at the moment when others failed to understand him in
the manner which he expected. There is, and was, no reason to
avoid a full disclosure of the history of those hours, least of all if we
are prepared to exactly apportion merit and blame ; indeed, he who
desires earnestly to deal honourably with von Moltke’s greatness
must seek for it. Only so shall we be able to understand and
appreciate the struggles and the agony of soul of the General during
those hours ; he had indeed fully advised in his capacity as Chief of
the General Staff, but the might of a higher will was needed before
his counsel could be carried into effect.
I have been careful to write “ developed and illustrated in the
battles at Gravelotte and St. Privat,” since there were two battles on Privat
the 18th of August, 1870. As far as regards the guidance of the two were two
battles by the head-quarters, we may use such an expression with tatties,
reference to Gravelotte, but scarcely with respect to St. Privat; for
from 4< shortly after 5 p.m.” all influence of the head-quarters over
Prince Frederic Charles entirely ceased. After that hour there was
no communication between the two, and the head-quarters did not
receive from the Prince any report of the victory gained at St. Privat
until one arrived at Rezonvilie during the night between the 18th
and 19th of August. Gravelotte and St. Privat afford a proof of
maxim that, when the head-quarters are, under such
posted in rear of a flank, any guidance of the action is
by the exertion of every effort, and is even then quite ’
I
i
The posi-
tions of
the two
forces in
the early
afternoon
of the
17th of
August.
4 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
The battle of Gravelotte was fought by the 8th, 7th, and 2nd Corps,
supported by the 1st on the right and the 9 th on the left, and m it
the King of Prussia actually commanded. The battle of St. Privat
was carried through by the Guard, the 12th, and the 10th Corps,
supported, by a weak centre, the 9tli Corps, which really fought a
third action on its own account. Owing to the too great distance of
the head-quarters, its influence, even before 5 p.m., was always felt
too late, that is to say from the time when the 2nd Army and the
12th Corps had been detached in accordance with its intentions.
Thus the selection of the position of the head-quarters for this battle
was faulty. The French, on the contrary, differed from this peculiar
order of battle by being massed more in the centre than on the flanks.
After the orders issued by the commanders-in-chief on either
side, in consequence of the events of the 16th of August, had been
carried out, the opposed armies found themselves, shortly after noon
on the 17th of August, in the following positions (see Map I.) .
I. French.
2nd Corps, with Lapasset’s Brigade, from Ste. Ruffine to half- waj
between Point du Jour and Moscou.
3rd Corps, from that point to Montigny la Grange.
4th Corps, from there to the north of Amanvillers.
6th Corps, on the right flank, in and on both sides of St. Privat.
In rear of the 6th Corps was Du Barail’s Cavalry Division, while
in rear of the 2nd Corps were the Guard, Forton’s Cavalry Division,
and the main Artillery Reserve. ,
For further details, owing to want of space, I refer the reader to-
the Ordre de Bataille in the “ Official Account.”
The main road from Ars sur Moselle by Gravelotte, Malmaison,
V erneville, and Habonville, was unoccupied except by some weak
advanced detachments, and no hostile forces of any strength appeared
until Ste. Marie aux Chenes was reached.
II. Germans.
1st Corps — Courcelles sur Nied.
3rd Cavalry Division (Coin) at Cuvry, the 1st at Corny.
8th Corps in and near Ars sur Moselle, and in the Bois de Vaux,
as far as the south of Gravelotte.
7th Corps — Gorze, with one Brigade in rear at Arry.
9th Corps to the south of Flavigny.
6th Cavalry Division to the west of that place.
3rd Corps at Flavigny and Buxieres.
10th Corps at Tronville.
r 5th Cavalry Division and 3rd Cavalry Brigade of the Guard to-
the west of that place.
jfth Corps— Mars la' Tour and Puxieux.
Guard Corps — Suzemont.
1st Guard Cavalry Brigade at Sponville, with a mixed detachment
pushed forward to Porcher.
*, [ f ; ,
INTRODUCTION.
5
12th Cavahy Division at Parsondrupt.
11th Corps — Pont k Mousson — Gezoncourt.
4th Corps — Menil la Tour and environs.
The opposing armies were thus massed, since the French (who
did not make any alteration up to the beginning of the battle of the
18th of August) extended over a space of from eight to nine miles,
while the Germans showed a front of about twelve and a half miles,
if the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Corps, and also the Cavalry Division of the
I2th Corps, be left out of account. It was possible for the 1st and
2nd Corps, but not for the 4th Corps, to assist the 12th Corps on the P 1
18th of August.
We see at once that Marshal Bazaine had given up all the roads
leading to the west and north-west ; only one remained to him, that
by Thionville. Even the road to Auboue he could hardly use with-
out fighting, while that to Conflans was out of the question. The
Germans held the road Metz-Suzemont- Verdun, while that from
Gravelotte to Confians was within their tactical, and that to Auboud
within their strategical, zone of effect.
The positions of the hostile forces formed an angle of exactly
ninety degrees, joining each other in the Bois de Vaux and at Grave-
lotte, while the outer flanks were a good ten miles apart, less, how-
ever, than a short day's march. The French leader proposed to act
on the defensive, and under the other favourable conditions in which
he was placed, it is at least intelligible that he should have drawn
back his cavalry behind his front. No such reason can be found to
explain the similar action of the Germans; but this point will he
considered later on. Only one general, the then Crown Prince of
Saxony, handled his cavalry well, but he pushed them boldly to the
front to Parsondrupt and the Confians-Etain road ; if the remainder
of the cavalry had been used in the same manner, they would by the
evening have secured Conflans and Auboud as posts for observation,
assuming, as is now known to have been actually the case, that the
enemy were expected to retire towards the north. If the cavalry
had been pushed forward to these points, they would have come
upon the enemy at Ste. Marie, and might thus on the 17th have fully
cleared up the whole situation, and have easily reported all results
up to that evening. The reason that the opposing generals did not .
make a proper use of their cavalry was, that they both wished, under
alt^drcumstanees, to avoid a battle on the 17th. This common object,
springing as it did from different motives, marks the distinction
between a true general and a “ general.” A true general would have
learnt everything in good time by dint of skilfully using his cavalry,
and this probably without losing a horse or a man ; the generals of
both armies learnt but little of that which they ought to have known
before issuing definite orders, since the master-hand was wanting,
which might have held the cavalry so completely under control as
to have successfully watched the enemy, while at the same time
avoiding an engagement.
There can be but few instances in military history where so T ^ r e ^" of
many failures and mistakes of every kind occurred as was the ease the °
D 1
1
silt
i II
5 ■ ■ ^ -'-r :: • ■
6
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
strategical
and tactical
events in
the Mance
Ravine.
The origi-
nal cause
of the
mistakes.
before Metz on the 17th and 18th of August, 1870. In saying this.
I am speaking, generally. If we go into details, we find that the
strategical objects and the tactical principles, together with the
means adopted to attain them, of the struggle in the Mance Ravine
are well worthy of careful investigation ; this is the more the case,
since varions things happened there which, if they are not well taken
to heart, must, in the future, lead to most disastrous consequences.
It is very remarkable that while the details of the fight at St. Privat
have from the first been the subject of so much criticism that an
important mass of literature on that subject is in existence, those of
the struggle in the Mance Ravine have up to the present, as far as
I know, failed to give employment to a single pen. Yet the errors
at St. Privat, terribly as they were punished, belong rather to minor
tactics, and were, consider them how we may, but trifles compared
with the mass of strategical and tactical faults and omissions per-
petrated by high, and even by the highest, authorities in the Mance
Ravine; and these faults repeated themselves to an extent which
continually increased from the beginning to the very end of the
battle. If we consider only the events ‘themselves, which took place
in the Mance Ravine, and which make us hold our breath in continued
excitement, we shall feel that a whole -world was in stirring action
at this point; there were the head-quarters with their crowd of
celebrities, the general commanding the 1st Army, General von
Goeben, General von Zastrow, and General von Franzecky, all names
already well known to history.
The terrible events which came to pass on the 18th of August,
distinctly endangering the great strategical scheme which had de-
veloped up to that date, had various causes. Of these the principal
appears to me to be quite obvious, when I recall the conduct of
INapoleon I. on the afternoon of the 13th of October, 1806. Notwith-
standing that he had ridden far, and had undergone great previous
fatigue, the Emperor made a personal reconnaissance at Jena, when
he arrived there at four o'clock; he gave orders for the immediate
construction on the Steiger — a difficult mountain path — of a road
suitable for guns, in order to create a possible line of approach for
his artillery up to the enemy's position, and allowed till the following
morning for its completion; when he had himself seen everything,
had himself made his decision, and had himself given all orders, then,
and not till then, did he take his rest in his tent, close to the enemy,
in the ranks of the grenadiers of the 4th Regiment. He did all
this after 4 p.m. on the 13th of October, 1806; what were the German
head-quarters doing in the same direction after the early morning of
the 17th of August, 1870 ? I will not say that they did nothing ;
but, considered as independent generals, they acted very differently.
Consequently the Germans, at the time when the orders for the
inovements of the 17th and for the battle of the 18th were issued,
had not full information with regard to the position of the enemy,
and were not even well informed with respect to it when the battle
had already passed into its first stage, since, up to 5 p.m., the head-
quarters had no knowledge of the amount of the extension of the
INTRODUCTION.
French right Hank. Moreover, since a whole day passed without
anything of importance being done by which the proper guidance
of* the army might have been facilitated, all possibility of such
guidance during the battle was lost ; this fact no one can deny.
In one point only is the difference between the two cases favour-
able to the Germans. The orders for the movements, issued at 2 p.m.
on the 1 7th, and those for the battle, given out at 10.30 a.m. on the
18th, are works of art as regards their form, while Napoleon’s order
for the battle of the 14th of October is not only nothing of the kind,
but is perhaps in this respect the very -worst that he ever issued.
I
9
^ 1
8
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTICE’S STRATEGY.
The head-
quarters
before a
battle.
CONCERNING THE HEAD-QUARTERS AND THE POSITIONS OF THE LEADERS
DURING THE BATTLE.
If we study Napoleon’s system of conducting war, which was,
moreover, assisted by no electric telegraphs, we find, as a ru]e, that
the emperor, as he approached nearer to the enemy, pushed his
head-quarters more and more to the front, so much so that on the
night between the 13th and 14th of October, 1806, Napoleon was
within a square formed by a regiment of infantry, which he had
selected for this special honour, and was immediately in contact with
the enemy. It is not, however, possible on this point to lay down
rules which shall be invariably correct ; the choice of the position for
the head-quarters depends rather upon the special circumstances of
each case, and, above all, upon one’s own intentions and the probable
designs of the enemy. One only principle must always be right,
namely, that when a battle is imminent, one .should be as close as
possible to the scene of action ; for though the telegraph can certainly
send information quickly, yet the road to the battle-field must be
traversed on four legs, of which the endurance and the rapidity is
limited. Even when the leader in a battle is a particularly good
rider, and is mounted on an exceptionally good horse, this principle
does not lose its force, since the horses of the leader s stall' and the
freshness of the staff* itself must be considered ; and these, if the head-
quarters are too far to the rear, will be obliged to use such exertions
that the horses will not be able to keep up, and will in many cases
be exhausted, while their riders will naturally lose their freshness if
the pace be too great. We know well what a strain it is upon horse-
men to get over long distances at a rapid pace. But since the tactical
handling of the troops will eventually call for yet greater exertions
on the part of the staff*, we must certainly do all that we can to get as
near as possible to the anticipated field of battle, since only thus can
we avoid too great a distance and undesirable and premature fatigue.
Moreover, the danger that a head-quarters may be attacked or swept
off* by the enemy need scarcely T^e taken into account, since sufficient
troops for its defence will always be available, and in contact with
the enemy.
According to Napoleonic teaching, which, in this case, is an
example to us, the nearness of the head-quarters to the enemy offers
yet other advantages; for the general thus obtains a great gain in
time for that which he himself wishes, does, and must do, and also
I
POSITION OF HEAD-QUARTERS.
9
for everything which others ought to cany out in accordance with
what he observes and with his consequent orders. He is on the very
spot, and has time to see everything himself, and this personal obser-
vation is now, as it was formerly, under circumstances such as those
of the 17th and 18th of August, one of the first duties of a general.
Such a method of proceeding certainly presupposes that considera-
tions regarding personal accommodation need not be taken into
account, at least not to a detrimental extent. But at an advanced
period of life considerations regarding comfortable accommodation are
necessary, if a leader desires to find himself relatively fit for work on
the day of battle. A general of from thirty-five to forty-five years
of age will think little of losing a night's rest, or of contenting himself
with a tent pitched among his troops, but this can scarcely be expected
of officers of seventy or more ; it would be unreasonable to hope for it.
These facts, however, prove that a general must be bodily as vigorous
and robust as possible, so that he may have no fear for himself from
exceptional fatigue under exceptional circumstances. If, for example,
we imagine Napoleon — such as he was at Jena, Borodino, or Dresden —
placed in the position of the German leaders on the 17th of August,
we may be sure that he would have announced where he would be
found at certain given hours, while he would in the mean time have
fiown hither and thither, leaving no method untried by which he
might obtain information with regard to the enemy's position; and
all this without any effort to avoid the most extreme bodily exertion,
and without taking account of the employment of his cavalry, being
determined to pierce the veil by his own observation, which, in such
cases, is always the best. We may also be sure that the news of the
battle of the 16th of August would have called him up betimes to
Rezonville on the 17th, in order, after starting from there, to shift his
point of view, to see everything himself, to summon the leaders of
both armies to his side, and, after settling all that remained uncertain,
to dictate his orders for the battle. Since the German right flank
might be in some danger during the general deployment, Napoleon
would have posted himself at this point, while reports might come
and go; he would have remained close to the enemy during the night
between the 17th and 18th of August, at some point or other on the
right flank, while on the 18th, in the early morning, say at 5 a.m.,
he would have been again in the saddle, in order first to observe what
was going on in front of the German right, while he would have
moved thence in a northerly direction, in order to endeavour to
complete his survey of everything which might up to that time have
remained uncertain.
The emperor would then, in all probability, have suitably
completed or modified his last orders, and would have selected some
point in the neighbourhood of Verne ville as the position for his head-
quarters, whence he would conduct the battle. All this would have
called for no special exertion, owing to the relatively short distances,
the many and good roads, the fine weather, the dry soil, and the
numerous points from which it was possible, without any particular
risk, to observe the enemy's position.
. ::
10
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
Napoleon, under the circumstances which prevailed at 7 a.m.
on the 18th of August, would have known, without using a single
squadron, whether any, and, if so, what changes had taken place
since his last appreciation of the situation (at midnight, on the 17th
of August), and his head-quarters would from that hour have been
firmly established at the right point (near Yerneville), and would,
have there remained up to the time when the decisive crisis arose at
St. Privat. Napoleon would have held it necessary to place himself
near that flank, as soon as he had taken the required steps with
regard to his pivot on the right. This would have been the behaviour
of a young Napoleon.
At the German head-quarters great attention was paid towards
flue upon 1 sparing men of advanced age, and the same was the case, for other
selec- motives, in the higher commands ; at all events, matters, which were
accomrao- on account much considered at the head-quarters and in the
dation for higher commands, had a prejudicial effect, and acted injuriously upon
quarters!” ^ le wor k to be done, while they could, speaking generally, have been
brought to a good result only by the greatest conceivable exertion,
and by the employment of machinery which did not exist on the 18th
of August. Opinions at head-quarters, which were correct under the
existing circumstances, attributed a great part of the blame to the
objectionable conditions against which the directors of the battle had
to strive on the 18th of August. From this we may learn how
important it is to make a good choice lor the position of the head-
quarters, while, .strictly speaking, almost everything that was done in
this direction before Metz, between the 16th and the 18th of August,
must be condemned.
Let the facts themselves speak. Whilst fighting was going on
near Vionville on the 16th of August, Prince Frederic. Charles was
at Pont a Mousson ; he was very late in reaching the battle-field from
that place. During the night, between the 16th and 17th, he was
at Gonse, while Steinmetz was at Coin-sur-Seille. The head-quarters,
which came from Pont a Mousson, reached the hill near Flavigny at
6 a.m. on the 17th; at 2 p.m. the orders for the movements of the
' 18th were issued from Flavigny. Why was this done at so early an
hour? Was it because the head-quarters would, ought, or must
return to Pont a Mousson ? It is impossible to find any other reason.
Thus the question of the provision of suitable head-quarters was
considered of the first importance, and out of regard for this the
events of the day (the 17th) were not awaited on the scene of action,
while the orders for the movement of the army were issued with
a very small regard to the actual state of affairs. And yet recon-
naissances pushed out along the roads to the north and north-east,
fispm Gravelotte to the Orne, would have called for much less exertion
than moving from Pont a Mousson to Flavigny and back on the 17th,'.
and again from Pont a Mousson to Flavigny on the 18th of August.
Thus the careful attention paid to the position of the head-quarters
was really responsible, in a great measure, for the imperfections,
the errors, and the failures of those hours, and, above all, for the
state of ignorance which existed with regard to the enemy, under
POSITION OF HEAD-QUABTEKS.
11
circumstances which, as far as the Germans were concerned, could
not have afforded easier or more inviting opportunities for learning
everything, and for learning it in good time. For, by between 2
and 3 p.m. of the 17th, the French were in the position in which
they were attacked on the 18th. At about the same hour, the
German orders for the movement of the army were issued.
If it had been determined not to return to Pont k Mousson, but
to remain close up to the enemy, even then, as we now know, nothing
more would have been learnt, and nothing better would have been
ordered, since equally little was done in this respect during the period
of the stay of the head-quarters and after their departure. Yet how
much there was to do, and how easy the enemy made it all for the
Germans ! There is hardly a single other instance in military history
of a great decisive battle where, as in this, the assailant had almost
everything offered to him, as it were, on a waiter. General von
Steinmetz passed the night between the 17th and the 18th of August
at Ars-sur-Moselle, while Prince Frederic Charles was at Buxieres.
On the enemy’s side, we find Marshal Bazaine in the village of
Plappeville; this was, at any rate, in accordance with the plan of
“ strategy ” on which the marshal acted.
The French general remained in about the same place during the
battle, and consequently continued in the same error. The German
head-quarters were between Gravelotte and Malmaison ; the selection
of this point was not strategically correct, it was even opposed to the
special plan, while it was tactically unfavourable. Thus it came
about that the head-quarters of the two hostile forces were both, lor
different reasons, in the wrong positions, and were almost exactly
opposite to each other. General von Steinmetz remained during the
battle to the south of Gravelotte, while Prince Frederick Charles was
near Habonville.
If the head-quarters before a battle such as we are now con- considera-
sidering — in front of a position which practically cannot be changed, ^obs with
and in which the enemy intends to receive our attack — have been thfposk
suitably selected, their position during the battle is easily settled, tion
This is governed by certain conditions. It must always be easily quarters
reached, and as far as possible in rear of the centre, unless it is during a
necessary to place it in rear of the strategical flank, that is to say battle *
the dank with which the assailant intends to make his decisive and
victorious attack. It must be possible to govern the course of the
battle in all respects, so far as the few important items are concerned,
such especially as the opening of the action, the posting of the
reserves, the out-flanking movements, etc. The general’s position
must also be so far from the struggle that he cannot be influenced by
minor events, such as he might himself see, for these might affect
him, and might incline him to take narrow views ; for he must not
lose the main threads of the action, nor must he make minor details
into great events ; should he do so, he will become false to his own
principles, not only as regards his plan, but still more as to the
manner in which he intends to work out that plan, passing gradually
from step to step.
: . ■■■ ■/ ■ . ■' . ■ ' . ■ . ■ ■ ■
\v :A. A /V :v-.
" ■ ■ Lx 112
12
TWENTY-FOUB HOUES OF MOLTKE’S STEATEGrY.
In the Mance Ravine, all these matters were jumbled together and
intermixed. Not only are these things very instructive tactically,
but, if we from this point of view consider the head-quarters, with
their position and action, we shall find much that is worthy of
earnest consideration, and which, moreover, might not have been
altogether free from objection in the case now before us. While dis-
cussing these matters, we shall not, of course, mention any. particular
individual, but on this point the general character of the circum-
stances must be borne in mind, since no one person among the leaders
in 1870-71, was so. conspicuously in the foreground as was, for
example, the first Napoleon. Since this was the case, we may be
so much the more free in our conclusions. We must certainly own
that he who leads in a battle is equally responsible for loss and
gain, but even the leading has in these days far less of a personal
character. It is usually carried out by individuals organized under
a head, and depends rather on a system than on a person. The
system requires a technically skilled head, otherwise it will fail, but .
it is not yet quite certain how far this head must be tied down, and
the mode of action is not exactly clear, supposing that something
happened which the head did not wish, and this at a time when the
situation was a little complicated.
If all this be taken into account, the German head-quarters were
first too far from the battle-field ; they next arrived there too late ;
they next placed themselves in rear of a flank, and that the least
important of the two ; they were then too near the fighting-line, and
finally committed the worst fault of all, in that they “ commanded ”
instead of “ directing ”
The number of persons with the head-quarters and with the
army staffs in the -war of 1870-71 was so great that Frederic and
Napoleon, if they could have been suddenly sent back into this
world, would have stared about them with extreme astonishment.
small a staff* as Napoleon used for the direction of his army is,
however, sufficient only when a Napoleon is in command; but in
1870-71 the head-quarter staff' and in some cases one or other of
the army staffs, was certainly very large ; and large staffs, especially
if increased by royal spectators, may under certain circumstances be
most undesirable and inconvenient. If a head-quarter, or an army
staff consists only of persons who are necessary on military or political
grounds, things will then work at their best; and this should be
invariably the rule. For it is easier to find accommodation for a staff*
of this size, while, since it is comparatively small, the authorities
whose decision governs the action can, if it be advantageous to do so,
get closer up to the enemy. In this respect we have acquired very
bad. habits, which are very noticeable even in peace at the Autumn
Manoeuvres. In these latter there is certainly some advantage in
having, whenever possible, three or four substitutes for every post,
but in war, on the contrary, the main principle of simplicity and
necessity must be, adhered to as regards the higher staffs, as in all
other matters, for it must be remembered that everything which is
not absolutely necessarv checks the movement of the great organism.
POSITION OF HEAD-QUARTERS. 13
We must undoubtedly in the future avoid such large head-quarter
and army staffs as we had in 1870-71. Moltke, on this subject,
says —
£C To the former (the Minister of War) we attribute in peace the
administration of the army, and there are thus in war a number of
functionaries at home, who will only allow themselves to be guided from a
central point. The Minister of War does not, therefore, belong to the head-
quarters, hut should remain in Berlin P
Moltke says this, not with regard to the objectionable number of
persons at head-quarters, but with reference to the way in which the
work should be done; he therefore gives still more ground for my
opinion. Too many cooks spoil the broth. War suspends the policy
of diplomacy, and, as long as arms rule, the latter has nothing to
do. When arms have ceased to speak, then the hour has come for
diplomacy to take up again its questions of policy. Though King
William I. never held a council of war, it is possible that, even if
only occasionally, in conversation at table, or in other places, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of War had private
opportunities of expressing their opinions. This did actually take
place, and that not only in the above manner, as we learn from the
discussion as to the siege and the bombardment of Paris. When
the head-quarters, with reference to the conduct of the war, and also
as regards its leader and the chief of the general staff- is of such over-
whelming greatness, as was the case in 1870-71, the efforts of others
will have no influence upon the plans and operations ; but who will
ensure that we shall in future have so strong a head for the army ?
If this were not the case, irresponsible persons might- easily obtain a
fatal influence, as, indeed, happened in Prussia, in the war of 1806.
Moreover, only such a theatre of war as France can possibly provide
means for the accommodation of so large a staff.
Napoleon made a mistake in the days before Jena, since he to Ought the
some extent allowed the enemy to march by him ; but from the
moment that he recognized his error his personal conduct was a to make a
pattern. As regards this question*. there is now a distinct school g^° c ^ is '*
formed, which teaches that it cannot be the duty of a general to person,
reconnoitre in person, since he has other means for this purpose, and
since it is his business to discover which among the various reports is
correct. - We have on this point to deal with an instance of the
vagueness of the spirit of the times, which has already done sufficient
harm, which tries to make one shoe fit every foot, and which pays
more attention to the impression which its method of representation
makes upon the leader, than to teaching the latter the art and the
history of war. This is the same system which refuses to any longer
distinguish between strategy and tactics. When a general receives
information which affects the domain of strategy, it is then certainly
not his duty to personally reconnoitre. On the other hand, when a
case occurs, as on the 17th of August, 1870, where by means of two
preceding battles, touch has been obtained of the enemy, and where,
as on the 17th, it is possible for hours together, and with the naked
■ v ■■■' ' ■"
" v ■ '-■■■ '■•■■■■ ■■■
- . ■ • ; . ' ijSItP
^ ' v
eye, to observe a great part of the movements of the enemy, and to
follow him to his starting-point, while, however, it still remains
uncertain whether the foe intends to retain his whole force or only a
part in the neighbourhood of Metz, then circumstances are changed,
and in that case the general must himself reconnoitre. Moreover, we
seem to have held somewhat tenaciously to the school which forbids
us to annoy any one, even though a false and unmanly consideration
for individuals may endanger the great and vital truths of the art
of war ; such beliefs as this can in no way do good service to Moltke’s
heroic character. Owing to the fact that some persons have con-
stantly restrained themselves from looking into these matters, many
things have now grown to he maxims, not because they were rightly
done, but because such and such a man did them. The worst of it is,
that this feeling is not exceptional, but that no one dares to oppose
the spirit of the times.
Up to six p.m. on the 17th of August, it was possible for the
Germans to obtain, without any difficulty, all the information that
could be desired with regard to whether the enemy remained near
Metz. From such reports it would have been possible to ascertain
that the enemy was awaiting the Germans in a strong position, since
during those hours he was occupied in preparing that position for
defence. This was the moment when the general himself should
have reconnoitred ; while, since the days in August are longer than
in October, the Germans, on the evening of the 17th of August, ought
to have been better informed regarding the enemy than Napoleon
was on the evening of the 13th of October, and should thus have
been able to issue all necessary orders. Indeed, the general and
special circumstances were more favourable to the Germans than they
were to the emperor. Only what should have been done was left
undone, and we must later on show the reason why this was the
case. On this page we propose only to combat the false maxim that
in these days a general need no longer reconnoitre in person.
The French position at Gravelotte-St. Privat had been prepared
beforehand for defence, and in all such cases the general, even though
he have received good information, must himself reconnoitre in person.
I venture to lay this down to the school of to-day as a cardinal axiom,
since it is probable that the typical battle of the future will, as regards
the defender, closely resemble those now in question.
There would, moreover, have been ample time for the most complete
and comprehensive reconnaissance, but even at the point where the
foes were in close contact (on the right flank), not one of the higher
leaders made any reconnaissance on the 17th or 18th of August, nor
did they order any, nor later on did they take any trouble to keep up
connection between the troops who were in front of them and their
staffs, though, considering the tactical situation, all these were both
necessary and practicable. If we were to draw up a form of govern-
ment on the lines laid down by some individual man, this might be
convenient for the rulers and without danger for the State, so long
as the author of the constitution was at the helm ; but the danger
begins so soon as he is no longer there. This is exactly the case as
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
POSITION' OF HEADQUARTERS. 15
regards the few great maxims of war. Though Napoleon at 4 pan.
on the 13th of October, 1806, behaved in such and such a way, and
won the victory, and though Moltke from the early hours of the 17 th
of August, 1870, did so and so, and was also victorious, this does not
prove that they both did right, even though they were Napoleon and
Moltke, and both won a victory; for the art of war demands that,
without any regard to the personality of the individual or to his
success, his conduct shall be judged by its suitability to the special
circumstances in which he is placed, and that the result of full
investigation shall alone afford a basis for maxims.
No maxim of war can suddenly become a fallacy because a general
of seventy or more years is physically incapable of doing what is easy
to a younger man. A maxim of war cannot be founded upon the age
of Badetsky, or upon that of Alexander, of Csesar, of Frederic, or of
Napoleon, but it should he mentioned in which cases old age com-
pelled a neglect of its laws, and when bodily vigour gave the power
to obey them. If we acted thus, we should hold to the old principle,
in its eternal and unimpeachable truth and accuracy, which lays
down that under circumstances such as obtained (as regards the
Germans) on the 17th and the morning of the 18th, the Commander-
in-Chief, unless he is prepared to resign all guidance of the battle,
should himself reconnoitre, as Napoleon did before Jena. As a matter
of fact, nothing was done on the German side, and there was, moreover,
no guidance during the battle. Oily flatterers have tried to legalize
such action by saying that in the present day a commander-in-chief
is only a strategist in battle. A commander-in-chief must always
be a strategist in battle, or he would cease to be commander-in-chief,
but if he wishes that the fruit of his strategy shall not escape him, he
will, when the time of trial comes, offer his most sincere thanks for
the “only,” but will make up his mind to be also a tactical leader in '
the battle. In this case, the correct selection of his position becomes
of importance.
Gravelotte and St. Privat were not two battles in the same sense Can batfcies
as were Jena and Auerstadt. Napoleon alone commanded at Jena, Gravelotte-
and Davoust at Auerstadt ; neither of them knew what the other was St. Privat
doing, neither knew that the other was in action at all, and Napoleon, aucted'by
until after he had won his victory, received no news of the ruin of one man'?
the Prussian main army. Moltke, in his order of 10 a.m. on the 18th
of August, dealt with both armies ; but, on the other hand, he so shaped
the course of the intended battle that, as a matter of fact, two battles
took place; for when one of two armies escapes from command, it
practically fights a battle on its own account. But if we argue from
the separation of the 2nd Army that it will not he possible to
handle similar masses to those at Gravelotte-St. Privat, and with
even greater success, we are again striving to legalize a sin, and are
again laying down a false maxim of war, which Moltke would have
unhesitatingly swept aside.
A better system of leading might have been possible even at *
Gravelotte-St. Privat, if a sufficient reconnaissance had been made
beforehand, and if a corresponding selection of the position of the
■ill
y
s
leader had been made. Up to tlie 18th ot August, all tne Dairies naci
been improvised, but on that date it was possible to fight a battle on
a settled plan, for the arrangement of which there was indeed more
time available than would ordinarily he the case; and yet late
decreed that, under the eyes of Moltke himself, the very thing should
arise which had been the curse of the former battles, the thing which
Moltke himself hated, namely, great difficulty of direction, and even
the entire abandonment of all guidance. To such a man as Moltke
this must have been very grievous, but it was not the consequence of
his strategy; the real causes will be treated of later on. The one
great fact, that Moltke had been able to assemble nine corps and
six cavalry divisions so exactly at the right moment that they could
all, if necessary, be used in the battle, and this in the most effective
strategical direction, is in no way lessened by the above-mentioned
foU-nvS 1 sw.pcriea.llv sneakinsr. this is, since generals have existed,
III.
THE OBJECTS WHICH THE FRENCH PROPOSED TO ATTAIN BY THEIR
MOVEMENTS AND BY THE BATTLE. THEIR DISPOSITIONS FOR BOTH.
Marshal Bazaine had received an impression, from the reports on The general
the battle of the 16th of August, that he would not be able on the theeveni? 1
17th to continue his march on Verdun, which had been interrupted of the isth
by that action. He had very much over-estimated the strength of ^treason
the Germans on the 3 6th, and thought that they would be con- for the in-
siderably stronger on the 17th; while, since they were now in pos- ^ r ^P ti0J1
session of the road Metz-Yionville-Terdun, from which the marshal march to
had been forced on the 16th, Bazaine had available no roads but Verdlm *
those by Conflans and Briey, of which the latter could be reached
only by a march of no small length. The marshal gave up for the
present any idea of falling back on A 7 erdun or Ch&lons, being under
the impression that by such a movement he would bring on a fresh
action with forces stronger than those which he had met on the
16th, and because the movement of part of the army from the line
of battle of the 16th on to the road to Briey did not (owing to the
fatigue of the troops and the nearness of the enemy) appear likely to
be by any possibility completed in such good time, as to enable such
an undertaking to be carried out without risk. When we consider
that nearly the whole of the French army was, on the evening of the
16th of August, in the rectangle Gravelotte-Doneourt-Rezonville-
Bruville, with the Germans in their immediate front, and with only
the road to Briey in rear of them (that to Conflans being on their
right flank), we shall feel that the breaking-up of the line of battle of
the 16th, the arrangement of the order of march, and the distribution
of the corps for a movement on a more distant objective, were indeed
very serious matters. From his experience of the 6th, 14th, and 16th
of August, the marshal could not hope that the Germans would allow
this breaking-up to proceed without interruption ; while, unless this
was the case, it was quite impossible that such a march on a distant
objective could be successful. Moreover,, the French army was
deficient in ammunition and in supplies, which fact confirmed the
marshal in his above-mentioned decision.
Matters have indeed at the present day quite a different appear-
ance to that which they then had. Moltke, for instance, says : —
a But the principal care of the marshal seems to have been not to he
cut off from Metz, and he therefore directed his attention almost entirely
C
ill
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
upon his left wing, since, while he continually sent reinforcements to that
point, he crowded the whole of the Imperial G uard and part of the 6th
Corps opposite to the Bois des Ognons, from which no attack ever took
place. We are compelled to accept the conclusion that already on this day
political reasons alone induced Marshal Bazaine to remain in Metz.”
Since this sentence refers to Bazaine’s action on the 16th, the
c< alone ” and the “ already ” of the above must at least equally apply
to the 17th and the 18th ; in other words, Moltke does not altogether
believe in the reasons put forward by Bazaine, but considers that
political reasons chiefly governed the dispositions made by the marshal
on the 16th of August.
The de- When the marshal, under the pressure of the German initiative,
retireon renounced all resumption of his march on Verdun and Chalons,
Metz. he was compelled to consider" where and how his army could most
quickly he brought into the condition which he desired, in order
to enable it to regain its lost fitness for military operations. Since
it was no longer capable of holding its own in the field, this could
be found only in the fortress of Metz. Standing as did the French
army on both banks of the Moselle, it became a question whether
it should retire directly and seek cover behind the river (with
intentions which would be of importance later, but need not yet
be considered), whether it could fight with both flanks resting on
obstacles, or whether Metz should he used as a support for one
flank only. There was not, however, on the west bank of the
Moselle near Metz, any position which would secure both flanks,
and, quite rightly, the. second plan was given up and the third
chosen. There were, however, other reasons for this choice.
Thesigni- The abandonment of the march on Verdun, and the selection of
Semarch Uie direction of Metz, are in themselves acknowledgments of the
on Metz, strategical successes of the Germans up to that date, and they,
moreover, afford a proof that their tactical designs had not failed.
Bazaine’s movement towards Metz is easily to be understood on the
hypothesis that the Germans would again attack on the 17th. He
may he supposed to have thought, “ I have been defeated, my plans
have been ruined by the enemy, whom I cannot again meet in the
field until I have renewed my strength.”
The points Marshal Bazaine had no intention that the march on Metz should
nolfwhich result either in causing him to be shut up for ever in the fortress,
the position or in giving up all possibility of being able to escape from it later
Scted be on ' Under these circumstances, a further question became of impor-
tance, namely, whether it would be possible to And near Metz a
position of such great tactical strength, that the marshal might
there hope to engage in a new battle with some prospect of success.
A glance at the map would answer this question (theoretically) in
tfe affirmative, since the position which he had in his eye, and
which he actually occupied, was by nature of an exceptional tactical
strength. The knowledge of this fact no doubt confirmed the marshal
in Ms decision. If he could now succeed in fortifying this position
before the enemy made an attack, he could await events with even
greater confidence. It is certainly true that, if he feared to be
The sipni-
I
r-Li M,
|:§ ibi h / -
OBJECTS OF THE FRENCH.
19
*
'attacked on the 17th, while continuing his march on Verdun
and Chalons, there was yet more cause for fear, considering the
short distance which divided the Germans from the position Roze-
rieulles-St. Privat, that he would be again seized by the throat
while making the movement, and would be hindered in reaching,
in occupying, and in strengthening the position. In the marshal’s
position there was but one way at his disposal to avoid this danger,
namely, by starting as soon as possible ; this the marshal at once
seized. There was yet another way of escape, but over this he had
no power, since it depended upon whether the enemy would permit
the withdrawal to take place without interruption. This was, under
the circumstances, the most important point of all ; but as a matter
of fact the marshal had not counted upon it; he expected to be
attacked on the 17th,
After the costly battle of the 16th (which, according to Moltke, The retire-
was also a tactical victory for the Germans), both enemies pursued * s
at once the same object, namely, the avoidance of a fresh battle molested,
on the 17th. It is obvious that the marshal would desire this; but
lie could not suppose that the Germans would wish the same, though
he might have taken the possibility into account, since it was not
absolutely forbidden by the circumstances. When, indeed, he dis-
covered that the Germans had reasons for avoiding a new battle
on the 17th, then first Marshal Bazaine really attained the main
conditions for working out his intentions, namely, “ an undisturbed
retirement on Metz, and an undisturbed occupation and fortification
of the chosen position ; ” but he certainly knew nothing of this
beforehand. The Germans, on the 17th and the morning of the 18th,
were so completely held back that the marshal could not only
have marched undisturbed to the east, but could even — if he had
known it — have safely moved the main mass of his army to the
north, though he would certainly have thus exposed it later on to
new dangers in the field. Critical military history must come to
this conclusion, but a general who has to reckon with many uncer-
tainties cannot in. the time at his disposal obtain a sufficiently clear
view, and cannot act as if he knew everything.
Thus the first cause which enabled Marshal Bazaine to retire
at all without being disturbed, was the manner in which the
Germans held back ; and yet this, under the governing conditions,
was thoroughly correct on their part. When, therefore, both sides
determined on and carried out that which, in their respective
positions, was the right thing to do, namely, to avoid a battle on
the 17th, the main advantage, as regards time, the situation, space,
and object, belonged at first to the French, while, at a later stage,
this relation might very well be reversed, and upon this the
German leaders, while the enemy retired, distinctly and decidedly
reckoned.
There are no grounds for saying that Marshal Bazaine over- Rapine’s
looked the strategical dangers of the position which he selected, buttle,
because he was dazzled by its tactical advantages ; any such state-
ment is contradicted by the dispositions and the plans of the marshal.
20
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
■Ml
opinions
and dis-
positions.
Nevertheless, considering everything, he made one great error in
his calculations. This was in underestimating the determination,
the tenacity, the energy, and the military skill of the Germans,
especially when striving for a great strategical object. Since Bazaine
occupied a chosen position, extending from the north to the south,
he practically gave up all direct communication with the interior
of France; he reversed his front, and took up a “flank” position
in the fullest sense of the word. Even though the road by Briey
lay exactly in prolongation of St. Privat, it was, considered as a
line of march for the French* quite as much within the zone of
operations of the Germans as of the French. Though during the
battle each had a share in it, this fact merely proved its absolute
uselessness for a French retreat, unless they had previously defeated
the Germans. Thus only a decided assurance of a great tactical
victory could have justified the selection of the position, Bazaine
hoped for this, but had he any grounds for entertaining such hopes ?
He was influenced by the unfounded belief that he had on the
16th been attacked by at least an equal force; yet his telegram,
sent to Macmahon at 2 p.m. on the 18th of August, speaks of
a German army of reserve on the right bank of the Moselle at
Pange. If he believed this to be the fact, he must have said to
himself that this army of reserve would come up during the following
days, and that he would then (since he imagined the Germans to
have been on the 16th at least equal in numbers to his own force)
have been obliged to fight against a crushing superiority. In that
case, his confidence in a tactical victory, and, therefore, in the conse-
quent freedom of movement, must have vanished away. If the
marshal had fully considered the tactical power of fighting, which
the Germans had up to that time displayed both in attack and
defence, his hope of inflicting a tactical defeat upon them would
have rested upon yet more slender foundations.
Nevertheless, the marshal’s hopes were firmly fixed in this
direction, as we learn from his own words. He writes : —
“ My idea, when I placed the army of the Rhine in the positions
from Rozerienlles to Amanvillers, while giving the most stringent orders
that these lines should be very strongly fortified, was to there await
the enemy. The preceding actions had shown me that one, or perhaps
two, defensive battles, in positions which I considered impregnable, would
use up the forces of my adversaries, by causing him to suffer very
considerable losses, *which, when repeated time after time, would weaken
him sufficiently to oblige him to yield me a passage, without his being
able to seriously oppose it,”
Thus Bazaine considered that, in order to attain his object, more
than one defensive battle would be required. In perseverance — at
least, as far as intentions went— he was not wanting. But in this
matter he allowed a new error to creep in, since he thought, without
any reason, that the defensive would weaken the French — in every-
thing which gives power in battle — less than the offensive would
affect the Germans, though, taking all things into consideration,
military history teaches us that the contrary is the ease.
OBJECTS OF THE FBENCH.
21
The following telegram, which was sent to Maemalion during the
battle, agrees with the above opinions, which the marshal wrote after
the event. Bazaine also told almost the truth, and tried to do what
was right, as far as he could judge. It runs : —
“ In consequence of the successive actions which I have fought, on
the 14th and 16th, my march on Verdun has been stopped, and I am
obliged to remain in the vicinity of Metz, in order to supply the army
with ammunition in the first place, but also with provisions.
44 Since this morning the enemy has shown strong masses, which appear
to be moving on Briey, and may have an intention to attack Marshal
Canrohert, who is occupying St. Privat la Montague with his left on
Amanvillers, on which place the right of the 4th Corps rests. We
remain, therefore, again on the defensive, until I have learnt the true
direction of the movement of the troops which are in front of ns, and,
above all, that of the army of the reserve, which is said to he at Pange,
under the command of the king, whose head- quarters are probably at the
Chateau d’Aubigny.”
The tactical arrangements made by. Marshal Bazaine, according
to which the Germans were to exhaust themselves in the attack on
his position, show the same line of thought.
For after Bazaine had already issued instructions to the com-
manders of corps, directing them to strengthen the position as much
as possible, he, in consequence of a report received in the early
morning at Plappeville from Marshal Leboeuf, concerning the develop-
ment of considerable forces in front of the 3rd Corps, wrote again
at 10 a.m. to Marshal Canrobert (6th Corps at St. Privat) as
follows : —
cc Occupy your position as strongly as possible, and keep up your con-
nection with the right of the 4th Corps ; the troops should be encamped
1 in two lines, and on as narrow a front as possible. You would also do
well to have the roads reconnoitred which lead from Marange upon your
extreme right, and I am ordering General Ladmirault to do the same with
respect to the village of Norroy le Veneur (on the left bank of the Moselle
below Metz). If by any chance the enemy, extending along our front,
should seem inclined to seriously attack St. Privat la Montagne, take all
measures needed for defence in order to hold him there, and to allow the
right wing to make a change of front, with the object, if necessary, of
occupying the positions in rear, which are now being reconnoitred.”
ft>
f All this is distinctly in the line of thought on which Marshal
| Bazaine was at this time acting, and is besides in every way reasoned
out in accordance with it, though one single tactical point of view
again entails a considerable error. If the position of St. Privat were
taken or broken through, there was simply no other position further
to the rear, since the lie of the ground does not offer anything of the
kind. This was one main defect of the position selected, and owing
to this Bazaine lost the battle, as soon as St. Privat had been snatched
from his army. The reference to a position further in rear is the
more incomprehensible, since Bazaine gives it to be distinctly under- i
1 .stood that he was concerned not only with his right flank, but (even |
22
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
retirement.
as early as 2 p.m.) with his rear ; otherwise, what is the meaning of
the mention of Marange and Norroy ? If, however, this was really
his feeling, Bazaine must have acknowledged to himself that his fate
would be decided by one defensive battle.
The exeeu- Having shown beforehand the connection of these details, in order
tion of the co n ec t the various threads, and to avoid later repetitions, we must-
now deal with the execution of the march of the French. Marshal
Bazaine had issued the order for it on the night of the 16th ; in this
he says: —
“ The great expenditure of ammunition which has taken place, and
also the fact that we have not supplies for mauy days, prevent us from
continuing the march which has been begun. We shall therefore fall back
at once to the plateau of Plappeville.”
The army marched at daybreak on the 17th of August. The main
connections, and also the best distribution of the corps for it, were
governed by the positions of the army-corps at the end of the battle
of the 16th ; otherwise the marshal, who considered his left flank as
the most important, would * perhaps not have placed there, in the
foremost line, that corps which of all had suffered the greatest loss
in the action (the 2nd Corps), and which, therefore, was of all the
least suited to carry out the most difficult task, so far, at any rate,
as ordinary experience enables us to judge ; we shall speak of this
again in the chapter on “ The Occupation of the Position,” The
Guard, the 2nd and 3rd Corps, marched by the road Rezonviile-
Gravelotte-Metz, the 4th and 6th by Verneville on Amanvillers and
St. Privat. The former road was the better and the wider, and
thus the troops could move quicker on it. In order to cover the
retirement round Gravelotte, Metman’s division of the 3rd Corps
took up a position to the west of that village, while Du Barail’s.
cavalry division was at Yerneville. The arrangements were in general
suitable, though perhaps a stronger force of all arms should have
remained near Yerneville, since cavalry alone, though they may
satisfactorily veil such a movement, cannot cover it or ensure its*
being carried out. Undoubtedly, also, cavalry were required on the
French right flank, in order to scout up to the Orne.
The march to the point north of St. Privat was the longest
(about 8f miles), that to Point du Jour the shortest (about 5
miles), measured from Rezonville and Bruville. Although the
Germans were during the time occupied by this march influenced
by the desire to ward off) or rather, to avoid, a battle (which very
much facilitated the execution of the movement by the French), we
must still acknowledge that the by no means easy task of the latter
was carried out without any noteworthy failure as regards their
discipline, while their dispositions, the distribution of their troops,,
and all questions relating to timing, were suitably arranged, and
that the entire movement showed not only a very high cregree of
executive skill, but also a rapidity of marching which had not up
to that' time been observed in the French troops; moreover, the
eccentric direction of the march on Yerneville, in comparison with
DISPOSITIONS OF THE FRENCH.
23
that of the other on Point du Jour, might easily have led the Germans
into erroneous ideas with regard to the real intentions of the enemy.
But it does not appear whether the French had any intention of
manoeuvring with the object of deceiving the Germans ; at least, no
mention of any such intention can he found in the sources which are
at present available.
The advance into the position took place in succession : the 2nd The occu-
Gorps reached it first, and the 6th last, while the former commenced th^position
to strengthen it about noon. The general system of occupation on- generally,
the afternoon of the 17th was as follows : —
6th Corps, from Roncourt to the south of St. Privat.
4th Corps, closed up to the former by Amanvillers.
3rd Corps, closed up to the 4th by La Folie, Leipzig, and Moscou.
2nd Corps, from this last point hv Point du Jour to Rozerieull.es,
while Lapasset’s brigade of the 5th Corps (which was attached to it)
extended thence to Ste. Ruffine.
Du Baraibs cavalry division took up a position to the east of
St. Privat, while Forton’s was at Longeau.
The Guard stood, as a reserve, to the west of the forts St. Quentin
and Plappeville, while the reserve artillery was between these forts.
Throughout the whole, as the corps came up in turn, great activity
in fortifying the position was shown along the entire front, most
of all by the 2nd and 3rd Corps, less by the 4th, and least by the
6th, where it was most needed. Generally speaking, the troops on
the 18th remained posted as given above. We will here dismiss this
subject, of which such details and changes as call for notice will be
mentioned later on.
What do we learn from the above statement ?
The marshal wished neither to be torn away from Metz nor to incon-
be driven back into that fortress, but simply to remain connected j^^aine’s^
with it on political and other grounds (ammunition, supplies, sick objects in
and wounded), and to protect and strengthen himself, while relying the battle *
upon and supported by it. Do his dispositions correspond with these
objects ? The French position was by nature very strong along the
entire front, and was undoubtedly strongest (as will be shown later
in the chapter on “The Character of the Ground ”) on its left, though
the right also was capable of being energetically defended. The
marshal should certainly therefore have considered the possibility of
the latter flank being turned ; in fact, as we have already shown, he
did reckon on this. On the other hand, there was comparatively
little reason for him to fear for his left flank.
When the marshal, nevertheless, placed the reserve of his army
in rear of his left, this disposition (especially when considered with
regard to the support already afforded to him at that point by the
forts of St. Quentin and Plappeville) distinctly shows his politico-
strategical object. He was determined not, under any circumstances,
to be cut off from Metz. But the second task which he set himself,
namely, not to be thrown back upon the fortress, is in direct con-
tradiction to this disposition of his troops ; thus, as w r e have here
shown, it was impossible to carry out both of these tasks. This the
24
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
marshal discovered, but not until it was too late, at 3 p.m. on the
1 8th of August, and he then accordingly made fresh dispositions;
but the distance of the main army reserve from his right was then
far too great to allow them to be of use. If the marshal's right flank
were defeated and driven in, in that case, even though his left was
successful, he must fail to carry out his entire object. In other words,
the two aims, as the marshal sought to gain them, need not of them-
selves, without other considerations, have been incompatible with
each other (as has been well shown theoretically), but, under the
then existing circumstances, and considering the strength of the force
at his disposal, and also their distribution in the position, their realiza-
tion was not possible. Even if the main reserve had arrived in time
at St. Privat on the 18th, the defeat of the right wing would at the
best have been simply prevented on that day, while the overthrow
which must have followed on the 19th would, on the other hand,
have been still more serious to the French ; this can be shown by
merely stating the disposition of the troops on the evening of the
18th. The Germans had still a corps (the 10th) in the second line,
and ready to renew the fight on the 19th, and had, moreover, the
3rd in the centre and the two corps, the 7th and 8th, on their
right, while the French had no reserves worth mention available
for further action. It is therefore very probable that, under these
circumstances, Bazaine would on the 19th have been not only thrown
back upon Metz by the German left, but would further have been
cut off from the fortress by the German right, since the 2nd and
3rd French Corps had altogether only two infantry regiments in
reserve, though the last Voltigeur brigade of the Guard might have
been also employed. Under such conditions, these corps could not
have endured a second day of battle.
Bazaine’s double intention required for its execution: 1st, an
active general, who understood how to take advantage of the success
of the moment; 2nd, a skilful guidance of the battle; 3rd, a suitable
distribution of the corps and a proper disposition of the reserves ;
4th, a well-selected position for the leader of the battle ; 5th, the
greatest possible strengthening of the position by artificial means.
All these were wanting.
Criticism Strategically considered, the position itself was in the fullest
ti 52 s *” sense w °rd essentially a “ flank ” position ; the natural line of
reference to retreat was abandoned, while any other (from the Moselle) would
B-aine’s have placed the marshal in a disadvantageous strategical situation,
o jec s. enemy could not pass by the position; he was compelled to pay
attention to it, and to make the strong hostile force on his flank as
far as possible harmless, before he could, for his part, dream of any
further plans for operations. The great fortress of Metz was in the
eyes of the marshal a reason for taking up a flank position ; he could
rest his left upon it in such a manner that he need fear nothing
serious on that flank ; it further supported his centre in carrying out
his intention “ to bleed the enemy, and thus to obtain freedom of
action." ; Again, it compelled the Germans to leave considerable
forces (1st Corps and 3rd Cavalry Division) on the right bank of
DISPOSITIONS OP THE FRENCH.
25
the Moselle ; while Bazaine had, along the entire front of his left and
supported flank, ground which it was very difficult for the assailant
to pass over, even without any considerable preparations being made
for defence, since it was composed of the steep and deep ravine of the
Mance, with its large masses of thick forest; moreover, if the enemy
proposed to attack it, that attack must take place in the direction
from which the marshal most desired it, and must be carried out
against that which was tactically the strongest part of the whole
line of battle.
The position, however, wanted depth, and also suitable and suffi-
cient communications, either in case it was required to push the
reserves to the front, or in case of the necessity of a general retire-
ment. In addition to its insufficient depth, and to its want of com-
munications, the position had close in its rear, for three parts of its
length, the deep valley of Chatel, which ran about parallel to the
Mance Ravine ; this obstructed all movement, and might have been
fatal to a retreat. It is true, certainly, that the forts of Metz (St.
Quentin and Plappeville) lay so near to the valley that, unless the
victorious enemy could pursue along the foot of the slope, the dis-
advantages as regards a retreat of the French army would be much
diminished.
The selection of a “ flank” position can only be considered
desirable, if the general desires to again assume the offensive, after
having been temporarily subject to the will of the enemy, and after
having lost the initiative. He takes it up, not with the intention of
simply warding off a blow, but in the hope of again obtaining liberty
of decision and of action through the process of time, or by other
Y fortunate circumstances. For this a strong army is needed ; this
Bazaine had. But, in addition, a great, daring, skilful, and decided
general is necessary, as well as a careful and skilfully arranged
system of orders, and a suitable disposition of the troops ; these
requirements were not sufficiently fulfilled.
Strategically speaking, the assailant of a flank position must place
himself under conditions similarly unfavourable to those of the foe
to be attacked (I designedly do not here use the word “ defender,”
since that would not be the right expression), with regard to his
communications to the rear. Since the Germans could not neglect
his flank position, the question presented itself to the marshal
whether, considering the stage of the strategical concentration of the
enemy, he was the man, or his army was qualified, to destroy this
concentration, and to aim at great results against the strategical flank
i of the Germans, by throwing himself during the concentration, or
5 during the earlier stages of the subsequent battle, in superior strength
t and in the most effective direction, upon the communications of the
j enemy. If the marshal were not the man for this, and if the position,
! the number, and the disposition of his troops were not suitable, the
flank position must have more drawbacks than advantages for him,
\ and must be but the beginning of the end, since in that case, without
considering other matters, all utilization of the strategical advantages,
I which under such circumstances might have allowed him to hope for
i
26
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
0KP
success, must be renounced. As a matter of fact, however, Bazaine?
no more thought of breaking out in the direction of Gravelotte than
he thought of letting Metz take care of itself, throwing himself upon
the German communications on the right bank of the Moselle, and
using Metz as a pivot for his right; this would have been a task
worthy of a true general. When he abandoned Gravelotte without a
struggle, he entirely abandoned such possibility of success as lay in
the offensive, since for this the possession of Gravelotte would have*
been most necessary. His measures can therefore be explained only
by political reasons. . . . *
Bazaine thus, by his arrangements, left out of consideration the
important portions of the task of an army which is assembled in a.
flank position; he himself diminished his sphere of effect, and,
abandoning the paths of strategy, limited himself to those of political
tactics. He posted his main reserve (the Guard, etc.) in such a
manner that, in spite of the surrender of Gravelotte, one is at first
sight, under the existing circumstances, compelled to believe in an
intention to take the offensive in the direction of that village. But
even this has only a political explanation, namely, that Bazaine feared
that the object of the Germans was to cut him off* from Metz ; whereas,
sound strategy for the Germans could only consist in entirely cutting
the communications of the French army, in order, perhaps, at a later
date, to throw them back into Metz. The passage of the Moselle by
the Germans to the south of Metz must have appeared to Bazaine, if
he had considered only military aims, as the commencement of a
predetermined operation of this description.
In order not to he separated from Metz, Bazaine not only placed
his reserve in rear of his left, but further selected that point for his
own post, in order personally to be near that which he considered to
be his most threatened flank. Let us see what Moltke says with
regard to this point. He thus speaks with respect to the position : —
“ He (Bazaine) had preferred to assemble his forces near Metz in a
position which he rightly considered as almost impregnable.’' With
regard to the posting of the reserves, he says : “ This point (St.
Pnvat) should undoubtedly have been the position for the Guard,
but in his apprehension of an attack from the south, the marshal
kept this reserve behind Plappeville.” All this can be explained on
political grounds, but Bazaine the politician required a victory, and
therefore the offensive. There was, in fact, no harmony between the
political and the military sides of the question.
Bazaine really sought for nothing more than to hold his position,
allowing the enemy to rush upon it, in order to weaken him by a
costly defeat. For this purpose the position, tactically considered,
had great natural advantages, while, with regard to what was done
to strengthen it, as well as all his other dispositions, all, from a
military point of view, had reference solely to a purely defensive
action, and in no way showed any intention to himself assume the
offensive.
Yet any one who, being in a flank position, selects the pure
defensive, or who can only attain that scale of action, places himself
1 * 1*11
DISPOSITIONS OP THE FRENCH.
in opposition to tlie conditions which justify the occupation of such a
position, namely, the assumption of the offensive under favourable
circumstances, whether tactical or strategical or both; moreover,
experience teaches us that in the above cases flank positions, whether
they be named Jena or Metz, bring about great catastrophes.
At the very point, on the French left flank, where the conditions
regarding freedom of movement for bodies of troops ought undoubtedly
to have existed, or to have been created, such conditions were quite
insufficient; the same disadvantage indeed made itself felt along the
whole of the French front, since the depth of the formation was small
in proportion to its length. This arose from a circumstance of which
it was desired to take advantage, namely, the excellence of the arm of
the French infantry, which demanded a wide held of fire. Moreover,
the general direction of the position was governed by the lie of the
high ground between Point du Jour and St. Privat. The woods
which lay before the centre, and especially in front of the left, could
not, however, he considered as tactically advantageous to an army
which had determined to fight in a flank position; since these
expanses of wood, with their narrow roads, would (even if the French
had held Gravelotte) have led, in the case of an offensive carried out
through them, to the same difficulties as seriously embarrassed the
German offensive. At the same time, however, the woods and the
Mance Ravine together, if only the Germans had known how to make
good use of them both, would have offered them the main condition
under which they could carry out a successful attack upon an im-
pregnable position.
As things were, a French offensive would have been easiest in the
direction from St. Privat on Ratilly, etc., that is to say in the direction
which was least effective strategically.
28 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
THE OBJECTS WHICH THE GERMANS PROPOSED TO ATTAIN BY THEIR
MOVEMENTS AND BY THE BATTLE. THEIR DISPOSITIONS FOR BOTH.
The general After having in the preceding chapter noticed the intentions of the
themorn- a French leaders, and the dispositions made to carry them out, we add
rag of the n0 w a short sketch of those of the Germans. In doing this it is
August, impossible to avoid criticizing the principles which governed the head-
quarters and the 2nd Army. I have, nevertheless, dealt as shortly
as possible with the latter, since the dispositions of which the fight of
the 1st Army An the Mance Ravine was the consequence naturally
demand our principal attention in this work.
By the battle of the 11th of August the Germans had gained
considerable strategical advantage, since, owing to it, generally
speaking, the 1st and 2nd Armies had interrupted the intended and
pre-arranged retreat of the enemy's forces, and had delayed it about
thirty-six hours.* The German leaders skilfully employed this time
in making the most of their interior lines, inasmuch as they at once
commenced to endeavour to overtake the French army by means of
operations to the south of Metz; and, further, to pass it wherever
possible, and to compel it to fight again. The enemy’s army, which
after the battle of the 11th, had resumed its retreat on Verdun, was
again attacked on the 16th by the 2nd German Army, and this time
on its left flank. The strategical successes of the 16th of August were
for the Germans simply decisive of the whole campaign . The French
army lost the Metz- Vionville- Verdun road ; it had suffered severe loss
in the actions, and had expended much ammunition ; its march was
again interrupted and delayed.
Under these circumstances, as has been already shown, Marshal
Bazaine had finally abandoned his march on Verdun, and, resting his
left on Metz, had taken up a position on the eastern heights of the
Mance Valley. This position lay north and south. Marshal Bazaine
had thus given up his direct communications with Verdun and
OhMons. Presuming that the Germans took advantage of these facts,
both enemies would fight facing their proper rear. If Marshal Bazaine
were victorious, the Germans would lose their line of communications ;
while, if the Germans won, their enemy would presumably be thrown
hack upon the entrenched camp of Metz. Bazaine’s position, strategi-
cally considered, had much in common with that of the Prussians at
the 2nd and 3rd Army had thus
OBJECTS OF THE GERMANS.
29
Jena, in 1806, since both were flank positions. The manner in which
the French were attacked by the Germans differed, however, con-
siderably from that used by Napoleon against the Prussians. A more
exact example of a similar attack is to be found in Sherman’s engage-
ment at Atlanta, and the results of the operations and of the battles
were in these two cases almost the same.
The action of the 16th of August had called up King William to
Flavigny, which was on the battle-field, by about 6 a.m. on the 17th.
After care had been taken, as early as the evening of the 16th, that
the Germans should, in case of a second battle on the 17th, be pre-
pared in good time to meet the French (in the neighbourhood of the
battle-field of the 16th), with at least equal numerical strength, the
grand head-quarters watched the course of events from Flavigny.
From that point King William, at noon, determined to advance on
the following day in concentrated strength, and, in consequence of
this decision, the following orders were issued from the height of
Flavigny at 2 p.m. on the 17th : —
“ The 2nd Army will close up at 5 a.m. to-morrow, the 18th of August, Order for
and will advance in echelon from the left between the Yron and the Gorze tiie uiove-
brooks, on a general line between Ville sur Yron and Rezonville. The
8th Corps will conform to this movement on the right flank of the of August.
2nd Army. The 7th Corps will at the beginning have the duty of
covering the movements of the 2nd Army against any attempts of the
enemy from Metz. Further orders from his Majesty will depend upon
the action of the enemy. Reports to his Majesty will be at first sent to
the heights of Flavigny.
“ (Signed) v. Moi/ike ”
This order was at once despatched to the leaders of the 1st and Criticism
2nd Armies ; the 1st Army, with which we are especially concerned,
received it about 4 p.m., just as General von Steinmetz reached Ars. Effect of
In no other instance have Moltke’s great designs been so clearly ^ km s’ s
expressed in an order as was the case here. Great and little
“ strategists ” (especially in France, Russia, and Austria) have in this
order been able to recognize Moltke only as a strategical methodist,
who allowed too little for the unforeseen in strategy. On easily
intelligible grounds there has formerly been no inclination to oppose
these views. These grounds have now lost their value, and history
may claim her rights. I shall examine the order from this point of
view, and it will then appear how unfounded the written and the
spoken opinions are, how this order for the operations took full
account of the unforeseen, and in how high a degree it, under the not
altogether harmonious circumstances which prevailed at the time of
its issue, is and will remain always a work of art.
The order was issued at 2 p.m., at an hour when there was as yet
no certainty with regard to the movements or the intentions of the
enemy. How is this early hour to be explained ? The king had
been on the Flavigny heights since 6 a.m. Pont a Mousson is
about 14 miles, as the crow flies, from this height, and the king had
come from there; thus, considering the age of the royal leader, the
*30 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
dav had by 2 p.m. been already a very hard one, and a desire to take
rest is quite intelligible. What the coming day might bring forth
lay hidden in the future ; but in any case the Germans intended to
.attack, and thus fresh exertions would be called for on the part of the
king, of a kind which would, as a rule, be too great for a man of his
age" Considering this, not only temporary but as far as possible
•complete rest was desirable for the king on the 1 7th of August. But
neither temporary nor complete rest could, considering his great age,
be obtained in the neighbourhood of Flavigny, since there was no
suitable accommodation for the head-quarters, and the larger build-
ings in the immediate vicinity were full of wounded. Shelter for the
nio-ht could certainly have been found in Nove’ant, which was much
nearer than Pont a Mousson, and which had good communications ;
but, since it was not possible to remain on the field of battle, the
greater distance to the latter place was accepted in addition. Since
this decision was arrived at on grounds which, considering the cir-
cumstances, were intelligible, it was necessary to make a timely
return to Pont a Mousson in order that the required rest should not
be too long delayed.
The direct consequence of all this was the very early issue
2 p.m.) of the orders at Flavigny. The head-quarters thus moved on
the 17th from Pont a Mousson to Flavigny and back, and returned
the 18th from Pont a Mousson to Flavigny; thus in exactly 24
hours it moved 42i miles in rear of the armies. On the other hand,
*t is nearly 9 miles from Flavigny to Auboue. A general, such as
Napoleon L, who was in the habit of himself observing the enemy,
would on the 17th of August have ridden to Auboud and back (17J-
miles), and would in this case have learnt almost everything on that
day. The time available after 3 p.m., the hour of the evacuation of
Gravelotte, would have fully sufficed for this. Moreover, according
the order of 2 p.m., the 2nd Army was to move in the zone between
Flavigny and Auboud
A younger general would also have awaited on the field the receipt
-of the last reports, and would perhaps have spent the night between
the 17th and the 18th of August among his troops. It was impossible
to ask so much in the present case. For the last reports are not
usually so distinct that a conclusion can be drawn from them, without
having the result of the day before one, while this implies that the
night is broken into, since the result of the day cannot be known
until the evening. When the above-mentioned order was issued at
Flavigny, Rezonville had been (at 11 am.) abandoned by the French,
but Gravelotte and Yerneville were still occupied by them up to 3 p.m.
The order of 2 p.m. seems, therefore, to have been too early as regards
its time of issue, while with respect to the position of the enemy it
was written under premature and uncertain conditions. This is true ;
but it is also true that Moltke recognized this, and allowed for it in
his draft. It is, of course, necessary to understand how to read
between the lines of his strategy.
This must be clearly but very briefly shown. Ever since daylight
<on the 17 th the French line of outposts had . been seen, in part from
DISPOSITIONS OF THE GERMANS. 31
Flavigny, to extend from Rezonville to Bruville. This Prince Frederic
Charles knew from 430 a.m., and the king from 6 a.m. At a later
hour, from about 6 a.m., heavy white clouds of dust were visible from
Flavigny, and continued visible until the afternoon; these clouds
passed from the west towards the east. In the mean time not only
were these clouds to be seen from Flavigny, but also repeated crowd-
ings and passages of troops in and around Rezonville; these arose
from the corps (mentioned in the preceding chapter), which were
falling back on Gravelotte. It was certainly impossible to determine
from Flavigny what units of troops were marching towards the east :
but both Prince Frederic Charles and the king must have been
perfectly aware that they were strong masses, and that they were
moving in the direction of Metz. The distance between Flavigny and
Rezonville is about 2200 yards, and the above knowledge was pos-
> sessed before 11 a.m., the hour of the completion of the evacuation of
Rezonville, Colonel von Wartensleben had been allowed by the very
highest authority. to inform General von Steinmetz (1st Army) that
it had been ascertained from Flavigny that “ the enemy, who is in
great part withdrawing upon Metz, is still in possession of Rezonville
and Gravelotte ” : this must, therefore, have been before 11 a.m. As
far as the generals who were at Flavigny could see and judge from
that place, they had a full knowledge, and had formed an accurate
judgment, on all the above points concerning the enemy. This is very
important. The same generals left the cavalry here, that is to say
close up to the enemy, and troopers sent forward towards Rezonville
continued to receive tire from that place up to 11 a.m. ; in other
words, the enemy was still there. The same was the case when the
enemy had abandoned Rezonville, and the cavalry endeavoured to
observe him at Gravelotte ; but before this took place the order for
the movements had been issued.
On the other hand, it was impossible to see from Flavigny what
the enemy were doing towards the north. This was an opportunity
for officers’ patrols. But these seem to have been scarcely used at
all, while the pushing forward of whole squadrons, as has been said
over and over again, was quite out of place. Scouts sent forward at
this point brought back very contradictory reports ; some said “ the
enemy is retiring on Jarny,” while others stated that the retirement
was “on the road to Verne ville/V that is to say, in two entirely
opposed directions. If these reports had been compared at Flavigny
0 with what had been there observed and fixed, taking into considera-
tion the long duration of the French passage through Rezonville and
Gravelotte — from 5 a.m. to 2 p.m. — which had been observed by the
1st Army, and reported to Flavigny, even in the words, “ Artillery
are withdrawing through the infantry positions,” circumstances all
spoke in favour of a march on Verneville, unless the Germans were
prepared to believe in a division of the enemy’s forces. It remained
then only to decide what was going on at Verneville, and until this
had been decided without a doubt, no order should have been issued.
Little was done to find this out. About 8 a.m. it was reported that
i the enemy was standing on the west of Gravelotte, with, a cavalry
32
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
Proba-
bility and
improbar
bilitv of
the objects
of the
enemy.
brigade at Verneville. (It was not a cavalry brigade, but du BaraiFs
cavalry division). Count Haeseier, who was sent forward to recon-
noitre in consequence of this report, formed the impression that the
troops at Gravelotte were only a rear-guard ; in this he was right.
This must have been at about 11 a.m.
At 5.45 a.m. an enemy’s camp at Bruville was observed and
reported by the 11th Hussars. This was also quite correct; but
the second part of the report, which said that the troops were about
to march from St. Marcel or Verdun, was incorrect. Between 10 and
11 a.m. advanced patrols of the same regiment observed “clouds
of dust between Doncourt and Jouaville,” from which it was again
concluded that the retirement was on Metz. This was the only
information which General von Moltke had at his disposal at 2 p.m.
Even though the French movement on Verneville was exactly and
correctly perceived on the strength of the last report, it was still
possible for the German head-quarters, in consequence of the other
repeated reports, to believe in the march on Jarny. This important
portion of the task remained, unfortunately, uncertain, ill-executed,
and unfinished.
On this point Moltke says : —
a The reports which were received from the cavalry up to noon were-
partly contradictory; they did not enable an opinion to be formed whether
the French were concentrating on Metz, or whether they were retiring by
the two roads which still remained open, by Etain and Briey. ISTo move-
ments of attack were, however, observed.”
And further
44 Already by 9 a.m. the Saxon cavalry division had reached the road
to Etain to the west of Conflans, and had reported that no enemy except
stragglers were there visible, from which it might be concluded that the
French had not continued their retreat on the 17th.
They might, however, have wished to do so on the 18th.
Since Moltke thus judged the case, the order for the operations
had to take into account both a concentration of the French at Metz,
and a possible retreat of the army, or of a part of it, on the 18th.
Therefore the above report was especially important with regard to
the wording of the order issued.
The selection of the position for the liead-quarters at Flavigny,
and the long time that they remained there, from 6 a.m. on the 17th
to 2 p.m. on the 18th, can be explained by the fact that, up to
10.30 a.m. on the 18th the head-quarters believed rather in a retreat
of the enemy in a northerly direction, than in his presence in the
neighbourhood of Metz. It was not until the battle had grown hot
that the head-quarters placed themselves in rear of the 1st Army.
With regard to the question which is disputed among many critics,
whether it was possible for Marshal Bazaine to have moved to the
north or the north-west after the 16th, either with his whole army
or with a part, no higher authority can be quoted in favour of an
unqualified affirmative than Field-Marshal Moltke himself, whose
DISPOSITIONS OP THE GERMANS.
order of 2 pan. on the 17th accepted this idea to the fullest extent.
This I mention onlyby the way. Whether, on the other hand, it
was right to so consider it, and yet to order nothing which might
stop, disturb, or delay the retreat which was taking place, is a
question which must be answered later. As far as the Germans
were concerned, it would have been, theoretically, more promising to
hold the enemy fast, than to allow him to draw off*, in order to over-
take him after concentration. Experience teaches us that retreating
armies move faster than those which, pursue, and, therefore, if the
French had marched well, it would have been necessary for the
Germans to give up, in the first place, the concentration of the 17th,
unless it was expected to fight the French to the south of the Orne.
General von Moltke represented a school — indeed, he was himself
the school. He thus regarded everything which the enemy could
and must do from the point of view of this school. According to this
school, the enemy was to be expected to do that which would he of
the greatest advantage to him ; on the other hand, Moltke had, at
that time, no reason to imagine that Bazaine would he guided by
political considerations. An approach towards Metz, with the object
of forcing on a decision close to that place, must of necessity expose
the French to distinct strategical disadvantages. That Bazaine
should do such a thing appeared to the great strategist Moltke in no
way to be counted on, just as Napoleon I., in the days before Jena,
thought it incredible that the Prussians would remain behind the
Saale. Napoleon at the time determined, and held to his determina-
tion, to fight the Prussians at Gera. He notoriously governed all his
operations against the Prussians by this consideration, and was unable
to believe in the occurrence of the most improbable until lie had
failed to find the Prussians at Gera. Then he certainly swung round
to the left, developed an astonishing activity and mobility, and
thereby personally threw light upon the situation. As a matter of
fact, the French, up to the 18th of August, 1870, had always done
the most unlikely thing; they had done that which strategically
might bring them into the very greatest danger, and no general, such
as Napoleon or Moltke, could believe this without proofs. We must
always, if we wish to judge justly, keep before our eyes a quite
correct conception of what the enemy should have done. This must
be the starting-point.
Moltke’s order of 2 p.m. on the 17th was founded upon this, and
Moltke expected the enemy to do what was correct, and held fast to
this expectation, exactly as Napoleon I. did at Gera.
The order for the movement was, however, so drawn up that it
must on the 18th of August lead the Germans past the French, though
not to the same extent as was the case with Napoleon I. and the
Prussians, in 1806. This was, therefore, less worthy of blame in
Moltke than in Napoleon I.; and no real criticism is possible until
we consider the personal omissions of the head-quarters, whose part,
under such conditions, in front of an existing position, will be exactly
the same a thousand years lienee as it was with Napoleon I. on the
13th and 14th of October, 1806. The method of leading in war does
- i
fcL
3t TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE'S STRATEGY.
Choice of
the post
for the
quarters.
not affect the question in any way. When Napoleon I. saw that. he
had made a mistake, he gave himself no rest until he had remedied,
his error, and that before the battle. Moltke did nothing of the kind
before the battle. If he and his royal master had, however, been
thirty years younger, they would also have acted as Napoleon I. did
before the battle, and they would have been able to correct their
mistaken views more quickly and more easily than he did, since the
distances were much shorter than that between Gera and Jena, while
circumstances were also more clear, the days were longer, and the
means for giving direction and information were much more numerous
and better trained. Though we may not blame Moltke because he
refused to believe in what was most improbable, until he had been
convinced that the enemy really intended it, still we must not refuse
to allot blame that so much time was required to show that what
was most improbable was what was going to happen. This was due
to omissions on the part of the whole machinery of reconnaissance,
both as regards the arm specially detailed for it, the cavalry, and
also the generals and their General Staff officers. The most incredible
things come to pass in war. A methodical mind finds great difficulty
in dealing with them ; a conscientious man finds this, always more
•difficult than does a daring and nomad conqueror. The incredible
and the unforeseen twice puzzled Moltke; before the decision to
march upon Sedan, and even while that march was going on, he was
•observed to hold strongly to that which the enemy ought to have
•done, until at last all doubt became impossible. At Gravelotte
Moltke marched past the French, although since the 16th an un-
broken fire-fight had raged upon the right flank ; before the opera-
tions upon Sedan the two enemies nearly marched by each other.
Any one who has been on the ground knows that Flavigny, if
the possibility of what actually happened were considered, and the
French did not continue their march, was much too far from Grave-
lotte, when Rezonville had been abandoned, about 11 a.m. What
then took place at Gravelotte could not be observed from Flavigny,
nor could anything be seen of the eastern heights of the Mance
Yalley, since Flavigny was a good 6600 yards from Gravelotte.
The hill did not afford the required facilities for observation in
all directions ; since before the issue of the orders the enemy were
believed to extend from Point du Jour to Leipzig, it would have been
well to ride forward from Flavigny in the direction of Verne ville,
in order from that point to examine La Folie and Montigny la Grange.
It could also have been discovered from the general staff* maps in
their possession that the heights to the south-west of that point
were the highest in the neighbourhood, and that it might be possible
from them to obtain an excellent view of everything, since the whole
country to the east and north-east of that point might be called
open and easy to be surveyed in comparison with the southern part
of the French position. This could certainly not have been done
before 2 p.m., but after that there still remained five or six hours
for a reconnaissance ! ' The hill of Y erne ville appears from that of
DISPOSITIONS OF THE GERMANS.
35
These considerations must not be held to be merely wisdom after
the event, nor are they only the theoretical fruit of the writing-table,
they concern matters which can be dealt with in the saddle, according
to place, time, and circumstances, things with which every general
would feel himself called upon to reckon, since they are the most
natural, and since they include in themselves the questions which
must be answered before anything further can be done. Another
omission of the same kind also took place. Action in the above
direction was the more simple, since it might have been guessed that
the commander of the 1st Army, General von Steinmetz, was at least
in the neighbourhood of Gravelotte, with the object of reconnoitring
the ground, or of having it reconnoitred from that point. It was
obvious from the map that the eastern heights of the Manee Valley
could be observed from Gravelotte ; as a matter of fact, General von
Steinmetz, during the afternoon of the 17th, obtained a sufficient and
complete view over the enemy who were in front of him ; this result
certainly did not reach the head-quarters until they had arrived again
at Pont a Mousson.
It is remarkable that the order for the movement which was Omission
issued at 2' p.m. refers really only to the 2nd Army, and that the commandor
1st Army, as such, is not named in it. This more particularly affected o£ the 1 st
General von Steinmetz, as the commander of the 1st Army, since Army ’
direct orders were given in it to two of his eorpvS (the 7th and 8th),
and the reasons for this were not added to the order.
The orders to the 2nd Army are most to be blamed. Se 2nd t0
We here miss the necessary clearness and exactness, and it is Army,
impossible to discover how far the 2nd Army was intended to
advance ; moreover, the order contains no distinct mandate. It is
impossible to find out from it whether the 2nd Army was to attack
or not ; for the order says only, “ advance to.”
All this was neither forgotten nor overlooked by Moltke, but
these things were intentionally not mentioned, and the order was
intentionally written exactly in this manner and not otherwise. It
is also quite clear and exact, though certainly with a silent sup-
position which is not mentioned in the order, namely, thaj} the
enemy is rather to the northward than to the eastward. The 7th
Corps is at first “ to cover the movement on the side of Metz/’ When
the 2nd Army and the 8th Corps of the 1st took up their direction
towards the north, not as a position, but as a march, how ought
the 7th Corps to carry out this covering? Was it to remain halted,
or not ? As it stood at 2 p.m. on the 17th — Ars-sur-Moselle, Vaux,
the Manee mill, and the northern edge of the Bois de Vaux — it could %
cover nothing, though certainly since early on the 17th General von
Steinmetz knew from Count Wartensleben that “the 7th Corps was
to advance on Gravelotte/’ From the fact that the 8th Corps, in
accordance with the later order, was “to follow the movement on
the right flank,” General von Steinmetz might very well conclude
that the 7th was not to close up to the former corps, but was to
remain halted facing towards Metz, otherwise probably the 7th Corps
would not alone have been named. Steinmetz thus read the order!
M *4*
if ',il
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
1 shall show later on that Moltbe did not mean it to he so under-
stood, since at 4 a.m. of the 18th of August Moltke answered, “ The
concentration . . . can only he carried out to the front.” Moltke
therefore intended the “covering” not to take place until after one
inarch ; that is to say, after the passage of the valley of the Mance
from the neighbourhood of Gravelotte. It is, however, under the
governing circumstances, no disadvantage that the order does not
contain this information. Again, the 7th Corps was not to cover the
movement throughout, but only “at the beginning.” This was a
fresh stumbling-block to General von Steinmetz. Since the expres-
sion, “at the beginning,” seemed to him to imply another later
movement, perhaps a march by which it would close up to the 8th
Corps, or possibly an energetic attack towards Metz, etc.
The direction of the march of the 2nd Army and of the 8th Corps
makes another important matter evident, namely, that Moltke, at
2 p.m. on the 17th of August, believed that the enemy was (i.) in
a northerly direction, and (ii.) on the hither side of the One. The
direction of the march teaches us that the first was the case; the
second is proved by the remark of Prince Frederic Charles, who,
when he issued his orders, said that it was a matter of “ only a few'
miles of march.” Since Moltke, at 2 p.m. on the 17th of August,
assumed that the enemy was in a northerly direction, he neither
gave an object for the march, nor any other instruction than “to
advance” and “to push on.” Matters were not altogether clear on
the right, and, in order that in this direction, also, everything might
go well, the “ advance in echelon from the left ” was ordered. Moltke
certainly anticipated the results which the “Official Account” con-
siders to have been due to this, namely, that this order ensured the
possibility, either of obliging the enemy to fight, with Belgium lying
only two days' marches in his rear, or to do the same, by wheeling
to the east, in case the foe had fallen back upon Metz. In any case
this intention might have been later attributed to it without any
difficulty, since the armies which were concentrated for this purpose
in Moltke's hand actually succeeded in carrying it all out. But
therein lay the genius of the order, and without these considerations
it would not have been drawn up as it was.
Could Moltke,, then, at 2 p.m. on the 17th of August, really and
decidedly reckon that the enemy, after the costly action of the 16th,
,F would take up a position near Metz ? Could he anticipate that
the enemy would run short of ammunition and supplies, and that
he would consider his army to be in no fit condition to fight again
in the open field on the 17th, 18th, or 19th ? To say nothing of
Bazaine’s political schemes; hut no one could know them at that
time. It was undoubtedly right, strategically speaking, to expect to
find the enemy to the northward, since that was the direction in
which the movement of the enemy was likely to have the least
dangerous consequences. * Moreover, so long as it was not proved
that the enemy was not in the north, Moltke acted on a correct
strategical idea ; indeed, he had nothing but his own ideas to guide
him as to where the enemy retired when he abandoned his positions
tfo b *
DISPOSITIONS OF THE GERMANS.
37
of the 16th. In this matter Moltke undoubtedly made a mistake.
If from Rezonville as a centre a circle be described, with a radius
equal to the distance between that place and Ville sur Yron, it
will fall somewhere about St. Ail, and will have a diameter of 6J
miles. Although the 8th Corps was directed to “ close up to the
right flank of the 2nd Army,” it was undoubtedly implied that the
right flank of the 2nd Army would remain at Rezonville, and that
the probable point of junction of the 8th Corps lay, and was intended
to lie, at that place ; but since the 2nd Army was to advance between
Rezonville and Ville sur Yron, and was thus to move, it must of
necessity leave Rezonville behind it. Nevertheless, Goeben cleverly
and luckily got over this difficulty, for he moved upon Rezonville,
from which point he could act as circumstances might require. As
a matter of fact, the right wing of the 2nd Army (the 9 th Corps)
moved as far as the neighbourhood of Caulre Farm, with the object
of there changing front to the east.
Considering the unfavourable character of the situation, and under No men-
the pressure of the then existing circumstances, it is remarkable ^ ^ ^
that there is in the order not a single word with respect to the cavalry,
employment of the cavalry, and no mention of reconnaissance or
scouting. If it be said that this should have been naturally the
duty of the two army staffs, we must, on the other hand, protest
against this idea, as a matter of principle, under the circumstances.
In support of this opinion we may quote how Napoleon would have
behaved under such conditions, and this must be accepted as a
pattern for all time. In such cases the head-quarters must assume
the command of the independent cavalry, and must supply the army
staffs with the latter. This is exactly what happened after Grave-
lotte. But the cavalry, on the 17th, not only received no orders from
the head-quarters, but were even drawn back behind the deployed
2nd Army. Thus the 2nd Army also forgot to make use of them
at the very moment when, if they had been suitably employed, full
information might have been obtained in a few hours, and when
the results of their action might have been easily reported to the
ruling powers, if the latter had remained on the scene of action, and,
even as things were, might have been sent to Pont a Mousson by
10 p.m. Unfortunately, General Von Steinmetz also was already in
Ars by 4 p.m. ; it is uncertain at what hour Prince Frederic Charles
took up his quarters at Buxieres.
Everything considered, there is in truth not one of the orders The order
signed by Moltke which is, given the time and the circumstances, so a e % b°* of
entirely opposed to his idea of what such things should be as this is ;
yet if we realize the considerations which governed its issue, the order
of 2 p.m. is, always excepting the omission to mention the employment
of the cavalry, a work of genius, which shows us how Moltke so
thoroughly understood how to act in an unfavourable situation, that
he on the one hand took into account the consequences of the age of
the royal leader, without, on the other, jeopardizing anything for the
following day. These two considerations exclude any agreement
which could be in all respects harmonious. So far, however, as human
"Will life
. i t Mi ■ i
.
88
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
I
The space
available.
The ex-
planation.
genius could suffice for such a task, Moltke’s foresight and grasp of
the situation were equal to the demands made on them;
The space between Bezonville and Ville-sur-Yron, about 6 £ miles,
was certainly scarcely enough for five army-corps and four cavalry
divisions, though, owing to the advance being made by massed corps
in echelon, this was of less importance. Moreover, the direction laid
down took careful account of very various strategical points of view.
For if the enemy were found on the 1 8th in the direction of the Orne,
he could be duly met ; while, if he happened to be on the right flank of
the 2nd Army as it marched, it was possible to wheel to meet him.
Neither the one case nor the other could, supposing that sufficient
means existed for carrying orders, cause any great difficulty ; while
al though the order was issued before the situation was clear, and thus,
in the second case, it was not so effective against Bazaine’s true and
actual position (as it showed itself later on), yet the front of march
of the 2nd Army, even if it was wheeled as soon as at Bezonville,
would reach to St. Ail,
Moltke speaks as follows concerning his intentions on the 17th : —
“The dispositions for the fight which was expected on the 18th of
August had to take account of two possible cases.
“ In order to meet both, the left wing had to advance in a northerly
direction against the first line of retreat which was still open to the
French, that is, to Don court. If the enemy was caught actually on the
march, he was to be immediately attacked and held fast, while the right
wing was to come up afterwards in support*
“If, however, the enemy remained near Metz, the left wing* was to
change front to the east, and to turn the flank of his position from the
north, while the right wing, until the above became possible, was to carry
on only a delaying fight. In this’ case, owing to the wide circumferential
movement of part of the army, the battle would presumably not be decided
until late in the day. 'Moreover, it would be fought under the unusual
condition, that thus both sides would engage facing to their rear, and
would, to begin with, abandon their communications. By this the conse-
quences of victory or of defeat would he greatly enhanced, though in this
respect the French had the advantage of being based upon a large fortress
which could aid them in various ways.
“The resolution was fixed, and the order for the advance by echelons
from the left was issued from Flavigny as early as 2 p.m. The direction
of the individual corps during the battle was to depend upon the
information received.”
We can add nothing to this ; and only those who have not
sufficient time to study the question in Moltke’s writings will object
to the words “as early as,” since they are full of self-criticism.
It must be admitted that the varying strategical conditions
demanded corresponding measures on the part of the 2nd Army.
Unfortunately the explanation entirely neglected to say so on the
17th of August, and consequently on the 18th, serious vacillation and
complications arose which caused considerable loss of time. Since
this army was to play an active part, was to move, and was to hold
the enemy, or to attack him by a change of front, their peculiar task
DISPOSITIONS OP THE GEBMANS.
39
should have been, especially considering the uncertain condition of the
general situation, to obtain the most trustworthy information possible,
in order to make sure that the later orders should be judicious and
suitable. This was neglected. No doubt this was to some extent due
to the consideration that an action might thus be brought about on
the 17th, an event which was by no means desired by the Germans.
But too much importance was attributed to this consideration ; there
was a reprehensible backwardness in seeing and reporting, with the
result that nothing was done on the 17th to elucidate the situation,
Moltke himself considered his order of 2 p.m. as somewhat
insufficient. He says in the order, “ The further instructions of his
Majesty the King will depend upon the action of the enemy.” Was
not this a distinct invitation to both armies to ascertain and report
in time the <f action of the enemy ” ? Everything in the then situation
depended upon that ! For only when this had been done could fuller
directions be given, or the real orders for the battle be given. In the
hope, and with the reasonable expectation that full information would
be obtained, Moltke wished to be back again at Flavigny by the
early morning of the 18th, and thence to issue the Sf further
instructions.”
When the order of 2 p.m. reached General von Steinmetz, the general |^ e t ^ der
— according to the £e Official Account” — had taken the requisite (?) operations,
steps to carry out the task of the 7th Corps, and its arrival necessitated and
but small alterations.* General von Steinmetz, moreover, was much ^ era
enraged at the contents of the order. He considered this treatment Steinmetz.
of an army commander as “ wanting in consideration,” and that if it
was proposed to thus pass over the army commander and address
orders to the army-corps, an army command would become useless.
Of his army there really remained only one corps under his command,
since the 1st Corps was withdrawn from his direct sphere of influence,
and the 8th Corps was entirely taken from him.
It was not necessary to have two generals in command of the 7th
Corps, and he had no army left. What was he there for, then ?
Steinmetz was one of those generals who consider that they have an
inalienable right to any corps which has once been placed under them ;
as soon as any part of these is taken from them for a shorter or a
longer time, they consider themselves injured, and oppose everything.
Glaiisewitz mentions this as an argument against the introduction of
any intermediate position between the supreme commander and the
corps, and in the case of such generals as Steinmetz he is right.
Before his return to Ars, the general had, from the south of Gravelotte,
examined the enemy’s position at Point du Jour and Moseou, had
noticed much action and . movement there, and from the skilful
fortification of the ground, which he had seen to be in progress at
3 p.m., had concluded that the enemy would neither attack nor fall
back, but was rather preparing himself to resist an attack. The
masses of the enemy which he had himself observed, especially con-
sidering their nearness and concentration, might, so thought the
* By this is to be understood the pushing forward of two battalions of the 53rd to the
north-east border of the Bois de Vaux. See later on.
¥ d
T>
40
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
Disposi-
tions of
General
von
Steinmetz
for the
morning of
the 1.8 th
of August.
general, prepare many difficulties for the 7th Corps, which alone lie
had at his disposal, and which was in a very unfavourable tactical-
geographical situation; indeed, the general considered its condition to
be actually endangered, after the 8th Corps, which was at Gorze, had
been withdrawn from his command by the order which was received
at 4 p.m.
General von Steinmetz first informed his army of the order which /
had been received, and, at 6.30 p.m., specially directed tlie^Ml Corps //
to be in the following positions by 5 a.m. on the 18th of August, and
to hold them to the uttermost: —
1st and 2nd Battalions of the 53rd Regiment and the 7th Jager
Battalion, on the northern edge of the Bois de Yaux.
1st and 2nd Battalions of the 77th Regiment on the border of the
Bois des Ognons which is advanced towards Gravelotte.
In rear the Fusilier Battalion of the 53rd Regiment.
The remainder of the 11th Division in the Mance Valley to the
south of the Mance mill.
The Corps Artillery and the greater part of the 13th Division in
the valley to the west of Ars.
The 26th Brigade, one battery, and one squadron, General von
Steinmetz reserved under his special command, posting them part in
Ars and part lower down the Moselle.
The outposts were towards Yaux.
Thus the 7th Corps fronted to the north and east, and the enemy
was on its right flank, about on a level with the 53rd and the 77th.
The greater part of the corps was enclosed in two valleys, separated by
large and scarcely passable forests, and the tactical situation was thus
certainly not favourable, for a serious and energetic advance of the
French might have had for a time most unpleasant consequences for the
corps, which was thus divided and scarcely capable of being deployed.
The 8th Corps was in and near Gorze, about miles as the crow
flies to the west of the 14th Division, and separated from the latter
by difficult tract of wooded country, while it was, moreover, with-
drawn from the generals command. Before any support could come
up from this side a disaster might very well have befallen the 7th
Corps, since General von Steinmetz had no force beyond that corps,
at the very moment when by the position of events lie seemed to be
thrown upon his own resources. Though the general’s uneasiness
might perhaps seem to have good grounds, there are situations both
in tactics and in strategy which cannot always be dealt with “according
to rule,” in which something must be dared and endured, and which
may well beget a feeling of discomfort. In these cases we must trust
a little to luck. The situation in question was of this character. It
was bad enough that an army-corps should find itself in such a
plight; but, the more troops were so situated, the worse would the
look-out he for them. The highly gifted Moltke doubtless felt this,
and this may well have been the real reason why he, in this hour of
tension, withdrew the 8tli Corps from Steinmetz; of this the latter
was himself probably conscious. This we may conclude from the fact
that his irritation reached its height after 4 p.m. on the 17th of August.
DISPOSITIONS OF THE GERMANS.
41
After issuing the orders given above, General von Steinmetz Reports
reported accordingly to the bead-quarters at Pont a Mousson, and
added to the statement the observations (which have been already von em
given), which he had made in the afternoon from the south of
Gravelotte. This document arrived at the head- quarters during the T '° ' e ‘
night, after Moltke had retired to rest. Here is another proof of
the great disadvantage which is brought about by placing head-
quarters too far from the field of action. If conditions had been
better arranged, all written orders and reports would have been
unnecessary, since the head-quarters and the army-commands might
very well have communicated directly. In that case, however, they
must certainly have all three remained in the neighbourhood of the
enemy. Moltke, at 4 a.m. on the 18th of August, answered, among
other matters
“The 7th Corps will at first maintain a defensive attitude. Its
connection with the 8th can only be made to the front. Should it then
appear that the enemy’s army is retiring on Metz, we shall carry out
a change of front to the right. The 1st Army will he supported, if
necessary, by the 2nd Line of the 2nd Army,”
It follows from the above that General von Moltke did not regard
the situation as serious. He, who had already, since 2 p.m. on the
1 7th, six corps concentrated under his hand, while the seventh (the
2nd) was sure to arrive on the 18th, might, indeed, hold the great
danger, which Steinmetz dreaded, to be impossible. Since, even if the
7th Corps were overthrown, the force which he had at his disposal
would have been amply sufficient to snatch his partial victory from
the enemy, wherever he might be found ; Moltkes strategical object
attained, he could, at the moment when Steinmetz saw danger
ahead, no longer fail ; and even worse things, such as really arose on
the 18th, could scarcely come to pass. Steinmetz, in his communica-
tion, seems to have wished the 8th Corps to be recalled and placed
more to the east. A truer judgment showed Moltke that “the
connection with the 8th Corps must’ be made to the front.” More-
over, it was not the 8th Corps which was to seek for connection
with the 7th, but the 7th with the 8th. Steinmetz fell yet more
into the role of a follower; he felt the force of his mightier leader,
and his anger increased accordingly. “ To the front,” meant at
Gravelotte. If the situation of the 7th Corps was considered by
General von Steinmetz as being so “dangerous,” he had it in his
power to improve it by moving as quickly as possible out of the
Mance Valley. Steinmetz had done this magnificently in 1866. It
must obviously be done, if he was to serve as the pivot for a deploy-
ment. But such a pivot could not be found at Ars, nor on the Moselle,
nor in the wooded ground ; it must lie at a tactical point, that is to
say, at Gravelotte and its neighbourhood. The earlier General von
Steinmetz reached that point with the main portion of the 7th
Corps the better, and so much the earlier would he be able to
maintain an effective defensive, which should have been the object in
this case, and for which his present position afforded no opportunity,
42
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
liistorico-
strategical
importance
of Molfcke’s
answer of
4 a. m. on
the 18th of
August.
Gravel otte
as a pivot
and as a
point of
attack.
since the space was insufficient. But, in order to quiet General von
Steinmetz, Moltke allowed him to believe in his being supported by
the 2nd Line of the 2nd Army.
But General von Steinmetz did not yet lose his misgivings with
regard to the valley of the Moselle, and at 7 a.m., on the 18th of
August, General von Manteuffel (1st Corps) received an order “to
push forward a brigade of infantry and some batteries to Vaux, but
beyond the zone of effect of the fortress, in order to be able from the
right hank of the Moselle to take in flank any possible attack upon
Ars.” We may remark, in passing, that this brigade came up into
the position which was laid clown for it.
Moltke’s answer of 4 a.m. on the 18th of August is so far of*
historical importance that therein, for the first time, appears the
ruling idea of the subsequent battle and of its result, the surrender
of the French army and of Metz ; others may have thought of this
before, but I maintain that Moltke first put it into words. The
enemy did not, indeed, fall back into Metz, and this hypothesis was
not exactly realized ; that he did so retire was the consequence of
the battle ; but, nevertheless, the enemy was then found in a position
which rendered the change of front to the right a necessity. More-
over, the answer is of value as regards the course of the action, since
the 7th Corps was not ordered to take up the defensive, but only to
maintain a “defensive attitude/' and that only “at first." The
question of “supporting if necessary” leads to the conclusion that
Moltke did not intend that the 7th Corps should remain on the
defensive. In short, the maintenance of the defensive had especially
to do with the change of front, and was intended to cover a move-
ment rather than to be a part of the fight itself after that movement
had been completed ; it was of a strategical rather than of a tactical
nature.
The march of the 2nd Army on the front Rezonville-Yille-sur-
Yron, with which the 8th Corps was to conform on the right flank,
moreover, increased for General von Steinmetz his feeling of isolation
in the country, so unfavourable for the development of an action,
which lies by the Moselle and the Mance, and this the more, in his
opinion, since in their movement the 2nd Army and the 8th Corps
would get further and further from the 7th the later they found the
enemy, while he had not been informed in the order of 2 p.m. of the
1.7th, where the 7th Corps was to “cover the movement at the com-
mencement against any attack from Metz." Two cases might arise :
the enemy might break out in the valley of the Moselle, either in
front of or towards Gravelotte. In the first case, the German com-
munications would certainly be cut, but the army would not be
directly attacked; in the second, on the other hand, the blow would
fall direct on the right flank. This, of course, left out of consideration
the small probability of the 'first case, and the certainly equal
unlikelihood of the second, since the French had voluntarily abandoned
Gravelotte at 3 p.m. on the 17th. For, if the French had had any
intention of an attack in force in this direction, they must have
retained their hold on Gravelotte. Their voluntary surrender of this
DISPOSITIONS OP THE GERMANS.
48
point was the clearest possible indication of tlieir true intention, and
the generals, von Moltke and von Steinmetz, had the same opportunity
of realizing this then as we have to-day.
From this point of view the situation of the 7th Corps was not
then really dangerous, though General von Steinmetz considered it
to be so. This was so much the less the case, since the country
between Ars and the Mance mill was just as disadvantageous to the
French as for us, and equally unsuited to their tactical action as to
ours. General von Steinmetz had nothing worse to dread than the
temporary loss of Ars, and the consequent forced retirement of the
troops there by a roundabout way upon Ancy-sur-Moselle or Nov^ant;
in other words, that the 7th Corps might be cut in two. It could, at
any rate, certainly escape! Considering this, General von Steinmetz
must naturally have come to the conclusion that Gravelotte and no
other place must be the pivot, and that he ought therefore to reach
this place, to occupy it, and to hold it as soon as possible with the
mass of his Corps; everything else followed as a matter of course,
including a sufficient connection with the other parts of the army,
since he must have felt certain that the head-quarters would provide
for this in the early morning of the 18th.
Tactically speaking, General von Steinmetz, in my opinion, made
a mistake, in that, though he considered the situation of the 7th
Corps to be dangerous, he did not, as soon as he was certain that
Gravelotte had been abandoned (3 p.m.), at once strongly occupy that
place on the 17th of August. This must have been done in force, but
General von Steinmetz left his troops in the narrow valleys, while
if there lay any danger anywhere, it lay in the fact that they were
thus hemmed in. What was the use of keeping an army-corps for
twenty-four hours in narrow valleys, where it could not deploy?
The sooner it got out of these valleys the better for it. But General
von Steinmetz then regarded Ars as much more important than
Gravelotte, and therein was his mistake. The object of Molfcke’s
beautiful strategical combination was to pass the Moselle, in order to
make use of the advantages of the inner line. If the enemy did
break out on the right bank of the Moselle, General von Manteuffel
(1st Corps) had been directed on the evening of the 17th to fall back
on Remilly. General von Moltke had thus carefully borne in mind
all dangers which could arise.
At 9 a.m. on. the 17th, the 28th Infantry Brigade, which was Criticism
marching at the head of the I4th Division, and was moving from Ars- po^fons 3 "
sur-Moseile upon Gravelotte, had been fired on in the neighbourhood and of the
of the second Mance mill, and General von Steinmetz, who at that
moment had come up to the head of that brigade, consequently von
ordered an attack to be made on the woods which lay in front of Steinmetss#
them, so that the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 77th, and the 1st
and 2nd battalions of the 53rd, had to clear and to occupy the Bois
de Vaux. The fusilier battalion of the 53rd followed the 77th as
a reserve. These battalions carried out their task ; the first two
occupied the northern edge of the Bois des Ognons, and the latter
two the north-east border of the Bois de Vaux, opposite to the hill
I
5.1
44 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
marked 1081. The' 1st and 2nd battalions of the 53rd thus covered
the right dank of the line of march of the 7th Corps on Gravelotte,
whose exit from the Mance Valley was protected towards the front
by the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 77th, and the fusilier battalion
of the 53rd. This all took place while the French were moving into
their position for the 18th of August, and was tactically most unde-
sirable to them, since this state of affairs must have given the French
reason to fear that the Germans would fall upon their columns of
march during the movement. The Germans had no such intention,
and were besides too weak in numbers for the purpose ; but the fact
is mentioned in order to show that the French had at this point,
on the 17th, v as good reason as the Germans to avoid a serious
encounter.
Even before the French evacuated Gravelotte, General von
Steinrnetz had himself carefully followed what they did and left
undone, and continued his observation after the surrender of that
village. The impressions which he thus gained, and which he fully
reported, were altogether correct. But if Steinrnetz was convinced
by noon on the 17th of August that the French did not intend
to retreat, but meant to stay where they were and prepare for battle,
lie ought, especially after the receipt of the order of 2 p.m. on the
17th, not only (as he quite rightly did) to have reported his impres-
sions to the head-quarters, but should also have taken personally
the greatest possible trouble to keep himself, by means of his own
observation, up to the mark with regard to what was going oil,
and to make every preparation to attack in the best possible manner
(if by any chance this became necessary) that position of the enemy
which he had himself reconnoitred and criticized.
The light of the 53rd on the north-east border of the Bois
de Vaux never really ceased after 9 a.m. on the 17th, since the
troops of both sides continued to fire on each other up to the
beginning of the battle; on the other hand, nothing of importance
occurred in the direction of Gravelotte after the evacuation of that
village at 3 p.m.
If General von Steinrnetz believed at 4 p.m. on the 17th that
the French would aw r ait an attack, he ought either to have decided
himself, or allowed others to decide, how best to advance against
the line Eozerieulles — the quarry of the same name, whether the
north-east border of the Bois de Vaux was sufficiently strongly
occupied for the performance of this duty, and to cover the previous
march of the 7th Corps through the Mance Valley, whether any
practicable roads (and, if so, which and for what arms) led through
the Bois de Vaux, etc.; in short, everything of importance ought
to have been reconnoitred and prepared. Owing to circumstances,
Steinrnetz had become in a high degree the director of events and
the guide to action. Steinrnetz, at least to a certain extent, had
an opportunity ^ of judging from the neighbourhood of Gravelotte
as to the condition of affairs in and around Point de Jour, while
the map must have already shown him that the south front of
the French position was the most important, supposing that the
H; >i s
DISPOSITIONS OF THE GERMANS.
4.5
enemy were to be attacked, and that it therefore demanded special
attention. Three wood roads then ran from Ars to the Mance mill
in the direction of the height 1081. These roads must have been
well studied after the fight of the 58rd in the morning, and one
of them ought to have been at once made practicable for artillery ;
and the most convenient should have been selected. For this,
it is obvious, there was ample time, when we compare the few
hours which were available for the far more difficult work on
the “-Steiger,” which Napoleon had to carry out on the 13fch of
October, 1806. Moreover, the road leading to Vaux might have
been used; in which case, if it were determined to attack, strong
masses of artillery might have been advanced by both roads against
the south front of the French position, which might thus have
been easily made almost untenable. Unfortunately everything
necessary in this respect was left undone, though Steinmetz’s own
opinions pointed to this necessity, and such foresight and arrange-
ments were simply the logical deductions from his view of the
situation.
After the receipt of the order of 2 pan. General von Steinmetz
pushed forward the 7th Jager Battalion to reinforce the two
battalions of the 53rd in the Bois de Vaux ; he in other respects
made no change of importance in the then conditions of things.
It is hard to understand the meaning of this, for if he feared
an attack, this reinforcement was insufficient. If Steinmetz had
acted in accordance with the opinion which he had formed, he
would, immediately after the receipt of the order, have made the
following dispositions : —
“ 1. The whole of the 28th Infantry Brigade will advance to the
north-east edge of the Bois de Vaux, and will hold this under all
circumstances, in order to cover the valley of the Mance, and to
protect the corps artillery which must be used at a later period.
“2. The corps artillery will remain until further orders in Ars-
sur-Moselle.
“3. The 27th Infantry Brigade will cover Ars by taking up a
position in the direction of Vaux.
“ 4. The 25th Infantry Brigade will at once relieve the advanced
guard of the 28tli Brigade (three battalions of the 77th and 53rd)
in the direction of Gravelotte, and will take up their duty as regards
that village.
“ 5. The 26th Infantry Brigade will until further orders take up
a position near the Mance mill. (In order that they might, as was
probable, be used at a later hour from that point against the south
iront of the French position.)
“ 6. The artillery of the 1 3th and 14th Divisions will march at
6 a.m. on the 18th, in rear of the 25th Infantry Brigade, in the
direction of Gravelotte. The cavalry of both divisions will follow
them in the same direction, detaching one squadron to the infantry
of the 14th Division to carry reports.
46
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
■
If such dispositions had been made (which under the circum-
stances should obviously have been done), the 7th Corps, if an
advance were ordered on the 18th against the enemy’s position,
would have been in a condition to act energetically. The carrying
of orders, and the conveyance of information and of reports, would
have been suitably arranged for, while the requisite masses would
have been close at hand, and might have played their part as
occasion served.
Arrival of The night between the 1 7th and the 18th of August passed
von eml quietly along the front of the 1st Army; this was reported to the
Stemmed head -quarters, when they arrived at Fla vigny at 6 a.m. on the 18th.
fotte! aVe ’ It was equally quiet along the remainder of the front. General von
Steinmetz rode forward at 8 a.m. to the plateau to the south-west
of Gravelotte, after having received from Colonel von Unger a
report that the enemy’s position from Point du Jour to Leipzig
was unchanged. Considering the situation, General von Steinmetz
arrived somewhat lamentably late ! At 5 a.m. on the 18th, after
Gravelotte had been occupied by the 1st Battalion of the 77th
Regiment, the 14th Division had been posted to the north of the
Bois des Ognons, but “ concealed from the view of the enemy,” and
the 26th Brigade remained in Ars, while the rest of the 7th Corps
was advancing towards the plateau of Gravelotte. While standing
to the south-west of Gravelotte, General von Steinmetz received a
report which had been despatched by General von Goeben at 8 a.m.
from the neighbourhood of Rezonville, to the following effects —
“The 8th Corps advanced on Rezonville at 6 a.m. ; its advanced guard
is at Tillers aux Bois, in communication with the 9th Corps, which is
marching upon St. Marcel. Under these circumstances, the 8th Corps
will take up a position at Rezonville, in order to be able to move either
to the right or the left.”
This shows that General von Goeben had fully conformed to. the
order^of 2 k.m. on the 17th. If it was necessary to form front to
the : |e|i, hef was ready to do so, while if it was determined to push
‘ ards the north, he could follow in that direction. It was quite
right that General von Goeben, in spite of his being withdrawn from
the 1st Army command, should send this report, and this should
always be done in similar cases.
Arrival of Let us now turn our attention to the 2nd Army. Prince Frederic
Frederic Charles was already in the saddle at Mars la Tour at 5.30 a.m. He
Charles at was under the impression that -the enemy had retired on Conflans,
and therefore set his army in motion towards the north. His
Advance of measures were directed solely by this view of the case, otherwise
the 2nd the massing of the 2nd Army in echelons would have permitted
a change of front at the moment when such a movement might
become necessary, in which event the Guard Corps would not have
lost three hours by crossing the line of march of the 12th Corps,
owing to which the 2nd Army was fatally unable to move during
those, hours. On this point Moltke offers the following keen
criticism : —
DISPOSITIONS OP THE GERMANS.
47
“After the commander of the 2nd Army had ordered that the 12tli
Corps, although standing on the right, should move on the outermost
left flank, very considerable delay was caused by the crossing of the
two lines of march. The passage of the Saxons through Mars la Tour
was not over until 9 a.m., and the Guard Corps could not follow until
that hour.”
By taking up this direction of march (on Conflans), it might
have become necessary, even if the retreat of the French had been
carried out correctly, to make a change of front to the left. Herein
lies the great strategical difficulty of this day, with all its evil
consequences, namely, the difference between the views of the
head-quarters and those of the 2nd Army. The 2nd Army, owing
to the neighbourhood of Conflans (five miles to the north of Mars
la Tour), must have the better information, and a retreat of the
French on Conflans should, under these conditions, have been possible
only if reconnaissance was entirely neglected hv that army. Unfor-
tunately this was exactly the case. On the other hand, at the
head-quarters, a retreat on Conflans had been considered to be no
longer possible — at any rate, one by Auboud and Briey. A certain
discord of ideas between the head-quarters and this army-command
was also apparent here; this was not so great as that witli the
commander of the other army, and found its remedy in the massing
of the 2nd Army. It was necessary, and would have been possible,
to lay before the head-quarters, when they reached Flavigny at
6 a.m., a clear view of the situation — indeed, this was the main
task of the 2nd Army — but unfortunately this task was not fulfilled.
The commander of * the 2nd Army reported the details of this march
to the head-quarters from Vionville, and also that temporary halts
had been made at Caulre Farm, Doncourt, and Jarny. This action,
indeed, was so far in accordance with the order of 2 p.m. of the
17th of August.
At 8 a.m. the head-quarters had adopted the view that the main The. first
force of the enemy had fallen hack upon Metz, and extended to the ? dea 0± tlie
' liead-
aaorth as far as Amanvillers. Consequently a message was sent to quarters,
the 2nd Army by Lieut.-Oolonel von Verdy, “not to extend its left
so wide,” as had been reported. The head-quarters were, moreover,
waiting for some confirmation of their view. At this moment the
at
head-quarters were at Flavigny, the leader of the 2nd Army at
Vionville, and that of the 1st on the road to Gravelotte. All three,
as far as events could then be judged, were not at the places where
they should have been. The head-quarters should have been on the
road to the height 1038 near Verne ville, the leader of the 2nd Army
by Caulre Farm, and that of the 1st Army at Gravelotte ; all the
roads would then have been shorter, and all reports and messages
would have arrived quicker at their goal. If Prince Frederic
Charles had now kept the leading corps on the road to Etain, they
would actually, while turning their right flank to the enemy, have
marched past the French at but a short distance from them, and it
would seem that they could riot see the wood for trees, as indeed had
been the case during the last twenty-four hours. How would a
I *
BnB
ii
The second
idea of the
head-
quarters.
Tire third
idea of the
I lead-
quarters.
The order
forth©
battle.
48 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OP MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
Napoleon at this moment, between 8 and 9 a m., have personally
obtained information. He would have done nothing of the kind, loi
he would have obtained it long before.
At 9 am the 8th Corps, which was on the march towards Viileis
aux Bois, had halted, the 7th Corps was assembling to the south of
Gravelotte, the 9th stood by Caulre Farm, the 12th was deploying
at Jarny, the Guard, owing to the mischievous and unnecessary
crossino of the line of march of the 12th, was just leaving Mars la
Tour - the 3rd was at Yionville, the 10th was ready to start from
Tronville, the 2nd was moving on Onville, while the oth and 6th
Cavalry Divisions stood fast at Tronville and \ionville, and the
Saxon was on the road to the west of Jarny. In this entirely satis-
factory position the 8th Corps was still withdrawn from the command
of General von Steinmetz, while the head-quarters had also reserved
to themselves the disposition of the 3rd Corps, which was thus like-
wise no longer under Prince Frederic Charles. General von Moltke
at this time intended the latter corps to serve as that support to the
1st Army, of which he had spoken to General von Steinmetz m his
letter of 4 a.m. ; when, at 11 a.m., the 2nd Corps drew near to
Buxieres the 3rd Corps was returned to the 2nd Army, and the _nd
Corps told off to support the 1st Army. But the 8th Corps was not
given back. , .. , , ^ .
i Even at 9.30 a.m. the situation was not realized at Flavigny;
even then it was thought that “ the enemy is moving towards Bney.
It appeared to be now impossible to make certain as to this^ point.
Information to the above effect was sent to the 2nd Army at 9.30 a.m.
This indeed did not agree with the first idea, but might have served
as a’ hint to’the mounted troops of the 2nd Army to at last find out
the proper direction by drawing tbe enemy’s fire. But on these
two days the very simplest things seem to have been neglected m a
manner which is to-day quite incomprehensible.
Will it be believed that the right flank of the enemy was less
than five miles from Caulre Farm, and had been there for nearly
twenty-four hours, and that, though more than foui cavaliy di\isions
were available, this had not been discovered, in spite of the fact that
a camp had been seen which extended from Montigny to Rozeneulles,
and had been observed— though perhaps at times not very distinctly—
t0 Aboutlo^aun. General von Sperling (tbe Chief of the Staff of the
e 1st Army) and Major von Holleben reported that “ the enemy in
considerable force appears determined to accept battle, and extends
from the Bois des Genivaux.” This was no news, and could add
nothing fresh to the strategical idea, since it was all well known
r before. Nevertheless, in consequence of this report, the real order for
the battle was issued from Flavigny at 10.30 a.m. This order is so
important with reference to our criticism of the occurrences in the
Mance Ravine that it must be given word for word :—
“ From reports which have been received it is believed that the enemy
will hold his ground between Point du Jour and Montigny la Grange.
Four French battalions are in possession of tbe Bois des Genivaux. His
A i ,
'
DISPOSITIONS OP THE GERMANS.
49
I
Majesty is of opinion that it will be advisable to move the 12th and tlie
Guard Corps in the direction of Batilly, in order, if the enemy is retiring 1
upon Briey, to come up with him at Ste. Marie aux Chenes, or, if he remains
in position on the heights, to attack him from Amanvillers inwards. The
attack must take place simultaneously, by the 1st Army from the Bois
de Vaux and Gravelotte, by the 9th Corps against the Bois des Genivaux
and Yerneville, and by the left wing of the 2nd Army from the north.
“ (Signed) v. Moltke.”
This order also did not answer to the situation; its execution
might have easily been made to correspond with the instructions
given one hour earlier to Prince Frederic Charles. If that had been
done — and it might have been without any difficulty — the attack
“from the north” might have been carried out even if the enemy
extended beyond Montigny la Grange in that direction. From this
point of view it must be acknowledged that the order came too late.
But that at 10.30 a.m. it was still not known whether the enemy was
marching away or was standing to fight, is one of those extraordinary
things which happen in war! At 11 a.m. General von Sperling
rode back from Flavigny to Gravelotte, miles, in order to give
special instructions to Genei$d von Sieinmetz “not to attack with
the |if4<Army -until the Army had advanced farther, and was
in readiness to co-operate.” Taking into consideration the situation
on either side, this might well have led to a delay of three hours.
It would then have been more than 1.30 p.m.
Before this order of 10.30 a.m. had reached the 2nd Army, its The order
commander had, at 10 a.m., directed the 9th Corps “to advance in^ta^kof
the direction of Verneville and La Folie,” so that with respect to the the 9th
position of the axis of the battle there was harmony between the Gorps *
dispositions of the head-quarters and the execution of the leader of
the 2nd Army. “ In case the right wing of the enemy is in this
neighbourhood, it is to he attacked by the 9th Corps.” x/
The dispositions which related to the other corps of the 2nd ™
may be omitted.
This was a momentous order ! At 10 a.m. Moltke had not yet
issued an order for the battle; this did not take place until 10.30.
Yet Prince Frederic Charles must not on this account be blamed; on
the contrary, their passage towards the French right wing was a
path full of difficulties for the 9th Corps.
Neither army had during twenty-four hours succeeded in finding
this right wing, yet to find it may to a certain degree be considered
to have been both easy and natural. Since General von Manstein
pushed forward in this direction, he could not, owing to the near-
ness of the enemy, avoid coming shortly into contact with him, in
which case it was 100 to 1 that the 9th Corps, thus sent to the front,
would attack alone, with the result that the two armies could not be
in a position to “ attack simultaneously.” The “ simultaneously' 5 pre-
supposes that the situation on the side of the French was absolutely
fixed, and that everything on our side would be carried out with
mathematical accuracy before the attack was made; this supposition
included the occupation, of the correct front and of a sufficient length
E
50
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
4
o£ it. Both of these failed, and the two armies could not therefore
“ attack simultaneously ; ” they had to do so gradually, and the 2nd
Army, owing to its then dislocation, attacked really by successive
fractions. How could any one hope to begin an attack simultaneously
with such masses, when no one was very clear as to what “ simul-
taneously ” meant ? The second must in such a case follow the foot-
steps of the first ! The report from the 2nd Army on the above point
reached the head-quarters after the order of 10.S0 a.m. had been sent
off and was on its way ; this order reached the leader of the 2nd Army
at 11 a.m. After Prince Frederic Charles had despatched his order
of 10 am., and had received that of the head-quarters of 10.30 a.m.,
many reports (at 11 a.m.) confirmed the opinion on which he had
framed his measures of 10 a.m,, namely, “ that no retreat was taking
place, but that the enemy was standing to fight; ,J but at 11 a.m. no
one yet knew for certain where his right flank was. The Official
Account speaks of this as follows: “ Farther to the north the character
of the ground and the close country limited the view.” This cannot
well have been the case.
The post of It was about 11 a.m. when the report of Lieutenant Scholl reached
right flank the leader of the 2nd Army ; this said that a French camp lay at
fixed. St. Privat. The order of 10.30 of the head-quarters arrived at the
2nd Army at about the same time. Prince Frederic Charles had
now himself ascertained the bounds of the enemy’s position, and the
danger of his order of 10 a.m. became clear to his mind ; he therefore,
at 11.30, issued another order to recall the 9th Corps from the attack ;
it was too late. The Corps had begun the battle before the new order
had been despatched.
At about the same time as Lieutenant Scholl saw from Batilly
a camp of the enemy at St. Privat, General von Manstein himself had,
from Verne ville, observed one at Montigny la Grange. From Batilly
to St. Privat is about 3f miles, as the crow flies, and from Verne ville
to Montigny la Grange about 2J. Both points from which the
enemy was observed were on the road from Gravelotte to Auboue,
„ ' and in the above-mentioned direction of march of the 2nd Army ;
moreover, these places were such that, if they had been pointed out
to patrols as positions which ought to be reached, they would, in clear
weather, have given as wide a view as it was possible to obtain to
the north, east, and west. Thus, in order to make and to report the
observations of General von Manstein and Lieutenant Scholl, some
ordinary scouts would have been sufficient. It would not even have
been necessary to use officers’ patrols. Again, unless it had been
forbidden to send out patrols, all that was observed by these two
officers at 11 a.m. on the 18th, might have been discovered at 6 p.m.
on the 17th. Therefore, after the order of 2 p.m. on the 17th of
August had reached the leaders of the 2nd Army, and it w r as seen
that its execution must be carried out close to the points Batilly and
Verneville, the first task of that army, beforA they began to carry
it out, was to determine whether the direction in which they were
ordered to move was free of the enemy or not. This ought to have
been done in the afternoon of the 17th. For this purpose nothing
l!l!|||y
I
i
DISPOSITIONS OF THE GERMANS.
51
was required but ordinary patrols in that direction, and these would
most probably have been able to observe all that was worth knowing
without having been seen themselves; for Lieutenant Scholl and
General von Manstein were not fired on, while the situation was
exactly the same at 11 a.m. on the 18th as on the afternoon of the
17th. The French had neglected the very simplest precautions in
the way of outposts ; towards the west they did not even show any
patrols, and might thus have been watched without knowing it.
After the arrival of the order of 2 p.m. on the 17th, there can have
been no doubt in the 2nd Army as to the direction in which a recon-
naissance should be carried out.
General von Manstein at this time recognized from Yerneville
that, the enemy’s right flank did not lie in his front, but extended
farther towards St. Privat — a fact which, moreover, proves that from
Yerneville alone full information might have been obtained on the
17th. But the carelessness of the French seemed to him to be
tactically so tempting that he nevertheless determined to act con-
trary to the spirit of the order, and to surprise the enemy in his
camps by suddenly opening a fire of artillery. This succeeded
perfectly. It is no part of my task to decide whether General von
Manstein in acting thus did rightly and suitably to the circum-
stances ; it is only necessary to mention that the Official Account is
wrong, when it says that the character of the country, etc., limited
the view to the north ; and, further, to state that, if any one had
ridden forward in the direction laid down by the head-quarters for
the forward movement of the 18th, he would have learnt the position
of the enemy’s camps, and would thus without more ado have solved
all problems. No one did so ride until the morning of the 18th of
August ; why, nobody knows.*
At 11.30 a.m. the head-quarters were still at Flavigny, the leader
of the 1st Army south-west of Gravelotte, and that of the 2nd. at
Yionville, near the 3rd Corps. Prince Frederic Charles now began
to move his forces to the north ; Rezonville was laid down as the
point on which the 2nd Corps was to march, the 3rd on Verheville,
and the 10th on St. Ail.
When the roar of the guns of the 9th Corps was heard at Flavigny,
the following order was sent to General von Steimnetz, in order that
the 1st Army might not attack prematurely : —
“ The isolated action which can be now heard going on in front of
Yerneville does not call for a general attack by the 1st Army. There is
no necessity on this account to show large masses of troops, and if yon
must act, it should be only by using the artillery as a prelude to the later
attack.”
It was now noon.
It is here necessary to picture to ourselves the principal features
* Moltke’s statement contradicts that in the Official Account, for he says, “The large
masses which stood on his left at St. Privat he (General von Manstein) could not see from
his position. He thought that the enemy’s right flank was in front of him, and resolved
to act in accordance with the first order sent to him, and to surprise the enemy by his
attack.”
Precis of
the orders
52
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
from head- and tlie main principles of the method of procedure from 2 p.m. on
quarters. pp e noon 0 n the 18th. The various changes in the scheme
of the head-quarters (at 2 p.m. on the 17th of August, at 4 a.m.^
8 a.m., 9.30 a.m., 10.30 a.m., and noon of the 18th), and of that of
the commander of the 2nd Ai’my (at 5.30 a.m., 9 a.m., 10 a.m., and
11.30 a.m. of the 18th), and of that of the 1st Army (at 6 a.m., on the
report of Colonel von linger, on that of Colonel von Loe at 9 a.m.,
and of General von Steinmetz’s idea, about 10 a.m., that the enemy
was falling back, while Major von Holleben and General von Sperling
believed that he was still in position), are each and all to be attributed
to faulty reconnaissance on the part of the 1st Army, and to the
absence of all reconnaissance on that of the head-quarters and of the
The conse-
quences
of the
neglect to
recon-
noitre.
i
?
J.
2nd Army.
Since no movements of the enemy were known with the exception
of such as had been observed during the morning of the 17th, and it
was thus uncertain whether he was falling back on Metz, in order to
receive battle while resting on the fortress, or whether he had retired
by Conflans or Briey (for a retreat through the valley of the Moselle
was not considered), it should have been a matter of course to decide
by reconnaissances which of these two plans had been adopted, or
whether both of them might not be intended by the enemy, inasmuch
as Marshal Bazaine might have left part of his army at Metz, and
have marched away with the remainder. If, then, an operation was
designed which should take account of all these alternatives (witness
the order of 2 p.m. on the 17th of August), the preliminary condition
was a reconnaissance to the front and to the flanks. On the left the
matter was simple, for there everything would have revealed itself ;
on the front and right it was more complex, and here the contents of
that order, on account of the latitude allowed, called imperatively for
reconnaissance. If one side falls back in consequence of a tactical
operation, it is laid down in every text-book that the other should
follow it with a chain of scouts at a distance within the limit of vision,
in order not to lose sight of it. Nothing of this sort took place
throughout the extent of the 2nd Army, which thus along the whole
front lost touch and sight of the enemy, and knew nothing whatever
of what he was doing. At 11 a.m. Rezonville was abandoned by the
French, at 3 p.m. they left Gravelotte, and between these hours they
evacuated Verne ville. With the exception of Gravelotte, either this
was known, or it ought to have been known, at 2 p.m. by the head-
quarters and by the commander of the 2nd Army. At 3 p.m. on
the 17th the 1st Army certainly knew already that the enemy was
diligently strengthening the position in front of Gravelotte. If, then,
the head-quarters had been on the field of the operations, the report
of this circumstance would have reached them at the latest at 4 p.m.,
and the news would have arrived at the commander of the 2nd Army
by 5 p.m. at the latest.
The order of 2 p.m. on the 17th, taken in connection with the
knowledge which was then possessed of the abandonment of Rezon-
ville and Verne ville, imposed upon the commander of the 2nd Army
the duty of making certain where the enemy had halted, and what
DISPOSITIONS OF THE GERMANS.
53
he intended to do. Nothing was done on the 1 7tli to carry out this
duty. If it was then accepted that the enemy would remain in
position near Metz, it was obviously necessary to form an idea where
the enemy could so stand. For this purpose were available only the
1 two important rows of heights which run from south to north, and
are separated by the Mance Yalley ; these begin at Point du Jour
and Plappeville, and join somewhere about St. Privat. If it was
considered that the enemy was retiring on Verdun or Chiffons, this
might have been made clear by occupying the course of the Orne from
Oonflans to Auboue. These were the two most important points, as
might have been seen by simply looking at the map. If this was
examined with reference to the two possibilities, no other conclusion
would have been possible but that Auboue was the point where both
| the possibilities could be suitably and simultaneously met. For this
f* reason the proper decision was evident, namely, to send to that place
j as soon as possible observers who were capable of appreciating the
tactical situation. From Yionville to Auboue is about eight miles.
If scouts had been sent off after the issue of the order of 2 p.m. on
the 17th, allowing half an hour for observations and for halts, they
might have been back at Vionville at 6 p.m. on the 17th at the latest,
and might thus have obtained information to govern the particular
events of the coming day ; this information might have reached the
head-quarters at Pont a Mousson by 9 p.m. This is what ought to
have been done, to judge by the map, and there was no excuse for
not doing it.
If troops undertake anything, whether in war or in peace, the
front and flanks of their march must be made secure. If the 2nd
Army was to advance on the 18th between Rezonville and Ville-sur-
Yron, their march — considering the known nearness (3£ miles) of
the enemy to their right, which was in massed echelons from the
left — should have been carried out on these simple principles. They
must have asked themselves the question what the strong masses
meant which stretched from Point du Jour to Leipzig. It was too
j strong for a rear-guard — did they think it was two army-corps ? If
they considered how the line of heights of the enemy’s position
stretched to the north, they must by the map have recognized
that tins position was naturally strong — a fact which must have led
them to the conclusion that the French probably extended further
towards the north. In this case, they ought to have said to them-
T selves that important communications must lie to the east of this
| position, and that information must be obtained as to what was
advancing along them. Even if we pass over these higher but most
i natural ideas, the simple employment of a mechanical plan required
I that if any army was to advance in mass between Rezonville and
Ville-sur-Yron, its arrangements for reconnaissance, supposing it
merely to desire to make itself safe against a disastrous surprise,
ought .to cover its front and both flanks in that direction which it
proposed to take as the guiding line of the movement. No other
opinion could be possible. If this distance be taken as the radius
of a circle, or if we only judge it by the eye, it is evident that, after
i
54
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
riding over one-third of this radius, the scouts which moved towards
the east would have come in contact with the enemy along their
entire front. Fire would have been received along the whole of this
front, and they might then have been certain, without further
evidence, that the enemy was not retiring, but was holding his ground,
and preparing for the fight.
Between 5 and 6 a.m. on the 18th, Prince Frederic Charles had
sent his orders to Mars la Tour and Yionville ; by 6 a.m. the Prince
was at Yionville, while at the same hour the 4 head-quarters were at
Flavigny, about 1100 yards distant. How easy would it have
been to come to an understanding ! Since the left echelon of the
2nd Army was to begin its march at 6 a.m., all arrangements for
reconnaissance ought to have been in action since 5 a.m. to the north,,
east, and west ; in that case everything of importance would have
been reported soon after the start to the head- quarters, and to both
army commanders. No cavalry division would have been necessary
for this, but merely twenty scouts, who would have been amply suffi-
cient, if they had been pushed forward on the roads to the east on the
front from La Folie to Auboue ; it would have sufficed if an officer (if
possible of the General Staff*), accompanied by two orderlies to carry
reports, had been sent forward on each of the obvious lines — La Folie,
Montigny la Grange to Amanvillers, St. Privat, and Auboud to
Roncourt. I have said nothing as to the points to the north or to the
west. If we imagine Napoleon I. in this situation, we can see that he
alone, with his untiring activity and unceasing movement, would have
carried everything out ; for the general circumstances made a recon-
naissance the simplest thing imaginable.
Theenemy From the morning of the 17 th to 9.30 a.m. on the 18th the head-
have 61 61 quarters and both army commanders counted upon the retirement of
retired or the enemy. What would have been his object in so retiring ? To get
maSeain awa Y a $ quickly as possible from the Germans ! The Germans knew
position, from the morning of the 17th that the enemy were in movement.
From Gravelotte to Auboue is 7^, and to Conflans about 9J miles.
If the enemy had really been on the march since the morning of
the 17th, it was evident that, granting them only moderate march-
ing powers, they would by 9.30 a.m. on the 18th have crossed the
Orne. The considerations being as simple as this, how was it
possible to believe at 9.30 a.m. that the enemy was then retiring
from the position Point du Jour-Leipzig, where Colonel von Loe
had before 9 a.m. reported him to be in the strength of one and a
half to two army-corps. Indeed, if this had been the belief ever since
the morning of the 17th, then the mistake of not having observed the
enemy was doubly disgraceful. The question of the French retreat
must, under such considerations, have appeared on the morning of the
18th to be quite improbable; at that time the enemy must either
have marched away or be still present. The Germans were uncertain
about the former ; on the other hand, there was the strongest proof of
the latter along the front from Point du Jour to Leipzig. If, how-
ever, there was uncertainty at the head-quarters with regard to both
points up to 9.30 a.m., why had they not at once, on their aiTival at
DISPOSITIONS OP THE GERMANS.
55
Flavigny at 6 a.m., ordered the small intervening distance to be
reconnoitred. This does not seem to have been done, though one
would have thought it almost impossible to have omitted it. As it
was, the flank march of the 2nd Army, with its massed corps, which
even crossed each other (12th Corps and the Guard), with the cavalry
divisions in rear, and with the enemy during the whole extent of
the flank march at the most 4J miles (which, considering such
conditions and masses, is a mere cat’s leap), to the east of it, is
among the most wonderful in the whole of the history of war. And
this took place in very fine weather, with dry roads, and in country
which, afforded every facility for seeing. Only think what would
have happened if the enemy’s army had burst forward upon the
unmanageable crowds of men when, about 8 a.m., the collision of the
12th and the Guard Corps was at its height 1 It is true that the 2nd
Army paid more attention to the north than to the east ; but, con-
sidering the line of march, it was necessary to reconnoitre as carefully
to the latter as to the former, and the first officer, Lieutenant Scholl,
who rode forward to the north-east beyond the area occupied by the
troops (12th Corps), discovered at once without any difficulty the
enemy’s position at St. Privat. All that it was necessary to do was
to ride to the front.
The narrative of all these occurrences, which is given in the Official
Account, takes refuge in such cunningly worded expressions, duly
offered to the reader, as are perhaps unequalled in the history of war.
Whoever drew this up has much to answer for to history. When
country which lends itself to observation is described as just the con-
trary ; when the crossing of the Guard with the 12th Corps (by which
the former lost quite three hours) is explained and cleared up by
special and peculiar orders to the Guard Corps ; when the withdrawal
of the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions on to the high plateau of
Vionville, with the dearth of water which resulted, is glossed over;
when not a word is said as to the omissions in reconnaissance and in
the guidance of the army; and when all these matters have been
quietly and smoothly mixed up with each other, it absolutely seems as
if a prize had been given to that writer of the time who displayed the
greatest skill in making black white, and who could do it in such a
manner that the unsuspecting reader really sees white where all was,
and ever will be, black. But he who presents such things to ordinary
common sense must not be surprised if this common sense revolts
against them.
Almost twenty -four hours after the issue of the order for the Criticism
operations appeared the order of 10.30 a.m. on the 18th, which related ^aerfor
to a situation which had existed for twenty-four hours, but which was the battle,
still unrecognized. It had apparently, as regards the enemy, in no
way changed ; yet in the order it was only “ believed ” that they
would “ hold their ground ” between Point du Jour and Montigny la
Grange. Why “ believed ” ? Considerations with regard to the great
age of the royal leader explain why the order for the operations was
issued before the situation was clear ; circumstances were all-pow~erful
in this case, and it can at least be defended. Up to 10.30 a.m. on the
*
56
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
18th, if nothing had prevented it, would have been ample time to
learn everything, always supposing that scouts had been sent out to
observe. Exactly an hour earlier it had been noticed that troops
■which were visible on the heights towards Metz were moving in the
direction of Briey.” Was it that the French had really hindered us
so much from seeing and learning the facts? Not by any means.
But we persisted in looking through the peep-hole of Gravelotte ! At
10.80 am. the retreat of the enemy on Briey was counted on, in
which case he might be reached by Ste. Marie aux Chenes ; this, we
may note, was then possible, since that place lies far away from Point
du Jour and Jarny. Although, considered as a whole, the order for
the attack of 10.30 a.m. affords a proof of the uncertainty which still
reigned at the head-quarters with regard to the position and the
intentions of the enemy, it was yet totally different in character to
the order for the operations. In the latter the main consideration is
for the north, the possible secondary direction to the east; in the
former the main point is the east, but not without some consideration
for the north. It is only wonderful that both these orders were
governed by exactly the same amount of knowledge or ignorance.
This is the main fault, which cannot be excised from blame, since the
two possibilities — a retreat to the north or a standing fast to the east
— are considered in both orders. Under the before-mentioned and
very favourable circumstances, and though possessing a gigantic staff
and apparatus for reconnaissance, nothing whatever of importance had
been learnt in twenty-four hours with regard to an enemy who was
a mere cat’s leap distant. Nevertheless, the order for battle showed
the above radical change.
Simui- Something has already been said with regard to the simultaneous-
^tlie SneSS ness the attack by the two armies. It is only possible to make a
attack. simultaneous attack on a position when that position has been exactly
determined, and when the assailant is at the same distance from it
along its whole front. If either of these conditions is not fulfilled,
simultaneousness is impossible ; in this case they were not fulfilled,
and the head-quarters knew that they were not so. It was known by
the reports of the 2nd Army that at 10.30 a.m. it stood somewhat as
follows: namely, from Caulre Farm to Jarny, with the Guard Corps
still considerably in rear of this line, and that it was not ready to
change front in due order towards any front in such a manner as
would permit an army to carry out a simultaneous attack on the
above front. Nothing more need be said as to its simultaneous action
with the 1st Army. We learn, moreover, without a doubt, from the
wording of the order, that at 10.30 a.m. nothing was known of the
enemy’s position. Consequently the order for the simultaneous
attack ought not to have been given ; that it; was given proves that
there was a want of clear knowledge of all the circumstances which
have been mentioned. Moreover, in the then situation (and assuming
that all -worked out in the ordinary way), if the head-quarters had
been acquainted with the enemy’s position at 10.80 a.rn., a simul-
taneous attack, which should include the turning of the enemy’s right
flank, could not have taken place before 4 p.m. Again, tactically
DISPOSITIONS OP THE GERMANS.
57
speaking, it is impossible to see what advantages were expected from
the simultaneous attack. Positions which, as was believed at 10.30
a.m., are 4^ miles in length, cannot be attacked simultaneously along
their whole front. This is mere theory. In such cases, Napoleon
used, as the first act, to engage with advanced troops along the entire
front, in order to place himself in a position to find out more exactly
the distribution of the enemy’s forces, as may be done by personal and
other reconnaissances ; when the enemy had betrayed his dispositions,
then, and not till then, the true attack followed from the deployment
which had been completed in anticipation. This is the only way in
which fortified positions can be treated, such as were in question at
the battle of Gravelotte. Nothing of the kind took place on this
•occasion. So much space has been devoted to these matters, because
Gravelotte, within certain limits, must be the typical battle of the
future, if the defender wishes to avail himself of the advantages which
are founded on the weapons of the present day. A second Gravelotte,
given such insufficient reconnaissance, will certainly not be a victory 1
Especial importance must be attributed to the fact that the attack
of the 1st Army was to take place from Gravelotte and from the Bois
de Yaux ; in relation to the enemy’s position, such as Moltke pictured
it to himself, this is <f turning both the enemy’s flanks.”
At 12 o’clock, when the roar of the guns of the 9th Corps re- The 1st
sounded over Flavigny from Verneville, Moltke seems to have recog- ^ to
nized that the simultaneous attack had been nipped in the bud ; he front and
therefore sent to General Steinmetz the order which has been
mentioned. But the latter, in the roar of the guns, could pay at-
tention to nothing but the signs of the attack, and, since it is 3f
miles from Flavigny to Gravelotte, Steinmetz must have heard the
sound of the guns long before Moltke’ s new order can have reached
him. This was indeed the case. Nevertheless, there was no harm in
Steinmetz having already commenced the artillery fight, but the
course of events teaches us that the intention to attack simultaneously
failed entirely, since, as a matter of fact, the 2nd Army attacked by
corps in succession, just as it had marched, and the 1st by successive
echelons, in only one, however, of the two directions prescribed,
almost taking the bull by the horns ; while, in spite of the enormous
machinery at the disposal of the head-quarters, and of the army
commands, there was no unity of action in the direction of the battle,
which was from the beginning tactically abortive.
Yet Moltke held to the idea of a simultaneous attack with his
peculiar tenacity. In order even yet to bring it about, the following
information was sent from the head-quarters to Prince Frederic
Charles at 1.45 pan., “ In front of the Bois Doseuillons the 9th Corps
is engaged in an artillery combat. The true general attack along the
whole line will not take place until considerable forces can be pushed
forward against Amanvillers.” Thus at 1.45 pan. the grand head-
quarters did not yet know that the enemy’s right flank extended to
the north of St. Privat. Naturally, therefore, the message which was
sent could not lead to any simultaneous attack. The head-quarters
first heard of the real extent of this flank after 5 p.m.
58
TWENTY-FOTJR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
W
Frederic The roar guns from Verneville, which was occupied by the
Charles’s 18fch Division at 10 a.m. } woke the highest authorities to life. Prince
direction of Frederic Charles, with the accurate instinct of a general, immediately
t e attie. C0n y aue< j ^is . a t 1 p,m. he was between St. Marcel and Verne-
ville; at 2 p.m. at Habonville, and up to the end of the battle he
remained near the focus of decisive action. In this respect the
prince’s behaviour was a pattern, it was Napoleonic; indeed, only
through it and through the genius of the then Crown Prince of
Saxony (12th Corps) could the distances and times be shortened, and
the original error be to a satisfactory extent repaired. Both of the
Princes immediately grasped the strategical situation fully, in that
they both strove to reach, and succeeded in reaching in time, the last
line of retreat, the valley of the Moselle. Even that incomparable
leader in battle, Napoleon, made mistakes. The true mark of a
general is the manner in which he makes good a situation which at
the beginning has gone wrong. If Prince Frederic Charles must be
blamed for too much caution and delay before the battle, justice
compels us to emphasize the fact that the prince, from the moment
of the receipt of the report of Lieutenant Scholl, showed himself
throughout to be equal to the general situation in its widest strategical
sense, and that his direction of the battle from that moment need
shun no criticism, being fully equal to that of Napoleon ; this careful
general did not quit the point where the decision took place until the
blazing flames of St. Privat had been extinguished. Indeed, if any
individual persons can be described as the victors of St. Privat, they
are the Prince Frederic Charles and the Crown Prince Albert of
Saxony.
The airec- The head-quarters and the commander of the 1st Army did not
thTbattie fr e ^ ave as did Prince Frederic Charles. The former at 2 p.m. were
by the somewhere about Rezonville. Since the order for the battle directed
quarters. ^at koth enem y’ s flanks were to be turned, the head-quarters
ought to have placed themselves either in rear of the centre, at the
height 1038, or in rear of the strategical flank, for example, at St.
Privat. Instead of this, they, about 5 p.m., took up a position to
the south of Malmaison. The choice of this point may be defended
up to the completion of the deployment of the second line ; but, after
the position of the right flank of the enemy had been determined, and
the strategical idea, to throw the foe back into Metz, had become the
fixed object of the battle, and when the second line had deployed
according to rule, that is to say, at 4 p.m. at the latest, the head-
quarters should have moved to some point to the northward; at any
rate, they should not have stayed where they did. This is mentioned
only with reference to the question of the day concerning all orders
and reports.
Tbc direc- The commander of the 1st Army went about noon to the east of
battieVy 6 ^ravelotte, and there remained. This was the best position for him.
General but what General von Steinmetz did and left undone at that point
steinmetz differed widely from the behaviour of Prince Frederic Charles under
certainly not less difficult circumstances. There was no sign of a
general in his behaviour. There was no question with the 1st Army
DISPOSITIONS OP THE GERMANS.
59
of an attack, such as should have been decided on considering the
enemy’s position, and the sense of the order for battle of 10.30 a.m. ;
that army found no means of preparing the success of a frontal attack,
nor of supporting that attack from the Bois de Vaux; it did not
attack from the Bois de Yaux, though it would have been easier to
do so from there than from Gravelotte; it never understood at all
Moltke’s order of 10.30 a.m. ; it apparently knew nothing as to what
a common frontal and flank attack depended on — that is to say, upon
the previous capture of a strong enveloping infantry fire-position on
the east slope of the Mance — it did not suitably carry out the order
which it had received ; it was never used as a whole, nor had it ever
a reasonable object, but the troops poured out their blood under
wretched dispositions and by companies and battalions. Every effort
which was made at this point to take the position was a failure, and
a confused wild jumble, hustle and rush, without any clear idea of
what lay before their eyes, or of what, though not so plainly, could
be made out from the map.
60
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKUS STRATEGY.
PART II.
THE GROUND IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
Character Between the main roads Vionville-Gravelotte-Metz and Ste. jtfarie-
; w s G »f St. Privat-Saulny-Metz lie, approximately north and south, three
heights, rows of hills, of which the two westerly run nearly parallel to each
other, while the third, that most to the east, bends off a little in a
south-easterly direction. The heights are : —
1. That from Gravelotte by Malmaison and Verneville to Ste.
Marie aux Chines.
2. That from Point du J our by Moscou and Amanvillers to St. Privat.
3. From Plappeville to the quarries of Amanvillers and beyond.
Between these three rows of hills are two deeply cut valleys, that
of Chatel between 2 and 3, and that of the Mance between 1 and 2 ;
they are both of a similar character and of a moderate width (250 to
450 yards) at the bottom, with steep sides, which were then covered
with thick underwood. The brooks which run through both valleys
4 were, on the 18th of August, 1870, entirely dry, as were also the
" valleys, which were everywhere passable.
Of the three rows of hills the eastern is throughout the highest,
the western throughout the lowest, while the third is between the
other two. The distance between the three rows of hills is nearly
the same, namely, about 3300 yards, or in places as much as 3850
yards. The space between the two western heights was on the 18th
of August, 1870, from Verneville to the south, covered throughout
with large and irregularly shaped woods, while so much as lay to the
north of Verneville could, generally speaking, be considered as com-
paratively open and clear for vision. If, under these circumstances,
we imagine the enemy as standing somewhat on the line from
Montigny la Grange to the south of Point du Jour (and this is what
the Germans thought up to 10.30 a.m. on the 18th of August), every-
thing pointed to the desirability of examining Montigny la Grange
from the north and north-east, that is to say, this place gave the
obvious direction for reconnaissance. The height, 1038*6, to the south-
west of Verneville, was not only the most important in the western
row of hills, but vras also exactly in the centre of the line of the
battle, as it later developed, and was thus exceptionally suitable as a
position for the grand head- quarters; moreover, it could be reached
without danger.
THE GROUND IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
61
The previously mentioned patches of forest, the Bois des Genivaux Character
to the north and the Bois de Vaux to the south of the road Gravelotte-
Metz, were connected by a strip of wood, through which that main
road ran. This strip began nearly at the spot where the brook which
ran from La Folie fell into the Mance, and extended as far as the
Gravel-pit hill, with an extreme width of 550 yards. The strip of
wood did not hinder the view from hill to hill, since it then began
about halfway down the western slope and ended at about one-third
up the eastern, so that both sides could plainly see the main positions
over it. This strip was also no great hindrance to. movement, as was
abundantly shown by experience. There was sufficient room on both
sides of the Mance to post brigades side by side, and the strip of wood
itself contained several clear spaces, of which the largest lay imme-
diately north and south of the main road. In addition to the paths
which passed through it, the strip of wood was passable for companies
and sections without losing their order, and even cavalry could, in
places (for example, to the south of the main road), make their way
through it. The Bois de Yaux was very similar; but, on the other
hand, the Bois des Genivaux was throughout a great obstacle to
movement. I passed through it at a later date in all directions, and
in many places I could not make my way without tearing my clothes.
This is not of much importance for our present purpose, but the
northernmost part of the strip of wood, to the north of the main road,
was of the same character. / ;
The highest point on the western row of hills was to the south- Relation of
west of Verne ville, while that of the enemy’s position was at/Point ^ e e ^ hts
du Jour (1102),* while the line of heights thence to the centre of the side to
front of battle was over 1080, but from that point fell to 1050 (at St. each other.
Privat) and 1014 (at Koncourt). The command of the centre line of
hills, running north and south, over the western row, was in the
southern part less, and in the northern more than 100 feet. The
French army had been in position on it since the afternoon of the
17 th of August. The proportion between the eastern and the central
rows of hills was not so different, but to any one coming from the
west the former showed in some degree as a background to the latter,
which, with everything which moved on it, stood out fairly sharply
against it. On that day there would have been no difficulty, even
without a glass, in distinguishing from the centre row of hills the
advance of the Germans, if any one had wished to do so ; and, in
a similar manner, they, after the afternoon of the 17th, might have
ascertained with certainty what was going on on the centre row of
hills, how far the French position extended to the north, and how
much it was being strengthened. But both enemies failed to make
the necessary arrangements for this purpose, so that the French knew
no more about the Germans than the Germans about the French.
The clearness of the weather greatly enlarged the field of view ; The
from noon on the 17th to noon on the 18th (or up to the beginning weafclier *
of the battle), the sky was cloudless, and the pale-yellow line of the
centre hills, which were chalky and bare, showed .sharply against
* All heights are in feet.
I ■
62
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
The road
Bezonville,
Gravelotte,
Metz, with
its lateral
communi-
cations.
the dark background; any advance might therefore have been
observed by the German patrols, with the naked eye and without any
risk. So, at least, one thinks, when one wanders to-day from west to
east along either of the main roads named above ; but on the 17th
of August, and even up to the morning of the 18th, the Germans gave
quite insufficient attention to the more northern of the two.
The thermometer at noon stood at 86 degrees Fahrenheit.
The road from Gravelotte to Metz, which is about sixteen yards
wide, runs through the above-mentioned strip of wood, between the
Bois des Genivaux and the Bois de Vaux. Starting from Gravelotte
on a downward slope over open ground, the road at the strip of wood
assumes more and more the character of a cutting; thence by an
embankment, at the highest point about twenty feet in height, and
bounded right and left by walls knee-high, it passes over the Mance,
whence again it runs through a cutting for about 250 yards to St.
Hubert on the eastern slope. This road, which was in great part
swept by the enemy’s fire, was necessarily a bad line of approach for
the Germans, especially since its eastern exit lay within the enemy’s
effective infantry fire. When bodies of troops had once entered it,
they had no power to take ground to the right or left, but could,
while in the wood, go only forwards or backwards. This was the
case as regarded cavalry and artillery even on the eastern slope,
where the road ceased to run in a cutting, for a little way to the front,
in an easterly direction, were quarries on both sides of the road, and
these forbade the mounted arms to diverge on to open ground.
For the above reasons, this could not be called a road, but was really
a long and fairly wide defile ; this statement is little affected by the
fact that it might easily have been arranged to pass through the strip
of wood to the north or south of the road with infantry in good order
and in small, closed bodies. From Gravelotte the road ran in a gentle
curve, bowed slightly towards the north, as far as the height (1076)
on the farther side of the ravine ; at that point it turned almost at
right angles to the south, making from the corner a strongly marked
bow to the south. The first part is 2400 yards, the latter, up to
Rozerieulles 3500 yards in length. The road was lined with poplars,
and, except at the part which passed through the strip of wood, could
be followed with the naked eye, until it turned again to the east at
a level with the southern edge of the quarry of Rozerieulles. The
part of the road from the height 1076 to where on the south it turns
round to the east, and even farther, was for half its length shut in
by knee-high walls. Its general line offered a desirable and strong
front of defence. Following this line, the French had filled up the
open spaces in the wall with shelter-trenches of suitable profile, in
all cases sufficient to cover and hide strong firing-lines, while the wall
itself was provided with loopholes.
Two hundred and twenty yards to the east of the point on the
eastern slope, where the road ceases to run in a cutting, were quarries
on either side for a distance of about 220 yards, and about 160 yards
to the east of thpse again began the western garden wall of the farm
of St. Hubert. From the quarries and to the south of the main road
THE GROUND IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
63
a track passable for artillery ran almost straight to the main road,
\ which it joined after the latter had bent to the south, at a point about
* 270 yards to the south of the height 1076. A second road, passable
for all arms, ran from the Mance mill through the Bois de Vaux,
! turned to the north at its eastern edge, and, running along it, joined
f the main road at the point where the latter issued from the strip of
l wood on the eastern slope of the ravine. A branch of this road ran
|: in an easterly direction to the height 1081. A third road, passable
for all arms, ran from the northern part of the Mance Valley, by the
? farm of St. Hubert, striking the main road to the east of the farm at
| an acute angle ; this gave an easy line of approach from Malmaison.
( Owing to the thick underwood which -filled the valley, these three
roads were the only means of communication along a front of 4400
yards. The exits of both the side roads, from the Mance mill and
^ Malmaison, just as was the case with the main road, were all within
*■ effective range of the French, since the greatest distance of either of
j them from Point du Jour or Moscou was about 1200 yards.
I Point du Jour and Moscou were two small white buildings, visible point da
from a considerable distance, and distant about 1300 yards from each
1 other. This comparatively small space, 1300 yards broad and 1200 and sT’
yards deep, was at a later hour the battle-field upon which three Hubert.
German Corps were promiscuously crowded and jumbled together.
Point du Jour, which, consisted of two buildings about 100 yards
apart, was, for three-quarters of its circumference, surrounded by
a wall of moderate section, which was provided with flanks towards
the south and north-west. This wall gave cover against infantry fire ,
only, and not against artillery, and on this point, as on Moscou,
the German artillery directed such a specially hot fire that at the end
of the battle the small portion of either of them which remained
uninjured by the flames was entirely swept away. At these points
hardly any French were found killed or wounded by infantry bullets;
almost all had been destroyed by the fire of the guns. In the large
heaps of ruins, which, without an interval, extended from Point du
Jour to Moscou, the defenders, especially in Moscou, lay all around,
fearfully tom and mutilated by the German shell ; limbs and bodies
were blown from thirty to fifty paces apart, and the stones and sand
were here and there covered with pools of blood. In Moscou and
Point du Jour some French were found burnt in their defensive
positions, and a large number of the wounded showed marks of the
flames, which had destroyed both uniforms and limbs. All around
there lay rifles and swords, knapsacks and cartridges, the remains of
limbers which had been blown up, broken gun-carriages and wheels,
and a large number of hideously torn and mangled ‘ horses. The
ground was changed by the German artillery fire into a desert covered
with many corpses. The interiors of Point du Jour and Moscou were
not passable after the battle, until they had been cleared. The
courtyard of Point du Jour was smaller than those of Moscou and
St. Hubert; on the other hand, that front of Point du Jour which
faced the Germans was longer than were those of the two other
farms.
f
k*.
mm
64
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
The farm of Moseou was rectangular in shape, and the longer side
which faced to the south-west was turned towards the Germans.
The dwelling-house stood in the centre of a garden and farmyard,
which were surrounded by knee-high walls ; the stables were on that
shorter side which faced the north. The walls of the garden and of
the farmyard, as also those of the house, were pierced with loopholes ;
the longer side was about 200 yards in length. The massive building,
which stood as much in the open as Point du Jour, afforded an even
better target to the German artillery. On the right and left shelter-
trenches were connected with the walls of the garden and farmyard.
The farm of St. Hubert, a building of white stone, lay 770 yards
to the west of the others, on the naked slope. The two-storied
dwelling-house, which stood close to the main road, had both stories
prepared for defence ; one stable lay to the west and another to the
north. The western wall of the farmyard had no opening, the
entrance to the house from the road was not closed, and a large
opening had been made in the east side of the garden wall. Along
the north-western edge of St. Hubert a track, passable for all arms,
run from the main road to Moseou. This, as well as another track
which ran into it from the height 1102, was enclosed by shelter-
trenches. The farm and garden, which were surrounded by a knee-
high wall, formed almost an isosceles triangle, of which the narrow
western side (150 yards long) was turned towards the Germans, as
they approached it from the main road. Of the two longer sides,
which were about 250 yards in length, and formed an acute angle
towards the east, the southern had but small tactical value for the
French, since from it an oblique fire only was possible; the northern
had no value at all as a fire position. The shape was thus not
favourable for defence, a point which was the more important, since
the range from the west front of the farm to the eastern edge of the
wood was about 410 yards. Moseou, Point du Jour, and St. Hubert
had together the appearance of a great white bastion projecting far
towards the west, of which the northern side was 1100 and the
southern 1000 yards in length ; but both sides were open, except for
the walls of the farms.
St. Hubert A thousand yards to the south of the farm, of which the walls
gravel-pits. were P^rced with loopholes, and about 200 yards east of the eastern
edge of the wood, were a couple of gravel-pits. The farm of St. Hubert
and the gravel-pits served to some extent as an advanced position to
the main position, Point du Jour-Moscou. The French had not made
any covered communications between the two positions, and Point du
Jour and Moseou were in no way altered into small forts (as is stated
in the Official Account); the French had confined themselves to
making loopholes in the walls, and had thrown up to the right and
left shelter- trenches of strong profile, which, as trustworthy eye-
witnesses have assured me, showed throughout no systematic
character, but gave the impression of being hastily prepared, with
the result that as a whole they could not be considered good. To the
south-west of Point du Jour was a large stone-quarry, which projected
like a bastion ; the angle of the main road to Metz which lay to the
THE GROUND IN THE MANCE RAVINE.
65
:
i
:
east of it furnished an end to the front strong by nature, and with
retired flanks. Along the main road by Point du J our, up to Moscou,
and yet farther to the north, were shelter-trenches which were to
some extent connected with each other, and from which Point du
Jour and Moscou projected like two strong flanks. These defences,
which were perceptible with the naked eye from the neighbourhood
of Gravelotte, and were quite recognizable by the aid of a glass, were
traced at various irregular angles, so that it was possible to keep up a
cross-fire along the whole front. Moreover, the field-works at the
flanks (Point du Jour and Moscou) consisted of several tiers of fire
lying one behind the other.
Since their main position had such a favourable and strong front, Why was
the French would have done better to have entirely destroyed St. ^ b ^* t
Hubert, and to have levelled it to the ground. That they did not do so destroyed?
leads us to believe that they intended to use St. Hubert (in combi-
nation with the gravel-pits) as the pivot for an effectual offensive.
There was no artillery at St. Hubert ; the guns stood, in three easily
perceptible groups, behind strong cover, between Point du J our and
Moscou, and were placed in a half-circle in such a manner that they
could open a concentrated fire upon the exit of the Mance road.
The French front sloped continually and almost regularly from the Character
main position to the eastern edge of the woods which ran along the the Sl ° pe
Mance Valley. Considering the great range of the French rifles, and heights,
the fact that the French knew the distances, there was here an
excellent opportunity for the long-range fire of infantry ; as a matter
of fact, it proved extraordinarily effective. Under such circumstances,
the French could wish for nothing better than an energetic attack by
the Germans ; while, if ever impregnable positions existed, these were
they, though, indeed, General Frossard might at this point have done
greater credit to his career as an officer of Engineers.
While the French position, owing to the narrowness of its ridge, Depth of
had in the centre too little depth, in consequence of which it was ti 0 e n posi "
necessary in great part to keep the troops crowded together, yet in
the portion of which we are now speaking this depth was as much as
from a mile to 2000 yards; The troops were therefore not hampered
in their movements, and they could also easily draw back out of the
hostile fire and return quickly into the main position, an advantage
which the French well knew how to utilize.
Almost 4500 yards to the eastward of the above-mentioned Selection
position, Marshal Bazaine held the battle reserve, the Imperial Guard,
at his disposition, while the reserve artillery was between the forts for the 11
of St. Quentin and Plappeville. The Chatel Ravine was undoubtedly reserve *
a considerable obstacle to the movement of the reserve in the
direction of Gravelotte, hut if timely information had been obtained,
the reserve might have come up there in ample time. (As a matter
of fact, this actually did happen on this flank in the case of the attack
of the Voltigeur Brigade of the Guard.) Again, no assailant could
simply rush such a position, and the struggle for it must occupy
several hours, while the beginning of a perceptible pressure would
mark the moment at which the reserve should advance to it ; this
v'A,'. ’
66
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
pressure was reported to Bazaine in ample time. In any case, when
once his dispositions for the battle had detailed the reserve to the
left flank, the nature of the ground left Bazaine no choice. The
position where it was posted was, from Bazaine’s point of view, the
most suitable, since from there ran communications to Point du J our
and Leipzig Farm, as well as to St. Privat. The marshal could push
his reserve thence to the north or the south, but could do nothing
with it, except with the infantry, in the centre of the battle, since
there were there neither tracks nor paths. Nevertheless, the position
of the reserve had two disadvantages : 1. The communications to
all parts of the line of battle were insufficient, and the distance of the
reserve from that line, especially from St. Privat (6-J miles) was too
great. But it is seldom possible to find a position for the Reserve
which will fulfil all requirements. For, with regard to this point, it
is impossible to know beforehand what the enemy intends to do, and
equally impossible to judge how the course of events will run ; thus
the choice of the position for the reserve affects in a marked degree
the universal suitability of the dispositions for battle, and the manner
of its selection affords good grounds by which to judge of the capacity
of a general. Napoleon I. is an excellent example of this point. If
the position of the reserve be selected with reference to one contin-
gency alone, as was the case here with Bazaine, it will then not be
available for the other cases. Such an arrangement must, moreover,
end in complete failure when this one contingency is foreign to the
intentions of the enemy ; this, also, was the case here. But even if
Bazaine feared to be cut off from Metz, it would have been sufficient,
considering the strength of the position on his left flank, to have
placed a brigade in rear of the 2nd Corps, while the whole of the
remainder of the reserve should, if posted in accordance with the
intentions of the marshal, have belonged to the neighbourhood of
Amanvillers, where he himself should have been. In that case it
might have been possible for him to bring up his reserve in time.
As matters turned out, the loss of the battle is solely to be attributed
to the marshal’s faulty selection of his own position and of that of the
reserve. We have no certain knowledge whether opinions of this
kind existed at the French head-quarters, but in any case they came
too late. 2. The marshal could not avoid the disadvantages of the
position of the reserve, but if he nevertheless held to this position, he
might at least have arranged for the suitable and regular transmission
of information, and have kept the roads to St. Privat unencumbered.
Both these precautions were neglected. So far we have dealt only
with Marshal Bazaine. But Marshal Canrobert deserves even more
blame. In the very place where a skilful fortification of the position
would have been most necessary, that is to say in the neighbourhood
of St. Privat, nothing of the kind was carried out. An excuse has
been found for this in the fact that the 6th Corps had no engineer
park ; but this must be rejected, since even with the means at hand a
considerable amount of fortification might have been carried out, even
in the time which was available. Moreover Bazaine had impressed
upon Canrobert that lie should take up a concentrated position at
THE GROUND IN THE MANCE RAVINE.
67
SI Privat ; yet the latter did exactly the opposite, since he extended
his troops immoderately, even to the quarries of Jaumont. This
mistake was doubly fatal, since Marshal Canrobert did nothing
towards the strengthening of the position, but simply left everything
alone. This was in direct tactical disaccordance with the dispositions
ordered. Again, Marshal Canrobert had ample time, even on the I7tli
of August, to ask for engineers ; but he did nothing of the kind, nor
did he send in any report of value concerning what was going on in
his front, until it was too late for it to be of use.
It is impossible satisfactorily to discuss the events on one portion
of a battle-field, without remarking on the most important occurrences
which took place on the other portions; for this reason, the latter have
been here briefly alluded to.
Six thousand yards to the east of the German line of battle lay The forts
the forts of St. Quentin and Plappeville. This distance was too great Q^tin
to admit of their taking any part in the action ; but, nevertheless, in and
the case of a calamity, they formed a support in rear of the French
left flank. Everything considered, careful and systematic preparation
and deliberation were necessary, if it was proposed to attack, and to
capture, such a position as this.
Among these advantages must be counted the fact that the lieAdvan-
of the ground allowed the French to observe everything which went command
on on the western side of the Mance Ravine. If they noticed move- of site,
ments of attack in the neighbourhood of Gravelotte, they could
fairly well calculate when the Germans would advance from the
Mance Valley, and could prepare to receive them; for the French
position commanded the German. As a matter of fact, this was
exactly what the French did ! Our men could be watched, but, on
the other hand, could not watch the enemy so well as might have
been wished. When the Germans began the assault from the eastern
edge of the ravine they found, with the exception of St. Hubert, no
cover along the wide space in their front.
The French left St. Hubert standing, and the Germans captured The ground
it; but, nevertheless, as will be shown later on, it was impossible ^etot^e
that St. Hubert should play the part which it must have played attack,
had the attack been better prepared, in which case the French
position, strong as it was, might have been captured. The Germans
had many advantages on their side.
In the first place, their artillery was far superior to that of
the enemy, both in number and efficiency. So far as the artillery
positions were concerned, the difference in height of the two positions
had not much effect, since that difference was everywhere small
(1068 to 1102 feet on the French side, and 1009 to 1011 feet on the
German), and it was possible, as competent eye-witnesses have
assured me, to see fairly well with the naked eye from the German
line of guns all that went on in the French artillery and infantry
positions. Indeed, there was no particular difficulty in silencing the
French artillery. Moreover, the German artillery line to a marked
extent overlapped that of the enemy, and circumstances, so to speak,
caused it to be concentrated from the beginning.
68
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY*
In the second place, the advanced corners of the Bois de Vaux,
•which jutted out towards Point du Jour, were from the morning of
the 17th in the possession of detachments of troops of the 14th
Division; while, on the other hand, the western edges of the Bois
des Genivaux remained up to the morning of the 18th in the hands
of the French, so that that wood had to be captured. After this
had been done, the French abandoned the whole of the western part
of the Mance Valley. Thus the Germans obtained a certain amount
of advantage from this valley, supposing that they intended to make
an attack in earnest upon the position Point du J our-Moscou. This
was undoubtedly their intention.
The Mance Leaving this out of the question, favourable tactical opportunities
appoint ma 7 °ff er themselves in the course of a battle, which may induce
of depar- a leader to act contrary to the general plan ; but in such a case he
attack an lims f certain as to his duty. Such a point seemed at least worth
from the considering, and it especially suited the hasty temperament of
wesfc * General von Steinmetz. If thought had been given to it, the ground
about the Mance must have been regarded as to some extent the
starting-point for a later infantry attack, as the great place of
assembly for the preparation of such an attack and for the purpose
of, later on, feeding the attack from thence. Moreover, this was
favoured by the great breadth of the bottom of the valley, which also
varied little throughout. For this reason the valley of the Mance,
as regarded the infantry, partook first of the character of a tactical
preparatory position, and nothing more, but yet one which might
be of use should favourable conditions arise. The communications
with it were bad, consisting only of the three named above, while
of these the main road had its exit under the concentrated fire of
the enemy. Nevertheless, it might have been possible to have
allowed infantry in companies to make their way through to the
north and south of the main road from Gravel otte, and to have got
them again into order after they had thus reached the Mance Valley.
The Official Account, when speaking of these incidents, mentions
always the “ thick wood,” as if it would have been impossible to
march through it in order, and to make tactical use of it. This is
incorrect and beside the mark, and no one has any right to thus
gloss over the faults which were committed at this point, especially
in the zone of influence of the leaders of lower rank. The thick
underwood in no way prevented a passage, it merely rendered it
difficult. “ Where a man can stand, infantry must be able to march.”
This the Germans had learnt from Jackson and Lee. There was,
moreover, no danger in thus pushing the infantry to the front, since
from the moment when they entered the strips of wood, not only
were they hidden from the sight of the enemy, but, in addition,
the closer they came to the bed of the Mance the greater was the
advantage of dead ground which they gained. They were really
there as if in “ Abraham’s bosom,” for they were under cover from
fire, were only about 650 yards from the French advanced position,
A roaches anc ^ cou ^ reac hed by the enemy.
to P the aC CS “ place of assembly for an attack ” must have sufficient breadth
L
THE GEOUND IN THE MANCE EAYINE. 69
and depth, and also good and sufficient (in proportion with the point of
numbers) communications to the rear. These were wanting. If the departure ‘
troops had entered the woods in close order, instead of in extended
order, the difficulties which were found later on would in man}?-
cases not have arisen. But more should and ought to have been
done, if there was any real idea of an attack in earnest. Such
an attack was expressly ordered by von Moltke at 10.30 a.m., and
ordered also to take place from Gravelotte and the Bois de Yaux.
When Napoleon I., at 4 p.m. on the 13th of October, realized
that there was no road to the “ Steiger” which was passable for
artillery, he at once saw the disadvantages of this point as a spot
for the development of his attack. Moreover, Napoleon had then
(before the battle) the narrow tracks which led to the enemy’s
f position in his hands ; this was not the case with the Germans before
the battle. Napoleon at once ordered the construction of a road
passable for artillery, and the work was completed by late in the
evening of the 13th of October. It should have been considered,
with regard to the passage of the Mance, whether anything of this
kind was desirable, necessary, and practicable. If the enemy’s
position was to be seriously attacked, it was undoubtedly necessary.
If what was necessary could not be carried out, then under such
I governing circumstances a serious attack should not have been made,
and still less a serious pursuit, since in this case all requirements,
t as regarded freedom of development and of movement, would have
been wanting. Leaving other troops out of the question, would it
not have been vei'y desirable to have brought up the 7th and 8th
Pioneer Battalions, and to have given them up to 2 p.m. on the 18th,
to cut two openings through the wood to the north and south of
the main road, so as thus to have made the necessary communications
to the rear. Their work would not have been much disturbed as
far as the Mance, since up to there they would have been to some
extent under cover. It is, however, certainly true that from that
point on it would have been more difficult.
In order to carry out the clearing up to the eastern edge, the Exits from
advanced position of St. Hubert gravel-pits had to be first captured. departure? f
This was done, but nothing in the way of cutting roads was attempted,
and this must be taken into account. After, however, the advanced
position had been taken, the cutting through of the openings as
r far as the exit from the wood might have been easily managed up
■ to 4.30 p.m., while not until that had been done could it be said
that such arrangements for the development and the guidance, and
I also for the support of the masses of troops had been made as were
rendered necessary by the intention to make a serious attack. (As
a matter of fact this was attempted during these hours and was
! repulsed.) In this manner the enemy would have been compelled
; to divide his fire, and all the advantages attendant upon this
would have favoured the attack; while, as it was, since things
were allowed to go their own way, the enemy’s fire continued to
be concentrated in one and the same direction, which must be con-
sidered as the main cause of the long chain of German misfortunes.
-
70
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
Any one who judges, not only from the map, but by going himself
to the place itself, and bears well in mind the course of events, will
confess that what we have proposed must have been the only (and
a practicable) way to success. At least, there was no other.
Reasons for Not every leader of an army can be a Napoleon, but it is possible
necesSty* 1 ^ or ever 7 leader of an army to know what to do in such cases, and
for arti- every general must reconnoitre from the proper points ! If this had
nranica°- m ” been done, the Mance Valley would have offered great advantages
tions. to the assailant; an approach to the advanced position which was
not watched, and which was only in part under fire, the possibility
of deploying, and good communications to the rear. What has been
done cannot be undone, but we can learn much from our faults.
Positions such as are now in question will in the future be probably
more common ; only they may be somewhat more strengthened, and
perhaps with fewer favourable conditions for approach, and it will
certainly be obligatory, if we are to clo our duty, to attack such
positions in front, even when it is intended that the action shall
be decided on the flank. Let us imagine the attacking infantry to
be in possession of the firearms of to-day ; what stupendous loss will
the defender have to suffer from them alone ! In the case now before
us there was another main preliminary condition; no gun should
have joined in the action from the west of the Mance Valley, and
no gun should have been brought across that valley, but, on the other
hand, the artillery ought to have fired from the Bois de Vaux against
the left flank of the French. Tacticians might deduce this from
Napoleon’s method of handling guns. The infantry, however, could
not be better supported by the artillery in the present case, since
the latter had been left on the west of the Mance Valley.
The lie of the rows of hills of which we have spoken dictated, on
the 18th of August, without any question, the positions and the action
of the artillery of both sides. The German line of guns extended
almost exactly north and south, in one continuous line of fire ; this
was not the case with the French artillery. The character of the exit
of the main road, its further direction on St. Hubert, and the tracks
which led from it to the north and south, demanded that the French
artillery should be posted in groups, which might, in the case of an
infantry attack, concentrate their fire against this, the only direction
in which it could be developed, and thus against the road from Grave-
lotte to Point du Jour. The disadvantages entailed by the discharge
of this duty could not be entirely cancelled by entrenching the
batteries; thus the French artillery could be, and were, attacked on
both flanks, while the German had to guard its front only. The
distance between the two artilleries was about 2200 yards. This
range was known beforehand to the French, and the Germans very
soon learnt it, so that, as competent eye-witnesses have informed me,
almost every shell hit its mark. The French artillery, as a whole,
however, shot equally well. Shell after shell fell in the German
batteries, but most of them did not hurst, or, if they did, occasioned
little damage. The^ larger number of the shell passed on after their
graze through the line of German artillery, and the ground on which
THE GROUND IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
71
r the guns stood was so cut up by them that the adjutants bringing
orders had to ride with the greatest care. The French gun, then, was
not bad, but the projectile, as we may now own, was indifferent.
If, in such cases as the above, a serious attack with some great
object is intended, not only the enemy's artillery, but his infantry
( also, must be broken down by our fire. Artillery alone cannot do
this, but must receive the necessary aid from the infantry ; in order
j that the latter may work with the artillery, they must be able to
| extend and to occupy a fire-position. Nothing of this kind had been
| done as regards the infantry on the 18th of August, when, about 3.15
p.m., the artillery of the 7th Corps was pushed across the Mance
Valley. The German artillery could see this along the whole length
of their line, and they foresaw also the failure of the undertaking.
The enemy’s infantry even at 7 p.m. had not been broken down,
while the German infantry, having no suitable fire-position, had not
J sufficiently co-operated together. Attacks which are always uncler-
, taken in the same direction must for this reason fail. The artillery
effect of the present day has certainly much improved, but it still
I affords matter for some thought that about 132 German guns, after
firing for seven hours against a front of about 2200 yards in length,
had neither broken down or dispersed the enemy’s infantry. It is
possible to thus approximately estimate what would in these days
befall an assailant under similar circumstances. Not St. Privat, but
r the Mance Ravine, is the typical fight of the future, and the occurrences
1 at the latter, with respect to the instruction to be gained from them,
throw all tactical events of 1870-71 into the shade.
It is certain that the assailant has no chance of victory until the
enemy’s infantry has been shaken, and if any one doubts this, the
example now before us is a proof how long it may take to beat them
I down, and that the moment for the serious attack may not come until
late in the evening or on the following day. For the French artillery
did not throughout continue in action by the side of their infantry;
on the contrary, the latter mainly fought alone, while the artillery
came up beside them at critical moments only. This shows what
infantry in such positions as these can do, in spite of all attendant
I disadvantages.
I The openings through the woods ought, bearing in mind the Direction
s situation of affairs, to have been so cut that it might have been ^ of S the
^ possible to develop and attack, in good order, through two against communi-
; Moscou and through two against the gravel-pits and Point du Jour. cations *
t In the year 1873 I carefully examined the strips of wood, and a
! calculation made on the spot showed that if each pioneer battalion
be taken at 800 men, each man would have had one tree, large or
small, to fell. The small trees would not have needed more than
two or three blows with the axe. If the pioneers had been
| systematically distributed with a due admixture of infantry supplied
with entrenching tools, there would have been about 500 men to
each cutting, and if the work had been begun simultaneously at four
points, the men having been previously placed in position, each portion
i would have taken at most one hour. In this case everything might
72
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
have been carried out in the best order. I cannot gather any informa-
tion as to whether the strips of wood had changed very much between
1870 and 1873; probably the greatest change would be that the trees
would have gained in circumference by their three years of growth.
The character of the ground in the strips of wood offered no obstacles
to movement. When St. Hubert and the gravel-pits had been taken,
the moment would have come to choose St. Hubert as a central point,
in order to rush upon the shelter-trenches from the cuttings on both
sides of the farm.
Flre-posi- If two batteries were able to carry on a successful combat for
infantry , the h° urs St. Hubert, at a range of 750 yards, and under a cross-fire
from the enemy’s artillery and infantry ; if a regiment of ITlans (the
4th) stood fast for half an hour, and a hussar regiment (the 9th)
even longer, it would really not have been too much to ask of
pioneers and infantry that they should make shelter-trenches at the
same range. But no one thought of anything of the kind. This
must, however, be mentioned, since in the future tactical situations
must arise which will call for an advance of this kind, for the purpose
of gaining an effective fire-position, whence, wherever possible, the
enemy must be fired on throughout the day, and whence, also, on the
following day, the decisive attack must be made. On the 18th of
August, 1870, a broad fire-front of this kind might have been obtained
for the infantry, at about 450 yards from the enemy, which was ample
for the arm which we then had. Yet 4000 men were lost, of whom
the greater part might have been saved if the same number of trees
had been cut down beforehand, and a corresponding number of spadefuls
of earth had been thrown up ; in spite of this, the great disinclination
for such measures carried the day. How were we in this matter
superior to the Americans ? How did Lee’s troops gain cover under
the enemy’s lire ? They made miles of this sort of position, and with
insufficient means, being driven to it by necessity. The Germans
had good means at their disposal, but no one knew how to use them.
Does any one ask as to the advantages of such a fire-position, we
answer > —
(i.) It could have been easily reached from the rear, and (ii.) the
troops could have distributed themselves along the front by the
shortest way, and could have taken up a wide fire-position in which
to work either in attack or in defence.
Every man, even the best soldier, now searches for cover. Since
no cover was available, and none had been provided, the troops
instinctively crowded together to the very points to which, tactically
speaking, they ought not to have gone, especially to St. Hubert, until
at last that farm looked like a bee-hive, while to the north and south
of it there was no fire-position worth speakiug of. At these points
there were only irregular and far too weak groups, which looked like
mere drops, could produce no possible effect, and later on, as is well
known, were swept out of the way. This crowding together compelled
the Germans to expose their flank to the main position, and to traverse
an unnecessarily long distance before they could reach the bee-hive at
St. Hubert. Continued fire effect was impossible from the forty-three
THE GROUND IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
73
i p
f
companies (finally increased to fifty-nine), who were huddled together
in St. Hubert ; it was not possible to take aim, and no aim was taken,
since each company hindered the other, while at no time was the
farm, tactically speaking, occupied. If, however, a prepared fire-
position had been provided in this direction, there might have been
a line of fire of about 2700 paces, for the continued defence and for
the further preparation of which half of the troops which tormented
each other in St. Hubert would have sufficed, while the other half
could have been kept in reserve for emergencies. If any one maintains
that such demands could not be met, he may find his answer in the
fact that St. Hubert was taken and held without any real leading
and that artillery and cavalry were able to hold their ground there
for hours ; if this could be done, the other could not have been too
much to ask. Whatever happens, a soldier can only fall; that is
what he is there for, and if he realizes this, and it is demanded of
him, very much may be done.
I have on the very ground formed the opinion that the cutting
the passages would probably have entailed no very serious losses,
while the construction of shelter-trenches in conjunction with this
cutting would perhaps have cost us, while the work was going on,
one man for every ten who was sacrificed at a later hour, without
any result being obtained. This is the way in which a tactician
must look at it. If such measures had been taken, some direction
and guidance would also have been possible, at least within certain
definite bounds.
Even if we leave entirely out of account the question whether a
serious attack was intended or ought to have been made, the cuttings
through the wood were necessary for the formation of a suitable fire-
line. We must clearly and strongly lay stress upon the fact that
no such line actually existed along the whole front Moscou-Point
du Jour, and even much farther to the south, though it would
have been better in every respect to have formed one. The troops
crowded together, either towards St. Hubert or to the gravel-pits.
If the three existing roads had been used, and the four cuttings
through the wood had been made, there would have been seven
exits to the front, and it would thus have been seven times as
easy to form a fire-line as it was in the actual case, when only one
road was utilized. Much which happened here must be condemned,
and rightly so, but with regard to one main point, we have no right
to attack any one of the local leaders, though this has often been
done. Even* a defensive attitude, without going further, made it
desirable for the 1st Army that infantry should take their stand on
the eastern slope of the Mance Yalley, while the manner in which
the action was handled magnified this desirability into a peremptory
tactical order, since only infantry and artillery combined can
sufficiently prepare an attack. Moreover, the advance of strong
bodies of infantry into the bottom of the valley, with the object of
using it as a preliminary position, required the lormation of a strong
fire-line of infantry in its front. With this object, St. Hubert and
the gravel-pits must of necessity have been attacked, captured, and
wBlI
74
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
Why St.
Hubert
could be
held.
held, while such action went in no way beyond the sphere of the
mere defensive. This was in accordance with the duty which, after
12 o'clock, was attributed to the 1st Army, and was, tactically
speaking, quite correct. Such being the case, it is strange that no one
had any idea as to how the needful line of fire was to be formed, and
that no one realized, or at any time ordered, the correct means for
carrying out the correct tactical idea. This is the more incompre-
hensible, since from the western heights of the Mance Valley it was
possible, from the beginning to the end of the battle, to exactly
observe with the naked eye every event which took place at St.
Hubert. The defensive was first given up when the serious attack
against the main position was ordered at a later hour. It is quite
unnecessary to say that for the former attitude a strong line of
infantry fire was at first most necessary. The attacks failed, as all
such attacks must always fail, since the needful superiority of fire
had not been obtained, and this was not obtained, because no fire-
position was sought for, or made. If an attack is made under such
conditions, a tactical law is broken, though it is so clear that even
an ensign would not stumble over it. Indeed, whatever view of
affairs was taken, and whatever might be ordered, a strong infantry
fire-position on the eastern slope of the Mance Valley was an absolute
necessity, whether for the offensive or for the defensive ; there was
no such fire-position by nature, and the existing lines of advance
to such a position were both unfavourable and insufficient ; con-
sequently, the latter ought to have been first made, while from them
the fire-position might have been established.
In the tactical history of war, theory, however beautiful and
logical it may be, must never be pressed too far, and care must be
always taken to bear in mind how matters stood during the course of
the successive hours. The first question that meets us is. How
was it that St. Hubert was so comparatively easily taken, and
how was it that forty-three, and even more, companies, though
jumbled together, were able to hold it ? If one goes to the actual
place, and pictures to one's self the average defender, both of these,
though they actually happened, appear impossible. If, on the other
hand, one imagines ones self in the actual tactical situation, what
was done becomes quite clear and natural. St. Hubert was com-
paratively easily taken ; first, because the German artillery had before
the storming so broken down that of the enemy, that the latter
could no longer support their infantry at St. Hubert. According
to information which I have received, the enemy’s artillery was,
at the moment of the crisis, silent along the whole of the line in
question. Again, in the second place, the German artillery, after
silencing the French, were able to so play upon St. Hubert that
our gunners saw the French infantry bolt before the German infantry
began the assault. When the latter also realized this, then, and
not till then, they rushed forward from three sides against the
farm. This does not diminish their glory ; but the tactician has
nothing to do with glory — he is concerned only with explanations,
reasons, and proofs. Had the case been otherwise, but very few of
THE GROUND IN THE MANCE RAVINE.
75
the French 80th Regiment would have escaped ; whereas, the small
number of prisoners made — only forty — speaks for itself
How was it that forty-three and more companies could, without
extraordinary loss, stand fast for so many hours in and around
St. Hubert ? If one goes to the farm, and examines the then main
position of the French, one says to one’s self that a single battery
could in half an hour make it impossible for these companies to
hold their ground. Every shot must have swept away the German
infantry in heaps, and have thrown them into utter confusion.
Was the battery, then, not there ? Or were the French blind ? Not
at all ; but the superiority of the German artillery was so great
that the French came forward only at intervals, and even then
shot badly. This is the disadvantage of drawing artillery back.
As a rule, when a battery had once fired all its guns, it fell back
again under cover. The French artillery, though still generally
fit for action, fought in this manner on the left flank from about
4 p.m. It never succeeded in opening a systematic fire upon St.
Hubert, for it was too closely watched. For this reason alone was
it possible for those companies to huddle together and yet to hold
the farm. Almost all the loss which the Germans suffered here
was due simply to infantry fire, while all these companies did not
shoot fifty French. The real truth is, that the victorious German
artillery were the actual defenders of St. Hubert. As a proof of
this fact, let us look at Point du Jour and Moscou. The German
artillery had entirely destroyed these farms and defences, and when
they both burst into flames their garrisons retired from them, and
sought cover in the shelter-trenches to the right and left of therm
These examples corroborate the opinion expressed above, that,, if
the French had been able to attack St. Hubert properly with
artillery, it must have been abandoned by the masses which were
crowded within it. These events teach us yet another lesson.
Farm buildings, when once artillery have found their range, are
not only no longer of any value, but are absolutely disadvantageous,
especially if they are built of stone. It is not possible then either
for a garrison to hold them, nor for a reserve to stand behind
them. Extemporized cover is preferable ; the French continued
to hold their ground in such cover, after the farms had been
abandoned.
Some one may ask, What has all this to do with the subject reasons
of which we were speaking ? I will tell you. These concrete tactical possibility
facts were quoted in order to prove that the execution of the ofthe^
cuttings through the wood and of the fire-position was made per-
feetly easy to the Germans by the superiority of their artillery, position.
If a defender is so occupied and thrashed that he must draw back
his artillery, and must for hours abandon all offensive action, the
necessary preliminary conditions must exist, which, so to speak,
guarantee the possibility of carrying out such measures as we have
mentioned. We have dwelt upon this, not because it is theoretically
pretty, but because the concrete tactical situation in this case called
for these explanations.
■k.
76
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
Would the situation have thus been improved; and would an
attack have been successful? Of the first there can be no doubt;
it might have been as much improved as it was possible for it to
be. Whether the attack would have succeeded depends upon the
circumstances, and upon other measures working to the same end
against the left flank of the French. But if it had failed, at any
rate the right thing would have been done, and no one could have
blamed the mode of action.
of U Rozeri- ^ question be so treated, it may be said that a combined
euii.es and effort with strong forces, which must have been prepared beforehand
I08i heigilt ac ^ on a common pl& n > against the quarries of Rozerieulles and
the height 1081, would form the general preliminary condition for
an attack. It was easier to advance from that direction, since the
quarries of Rozerieulles, which were not more than three hundred
yards from the edge of the wood, could be captured under a concen-
trated infantry fire ; in short, an attack was at this point possible.
The quarries were finally captured by a handful of men, without
any regular preparation, and were permanently held. But General
von Steinmetz had not recognized the importance of these things,
although on the 17th of August detachments of troops of the
14th Division had occupied those edges of the Bois de Vaux which
jutted out towards this flank. A strong force of artillery would
also have been required at this point.
The good beginning, to which Steinmetz was incited by Moltke,
remained without any consequence. Instead of splitting up the
14th Division, one brigade should have been placed in a preparatory
position at the Mance mill, and the other at the north-east border
of the Bois de Vaux. One brigade would have been sufficient to
meet Lapasset’s brigade, the three others of the 7 th Corps ought,
in accordance with the intentions to attack the front (Moseou-Point
du Jour), to have worked principally against the flank of this front.
At least, this was the only way to crush the enemy. General von
Steinmetz hoped to do this, indeed the thought of doing so did
not leave him tlmoughout the day; but in that case the general
ought to have made suitable dispositions. But it seems impossible
to harmonize his wishes and his dispositions. With this object, the
attack from Gravelotte and from the Bois de Vaux wei*e at 10 a.m.
most essential. But everything connected with the 1st Army came
to absolute grief, and after the capture of St. Hubert we find no
example of the sensible handling of any considerable force. The
distribution of the troops of the 7th Corps made any handling on
a large scale very difficult; but this was all the more reason why
General von Steinmetz should have taken a correct view, should
have understood the orders which he received, should have moderated
the rashness of his temperament, and should not have allowed the
troops to run in upon an enemy, who could be plainly seen to be
lying, still unbroken, in his shelter-trenches. Moltke’s orders to
the 1st Army were so clear and suitable that it is impossible to
understand — at least, when we realize the situation of the moment —
how any inclination to act in opposition to them could have arisen.
■
THE GROUND IN THE MANGE RATINE.
77
L
Everything which took place up to the capture of St. Hubert was
in accordance with what General von Steinmetz had to do ; after
this, all went wrong, and the series of his mistakes commences from
that hour. These mistakes depend not upon whether he should
have made, or should have wished to make, a serious attack, but
upon the fact that he made it without looking to the preliminary
conditions, and that he carried it out against the enemy s front (an
error constantly repeated) without making at least one real effort
to turn the southern flank from the Bois de Vaux, as had been
distinctly directed by the order of 10.30 a.m. To endeavour to force
on a decision at this point, and even to think of a pursuit, when a
mere glance at the map must have shown that this was impossible,
was sufficient to bring everything to grief. The actual disaster was
at this point alone, but its consequences showed everywhere , amon
the leaders of the army, among the commanders of the smaller and of
the larger bodies of troops, and among the troops themselves, it was,
indeed, from whichever side we look at it, perhaps the most detestable
example of war of our times. And then to think that almost all
this mi edit have been avoided ; but thousands of the most incredible
things were done at this point, brought about for the most
reasons. That which was not was believed to be; that which was
obviously forbidden it was desired to do ; that which 1 was esire
to do (which was impossible of execution) was undertaken, < owing
to continual mistakes as to the means, by the worst possi • , ^ j
and the genius has yet to be born who by his skilful touch could
have brought all this into order— to then serve as a warning o
the future.
78
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
THE OCCUPATION OF THE POSITION FROM MOSCOU TO STE. RUFFINE.
Composi-
tion and
strength of
the 2nd
French
Army- ■
Corps,
Composi-
tion and
When we consider the resistance of the French force, we must hear
in mind that the principal part of it did not consist of fresh troops.
It was formed of the 2nd French Army-Corps under General Frossard.
This corps had suffered very considerably at Spieheren on the 6th,
and at Yionville on the 16th of August, and had since then received no
reinforcements. Its loss in killed, wounded, and missing amounted (ac-
cording to a statement in the “ Kriegsgeschichtlichen Einzelschriften’’)
to 5500 at Spieheren, and 5286 at Yionville, altogether 10,786, in-
cluding officers. It is, therefore, scarcely correct to speak of it as
an army-corps, since the troops which remained made up little more
than a skeleton. So much the higher must we estimate the tenacity
of their resistance after such heavy loss.
The 2nd Corps consisted of three divisions, of which, however, the
3rd (Laveaucoupet) did not take part in the combat of the 18th of
August, even with its artillery, since it was told off* to act as the
garrison of Metz, For this reason Lapasset’s Brigade of the 5th Corps
formed a support on the left flank of the 2nd Corps, on the line
Rozerieulles-Ste. Rufline-Moulins. This was composed of the 84th
and 97th Regiments of the line, one company of the 14th Chasseurs,
and one battery, to which later on were added one or two batteries
of the Guard.
General Frossard, therefore, on the 18th of August, commanded
two divisions and the artillery reserve of his corps, with one brigade
(Lapasset’s) ; he had no cavalry at all, since of these there were none
available along the whole line from Leipzig to Ste. Ruffine. In the
“ Kriegsgeschichtlichen Einzelschriften ” the strength of this force,
omitting Lapasset’s Brigade, is reckoned at 23 battalions and 12
batteries (of which two were armed with mitrailleuses), having
10,810 rifles and 72 guns (ef which 12 were mitrailleuses).
The statements of strength given in the “Einzelschriften” are
furnished by the well-known statistician Major H. Kunz, and since
their appearance I have obtained the following from more recent
sources; this shows some slight difference. According to this in-
formation, the French 2nd Corps on the 18th of August consisted
of 11,610 rifles, of which Verge’s Division contained 5620, and
Bastoul’s 5990.
Lapasset’s Brigade counted 3310 rifles, Nayard’s Division 6820,
Metman’s 7450, and Aymard’s 7950; the latter three were of 3rd
OCCUPATION OP THE FRENCH POSITION,
79
Army-Corps. These troops had suffered much less loss in action than strength of
the 2nd Corps, and the battalions were thus much stronger. About ot £ er
half of Metman’s Division was engaged with the German 9th Corps ; tro“p°s of
Nayard’s Division remained almost altogether out of action, but on 3rd »
the other hand Aymard’s Division was fully engaged. The total, Guard 1
therefore, amounted to 26,595 rifles, made up as follows : — Cor P s -
Iiifles.
2nd Army-Corps ... ... ... ... 11,610
Lapasset’s Brigade ... ... ... ... 3,310
Half of Metman’s Division ... ... ... 3,725
Aymard’s Division ... ... ... ... 7,950
Total .. 26,595
Moreover, to the 72 guns must he added the three batteries of
Aymard’s Division. It is impossible to ascertain whether there were
at Moscon any batteries from the reserve artillery of the 3rd corps,
but there might very well have been some. This question must,
however, remain open. There were then altogether in action on this
front 90 guns, of which certainly 18 were mitrailleuses. This is the
smallest number which can have been there. There were thus on a
front of 3300 yards (from Moscou to Rozerieulles) 23,295 rifles and
90 guns, or without artillery eight men to the pace, or with artillery
more than eight men. Since the French main position of which we
are speaking lay from 450 to 550 yards from the fighting line of the
German infantry, which was on the level of St. Hubert and the
gravel-pit, and since the French rifle had very good effect at this
range, it was possible for the French to keep up an annihilating fire,
provided only that there was a sufficient supply of cartridges. All
the above-named rifles and guns came gradually into action after
midday. Marshal Leboeuf (3rd Corps) brought up his last reserve,
the 41st of the line, belonging to the 2nd Division. Since already,
at “ about midday,” the 1st Brigade of the Voltigeurs of the Guard
had been sent to the assistance of Marshal Leboeuf, the number given
above must be increased by 6 battalions, each of 475 men, and there-
fore by 2850 ; so that “ about midday ” there were 26,135 rifles on
the front Rozerieulles-Moscou, But the “about midday,” consider-
ing the distance of the reserves from the line of battle, can scarcely
have been before 3 p.m. At about the same time (3 p.m.) Bazaine
started the 2nd Division of the Guard (Grenadiers) towards St.
Privat, af*te| having already sent off the reserve artillery in that
direction. Lapasset’s Brigade was also at this time reinforced by a
battery. Thus from 3 p.m. there were about nine men to the pace,
without counting the artillery. Leboeuf also placed the 2nd Voltigeur
Regiment of the Guard in the fighting line, so that only one Infantry
Regiment remained to him as a reserve. The whole of the infantry
of the 2nd Corps (Frossard) gradually took part in the fight, with
the exception of one regiment of the 2nd Division (the 67th), which
the general kept as a reserve in rear of Ch&tel St. Germain. The
84th Regiment of Lapasset’s Brigade did not share in the battle ; the
80
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
brigade thus had 3i battalions and 1' battery, or 1710 rides and
6 guns.
Occupation The line of defence of so much of the 3rd Corps as we must here
position. notice stretched from the height 975 on the north of Moscou to 440
yards to the south of that farm. The 1st Division of the 2nd Corps
( v erge s) extended from this spot, in shelter-trenches and in Point
uu Jour, up to the point where the main road from Gravelotte turned
to the east, on a level with the quarries of Rozerieulles, while the
2nd Division (Bastoul) up to about 3 p.m. held the flank of these
quarries. \\ e may therefore say that the French generals in some
degree expended their whole strength, and that no force of any value
remained at their disposal for the purpose of renewing the battle
lain ® 1 . • E ^ e .7 one therefore recognized on the evening of the
18th the impossibility of renewing the battle, and from this feelino-
sprang the belief that a retreat was obligatory. Even the last guii
ol the artillery must have been in action. Marshal Leboeuf had one
nhLt pl Re ‘Z pkC xT * north and south of Moscou, with the
object of firing from the flank upon the high-road; General Frossard’s
artillery stood from the height 1102 as far as the north of Point du
our, and fired at the same road from the front ; while it also occupied
a second artillery position to the south of the "old quarry” whence
it attacked the Bois de Yaux. i y> wnenCL
nf res P eets the distribution of the troops was at the beginning
of the battle so far as can be discovered at the present day, as follows •—
in reserTin ^ V ir°r T 'l? " d ***** *****
’ n ®heltei -trenches and m the Bois cles Gdnivaux, with
°- the J pushed forward towards the Mance Valley
between Leipzig and Moscou; the 59th Regiment in and around
Moscou ; tkne, of the 2 _ 7tll & Bois de3
re “f mder of the regiment in rear as a reserve; the 7th
Battalion of Chasseurs m the Bois des Genivaux.
i j.v yi ? aid ^ -Division — The 44th Regiment in shelter-trenches on
the h ^ SI rnf>, 0f Wit , h the 3rd Battalion in rear of that farm •
the 2 B01 ®, d ?r G ® nivaux > clos e to the high-road, with
llth 2 ~R»H V 11 anda ™ und Moscou, and the 1st Battalion in rear; the '
w“h Lie Sd Vo nJ irTsnu - 6 V%°1 Moseou ’ in conn ection
the 1 sahT • ° P •’ h f n -80111 m St - Hubert . three companies of
he l~80th m rear in shelter- trenches, two companies of the samp
battalion in shelter-trenches between the two houses of Point du
Jour, and the remaining company in shelter- trenches from Point du
of the roid- thfl °8 SG ® “ reServe behind bend
the 2-85th’^
0f the 3 “ 85th as an artiIlei 7
OCCUPATION OF THE FRENCH POSITION.
81
Bastoul’s Division — The 23rd Regiment to the east of the quarries
in shelter- trenches ; to the east, again, the 12th Battalion of Chasseurs ;
and in rear the 8th Regiment. The 66th and 67th Regiments were
in reserve to the south-west of Chatel St. Germain.
The disposition of the troops as well as the computation of their
strength (as given above) differ very much from those stated in the
Official Account, for since the publication of the latter many things
have been cleared up which could not be known at the time of its
appearance.
In order that the reader may form a good idea of the fighting Fighting
strength of the Germans, which was gradually brought into action
against the strip of ground from Moscou to Rozerieulles, the following Germans,
statement is given.
There were present: Of the 7th Corps, 17 battalions and 14
batteries; of the 8th Corps, 23 J battalions and 15 batteries; of the
2nd Corps, llj battalions and 2 batteries; of the 1st Corps, one
battery (of the 1st Cavalry Division) ; or — ■
Rifles.
Guns.
7th Corps
... 13,800
82
8th Corps
... 20,445
90
2nd Corps
... 10,335
12
1st Corps ... ...
— '
6
Total
... 44,580
190
From these must be deducted those troops of the 8th Corps which
acted in a northerly direction; namely, the 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, and
12th companies of the 69th Regiment; the 5th company of the 28th
Regiment; the 5th, 7th, 8th, and 12th companies of the 67th Regi-
ment ; the 5th company of the 60th Regiment ; and the 1st and 3rd
Battalions of the 40th Regiment, or altogether 4f battalions, which,
assuming in round numbers 900 rifles to the battalion, gave a total
of 4275 rifles; thus on the German side 40,310 rifles and 190 guns
took part in the fight in the Mance Ravine. Considering the position,
this force was not too great, and was certainly not so, if we remember
that the Germans came gradually into action during the course of
seven hours, while the French, soon after the beginning of the battle,
had, so to speak, all their rifles and guns at their disposal.
-crnTTRS OB' MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
TWENTY-FOUR HOOKS ui
I.i
the struggles in the mange ravine.
2i‘ , 3SS^2S^^^j5 l ‘SSSo’
“““'• system of army command, and <*» ™ wb ich resulted from {1»
n from the
corned
ordered to be given to bnn by th ® ^ , osal of the 3rd Corps,
quarters had reserved to themse ^ isth was given back
though this in the course of thej .^ », of the Germans was
to Prince Frederic Charles. T1 lineg . in the first passing
formed during the hatt e ^ Guard, and 12th Corps ,
torn right to left, were the 7th. ; " 3l i 3ra , m d lOtl.,
* in the second, also from ■ r^t to 1 .eftstood^t ^ ^ ^ tbe
and also the 5th a u<ms / General von Stemmetz expxessly
afternoon of the lbth » ’ Q orpS; s0 that the flanks ot the
received the command of the while t he centre was corn-
line of battle comnste o I line since there was but one
. nosed of two. thus tne centre uj. n( j thin, while the
corps in first line seems J tr0 & n a. For the 9th Corps
flanks on the other hanc wei e the 7th, 8th, and 2nd occupied
extended over nearly ^ fatainst the front of Point du
w ™i,“aSV“he 7th, and“the=2nd Corps fought in a space
“ f 2 S°e y c— d of the 8th Corps was not^ven bankte (tag
von Stemme ?- b ?““' t “3ntSiy returned the 2nd Corps to the
this command hut on the ; e rning command were
command of tne 1st A y, refined as should have been the
%y no means so clearly and shaiply ddined « » sno ^ ^
case. Again, the head-quar ers^sen the position of the
THE STRTJG-G-LES IK THE MANCE RAVINE.
83
played an entirely independent part. From the former General von
Goeben (Stir Corps) received no orders whatever ; on the other hand,
lie received several from the 1st Army (e.g. for the attack of the 31st
and 32nd Infantry Brigades), but each time only after he had already
of his own accord acted exactly in the sense of the order of General
von Steinmetz. This unsettled position (which was permitted or
neglected) of the 8th Corps was not altogether advantageous ; at any
rate, the simultaneous crossing of the Mance Valley on the high-road
by the 31st Infantry Brigade the Artillery of the 7th Corps, the 1st
Cavalry Division, parts of the 27th Infantry Brigade, and the 9th and
15th Hussars may be attributed to this condition of things, which
may thus be considered responsible for some of the later conse-
quences, which might have been avoided, if the sequence of command
had been more clearly defined.
The struggle on the heights of Point du Jour presents, with The mixed
reference to the troops engaged, such a variegated collection of races ^ a t ^ a e cter
of men as cannot be found in any other instance in German or troops.
Prussian military history. The 8th Corps, being a border force, had
left the greater part of its infantry regiments in the Rhine fortresses,
and had been made up to strength from other corps districts. The 29th
Infaiitry Brigade consisted of the 33rd Regiment (East Prussian) and
the 60th (Brandenburg) ; the 30th Brigade was composed of the 28th
(Rhineland), the 67th (Magdeburg), and the 8th Jagers (Rhineland);
the 31st Brigade alone was normal, being composed of the 29th and
69th Regiments (Hundsriick); the 32nd consisted of the 40th Regi-
ment (Rhineland) and the 72nd (Thuringian). Again, the 7th Corps
consisted half of Westphalians and half of Hanoverians, the 39th
(Lower Rhine) and the 77th (Hanover) being engaged at this point;
if we consider also the 2nd Corps, with its Pomeranians and its Poles,
we find an extraordinary variety of races in a small space. This is
a point to which some attention must be paid, for if anything goes
wrong in battle, one is sometimes only too quickly ready to make the
troops concerned, and the “ unmilitary ” races from which they are
recruited, answerable for it. Since this has taken place in this
instance, I have thought it right to make the foregoing statement.
If fate then determined that not one of all the bodies of troops who
fought here should carry the attack through, and that few among
them should be entirely exempt from panic, we may learn from the
fact this lesson, that the best soldiers, under such circumstances as
existed here, cannot remedy tactical errors which have been com-
mitted; that in such cases all “courage” falls to pieces. It is not
a question of a brave heart alone, for such a heart must be guided
by a clear head ; if this is not the case, brave hearts will result only
in heavier loss. The whole of the German troops who were engaged
here were fresh in comparison with the French, for only the 39th,
40th, 72nd, and 77th had suffered loss in battle, and their loss was
unimportant in comparison with that of the French. All this teaches
us how strong, under the then circumstances, a skilfully planned
defence was, and we may draw from this the conclusion that it will
be very strong in the future under corresponding conditions.
84 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
Why do I make this statement ? 1st, the somewhat resultless
attacks on Moscou and Point du Jour are, in the eyes of many, not a
very flattering story for the 8th. Corps; and even now we may hear
it said that the 3rd Corps would have done better, for the reason that
the Brandenburgers are better soldiers than the Rhinelanders, that
they stick to their work better, and so on. Indeed, during the pre-
paration of this book, this very remark was made to me by an officer of
high rank. 2nd, I shall show that an entire corps, the 2nd, though it
was fresh, and was pushed in en masse , did not really gain a hair’s
breadth more ground than had already been won by the troops of the
8th Corps, although the enemy could not in the evening possess the
same fighting power which he had at midday. 3rd, the numerous
attacks of these bodies of troops, of so many races, over open ground,
in swarms, lines, and columns, were each and all broken down; yet
not one of the bodies of troops which attacked the main French $
position lost twenty-five per cent, of its strength. This fact might
appear to tell very unfavourably against these troops, but such an
idea, in my opinion, would be wrong, although we undoubtedly must
demand that any good body of troops must be able to endure twenty-
five per cent, of loss, without ceasing to attack, and without falling
into disorder. If the question be asked, “ Why did none of these
troops do better ? ” the blame for this failure must not be laid upon the
troops themselves, but upon the tactics for which they were employed.
I will go into the latter question later on, and will now only remark
that the troops of those days had not yet got rid of a number of
elements which might at the beginning of a campaign bring about
many disadvantages for all troops, especially when they came upon
so strong a position as this was. We ought, therefore, to the utmost
of our power to guard against this disadvantage of universal military
service. Moreover, strong positions make an impression upon each
individual man, and do not, as a rule, increase moral confidence,
especially in cases where the assailant can make but small use of his
fire. On the whole, it would not be too much to say that, if the
infantry which were employed against the position Moscou-Point du
Jour had been equipped with sticks instead of with rifles, such an
equipment would have been about good enough for the “ customary ”
tactics of that day, for which, according to the latest opinions, no one
can be made responsible. And if it be desired to discuss and come
to a conclusion on the question, whether attacks over open ground
can still be successfully conducted, the events connected with the
position Moscou-Point du Jour will afford more matter for considera-
tion than all the other events taken together. At any rate, in this
case, no particular race can be made responsible for the perpetual
failure ; Rhinelanders and Brandenburgers, Saxons and Hanoverians,
Westphalians and Lower Rhinelanders, Thuringians and Pomeranians,
Poles and East Prussians, they all devoted their strength to the same
task, and could not carry it out. If, on the other hand, in one single
case an attack was carried through under yet more difficult circum-
stances, including even actual collision with the enemy (the 38th
Brigade at Mars la Tour), this one instance of success can be balanced
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANCE RAVINE.
85
by dozens of which the issue was most unfavourable. So long as no
information worth having is brought forward with reference to these
failures, the question of the attack over open ground cannot he
absolutely decided. We should also, before we enter upon discussions
and regulations, first exactly examine the occurrences of military
history. In that case, we should at least find ourselves in the right
way towards the solution of one of the most important tactical
questions. But no one takes this way; whether because they are
afraid, or because they will not take the trouble, I do not know. It
has, anyhow, been but rarely taken up to the present.
At the moment when the first guns of the 9th Corps were fired Beginning
(about noon), the 26th Infantry Brigade was at Ars ; the Corps of
Artillery of the 7th Corps on the march to Gravelotte, at which place Gravelotte.
it did not arrive until 2 pan., while the remainder of the artillery and
• infantry, with the exception of the advanced detachments in the Bois
de Vaux, were assembled at Gravelotte ; the 1st Cavalry Division
was about Rezonville, the 8th Corps at Villers aux Bois and Rezon-
ville, while the 4th Infantry Brigade, with 2 batteries and a
squadron of the 10 th Dragoons, was on the march to Vaux. General
von Goeben considered the artillery fire of the 9th Corps as the signal
for the “ simultaneous ” attack, and ordered (at 12,15) the 15th
Division to advance on Gravelotte, to occupy that place, and to take
up a position under cover (?) in the “ hollow ” (!) to the north of the
high-road. From Rezonville to this hollow is about 2400 yards,
which it took 30 minutes to traverse. The 15th Division cannot,
therefore, have reached this hollow until 12.45 at the earliest, and
must have been fired on by the French artillery. Nevertheless, the
Official Account says that, “ General von Steinmetz, in consequence
of what he observed, at 12.30 ordered the artillery of the 7th
Corps to advance.” General von Zastrow then allowed the batteries
of the 14th Division to take up a position between Gravelotte and
the Bois des Ognons. It is then said that the fire of these batteries
“ forestalled the enemy, who were apparently surprised,” while only
one page earlier it is stated that the 15th Division had already been
tired on by the French artillery! The 4 batteries of the 14th
Division were reinforced, at 1.25 p.m., by 3 of the 13fch Division
(the 4th Battery was with the 26th Brigade in Ars), so that at this
time there were 7 German batteries, in action, giving in this space
a number of guns equal to that of the enemy's artillery. Their effect
i ► was good, several limbers and ammunition- waggons soon blew up in
i the neighbourhood of Point du Jour, and after a short time this group
of German artillery began to feel that they were superior to that of
the enemy. This quick result was specially due to the fact that
Major von Eynatten had already, on the 17th, selected this artillery
I position. He thus knew the range, and could give information to the
batteries which came up later, so that they also quickly ranged them-
selves. This is how a commander of artillery ought to act. If we
have begun by giving praise, we must, nevertheless, blame the fact
j that the reinforcement by the 3 batteiies of the 13th Division was
| not carried out on one flank, but on both, of the artillery of the 14th
86
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
Distribu-
tion of the
troops of
the 7 th
Corps
shortly
after i
p.m., and
its conse-
quences.
Division ; thus the brigade-division of the 13th. Division iought from
the first under unfavourable circumstances, since their batteries vv ere
divided by those of the 14th Division. After this line of artillery
had been formed, General von Steinmefcz (at about 1 p.m.). received
the order of 12 o’clock, which said that “only such artilleiy as were
needed for the introduction of the coming attack were to be shown.
Moreover, the hearer of the order took a good hour to go from
Flavigny to Gravelotte, a distance of 3£ miles. . _
General von Steinmetz had, in accordance with the spirit of this
order, “held back” the infantry, and had placed the whole of the 27th
Brigade to the south-west of Gravelotte. Of the 28th Brigade the 1st
and 2nd Battalions of the 53rd stood at this moment near the 7th
Jager Battalion at the northern edge of the Bois de Vaux, with their
front towards the Rozerieulles quarries. The 2nd and Fusilier Battalion
of the 13th (25th Infantry Brigade) were, under General von Zastrow,
in rear of the above, in order to serve as a support in the wood;
the 1st Battalion of the 13th was to the north ot the Mance mill;
and the 2nd of the 73rd (25th Infantry Brigade) in the mill ; to
the right of the artillery were the 2nd Battalion of the 77tli, and the
Fusilier Battalion of the 53rd (28th Infantry Brigade), as well as the
1st and 3rd Battalions of the 73rd (25th Infantry Brigade). The last
formed the escort to the guns. This distribution of the troops, which
broke up the unity of the divisions, brigades, and regiments without
any real necessity, contained in itself- the seed of failure, especially
considering the difficult nature of the country, and the fact that the
error was not remedied. Moreover, the commander of the 13th
Division had not exactly distinguished himself by his initiative ; but
even under more favourable circumstances in this respect the dis-
tribution of the troops must of itself have rendered difficult the
conduct of command, the direction of the force and every detail of the
working. Everything of this kind thus went wrong with this corps
throughout the whole day, and it was made powerless by these dis-
positions. At a later hour the 26th Brigade was directed on Vaux,
and the 27th on Point du Jour; but on this flank, throughout the
whole day of battle, no attempt was anywhere made to carry out any
reasonable or great tactical measure ; the troops of the 13th and 14th
Divisions continued to be mixed together, while nowhere did the
infantry take up a strong fire-position, nor could they, for this reason,
make any attack with large and well-ordered forces. The 26 th
Infantry Brigade certainly fought united, though without any success
worth mentioning, against Lapasset’s Brigade ; but from the time
when the 27th Brigade took part in the action the 7th Corps, in this
country, extended over not less than 71U0 yards ! While the dis-
position of the force of this corps, from the 17th to 5 a.m. on the 18th,
was such that it could not properly carry out the task allotted to
it by the order of 2 p.m. on the 17th, its commander now deprived
himself of all power and means of carrying out the battle order of
10.30 a.m. on the 18th. Thus the 7th Corps discharged none of the
duties laid down for it in either order; everything which happened
pointed rather to uncertain fumbling, to the want of any distinct ideas.
, 1 1 ' t it ' ‘
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE*
87
to the absence of any clear grasp of their task, and to a lack of adequate
measures for its execution. If, in spite of this condition, the corps
apparently carried out the first part of its task, this was not in any
way due to its leader, but because the enemy allowed it to do so ;
indeed, if the corps had not been there at all, events at this point
after the commencement of the battle would have gone on much the
same. It is true that the 9th Corps also extended itself over too
great a space, but in its case there was an energetic and clear direction
of the struggle, while with the 7th Corps everything was uncertain,
without energy and without any real aim, and this though at this
point it was possible, by observing from the west and the south-west;
to make sure, even on the 17th, as to the means which an attack from
this direction offered to the leader. That part of the Bois de Yaux
which would have served this purpose had been abandoned by the
French on the 17th, and the northern border of this w T ood was in
the hands of the above-named battalions of the 28th Brigade. There
was, therefore, no obstacle to ample reconnaissance and other prepara-
tions, while the road from the Mance mill itself pointed out the
proper direction for the attack.
The conditions were far harder for the 8th Corps under Distribu-
Goeben. The strips of wood between the Bois des Genivaux and the ' *
Bois de Yaux, as well as the Bois de Genivaux itself, were in the the 8th
hands of the enemy, and had to be first captured before any steps
could be taken for an attack against the position Moscou-Point du
Jour. General von Goeben, having probably been called upon by
General von Manstein (9th Corps) for support, allowed the batteries
of the 15th Division to commence firing at 12.45. General von Goeben
had so massed his division in the hollow mentioned above that their
right (the 29th Infantry Brigade) rested on the road Gravelotte-Point
du Jour; next, on the left, came the 30th Brigade, and then the
artillery of the 15th Division, while the 7th Hussars formed the left
flank. The whole division was thus not only normally in hand, and
drawn up suitably for the battle, but was even set beforehand in the
direction in which it would naturally move. If, nevertheless, later on,
various difficulties arose in consequence of these suitable dispositions,
this was not due to General von Goeben, since he, unlike General von
Zastrow, had it not in his power to ward them off* by timely and
suitable measures, for Goeben had to make himself master of difficult
and wooded ground before he could give any consideration to the
dispositions necessary for an attack on the enemy's advanced and
main positions. The situation opened itself out to Goeben as it were
step by step, and he could endeavour to deal with it only step by
step. If the troops became afterwards jumbled together, it was
simply the orderly and well-directed advance of the division as a
closed mass which prevented the occurrence of the same confusion
which was to be found with the 7th Corps. Under such circum-
stances as the 8th Corps had to deal with, it can never he possible
to altogether avoid mixing troops together, and this has no special
disadvantage, provided that, at any rate, the direction of all the units
of the division against one object remains feasible; while, taking all
88
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
tion.
things into account, we must acknowledge that, so far as under the
very difficult circumstances a whole division could be directed at all,
the problem was really solved up to the time of the capture of St.
Hubert. Whether, nevertheless, General von Goeben did allow the
attack on St. Hubert to take place a little too soon, is a question very
difficult to decide. What he did with this object, and in accordance
with the time and the circumstances, was entirely in harmony with
the spirit of the order for the attack which he received (at 10.30 a.m.),
and in no way transgressed von Moltke’s order to General von Stein-
metz given at noon, even if we leave out of consideration the question
as to whether Goeben had any knowledge of this order either from
Moltke or from Steinmetz.
The remainder of the 8th Corps was at this time still in the rear.
Value of We may see how, under such circumstances, it is of great
in e ffonfeof advantage to a defender to occupy the ground in front of a position,
the posi- As a rule, in the German army we are opposed to the use of so-called
“advanced positions,” but I am of opinion that this is rather like a
judgment on a theoretical scheme, and shows a tendency to reject the
good with the bad. Questions of this kind cannot be answered in
principle either favourably or the reverse; the surrounding circum-
stances must be first examined. If we consider the strength of the
French main position, the possibility of conducting the struggle from
this and from the advanced position at the same time, and the
difficulties which the strip of wood must cause to an assailant
advancing from that direction, we shall agree that it was certainly
right, tactically speaking, that Marshal Leboeuf should advance his
troops to the western edge of the Bois des G6nivaux, and defend this
edge against the assailant in order to oblige him to develop his attack
prematurely, and to make a comparatively large display of force, since
at a later ^ hour the uniform direction of such a force must entail
special difficulties. Marshal Leboeuf could consider and provide for
all this before the battle, and by occupying the ground in front of the
position, he certainly, under the existing circumstances, did what was
entirely right, and caused the assailant no small embarrassment.
Thickly wooded ground entirely prevents an assailant from
knowing whether a battalion, a regiment, or a brigade is extended in
front of him. He must himself extend, throw back the enemy, and
then again get into order, before he can venture to press on farther,
unless he is prepared to find his troops becoming crowded together
and in confusion. Goeben’ s position was such that only by fighting,
and by an infantry attack, could he obtain a correct idea of the
character of the strip of wood. Of this he could learn nothing
whatever by reconnaissances, such as might easily have been carried
out by the 7th Corps ; he must fight before he could see anything.
It was no easy task which lay before him.
Moreover, when Goeben became aware of the occupation of the
strip of wood by the French, he was compelled to take such measures
as might lead to its capture ; he could only ask himself whether he
was doing this at the right moment and in accordance with the orders
which he had received. The decision as to the proper moment for
Goeben’s
position.
Goeben’s
attack.
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANCE RAVINE.
89
action depended upon the condition of the battle— while Goeben was
expressly called upon to attack — and thus upon the then position
of the 16th division and the corps artillery. At the moment when
Goeben sent the 15th Division into action, the 16th Division was in
the act — in pursuance of his orders— of forming up to the south-west
of Gravelotte as a second line to the former. Thus Goeben had done
exactly what was right, having one division in action, in good order,
and, as far as could be prearranged, well under control, "while the
other was collected in the rear as a mass, and the corps artillery
was ready to take part in the battle; he was thus ready for any
contingency. If, however, It be stated that it was intended that the
1st Army should take up a defensive attitude, as the Official Account
seems to have had an especial interest in impressing upon us (though
it was in opposition to the order of 10.30 am. for the battle), we are
obliged to ask whether the 8th Corps then belonged to the 1st
Army. But whether this be answered in the affirmative or in the
negative, the “ defensive,” equally with the “ offensive,” called for the
capture of the strip of wood. In neither case could this be avoided,
unless it be held that the defensive meant only the use of artillery.
But no tactician in the world could allow this, and Goeben least of all.
A strip of wood of this kind cannot be cleared by the fire of artillery,
and its capture therefore required that the infantry should attack.
In whatever way we consider Goeben’s dispositions, whether from
the point of view of the defensive or of the offensive, they w$re,
taking the time and the circumstances into account, correctly thought
out, correctly prepared, and, as far as lay within the province of a
general in command, correctly carried out.
The 29th Infantry Brigade was specially to advance along the road Direction
Gravelotte-Point du Jour, while the 30th moved against the Bois °ttackof
des Genivaux. Thus the former was not ordered to move 0$f tat the 15th
along the road, and the brigadier might, therefore, allow it to move on division,
one or on both sides of the road. This was also quite right under the
circumstances. In this manner, both brigades were further given the
direction of their later tasks ; since changes of direction of fighting
troops cannot be carried out, an extension of the original direction
of the march of the 29th Brigade must lead them to Point du Jour,
and that of the 30th on Moscou. And so it came about. At the
time of making these dispositions, Goeben, from his position, could
distinguish both these principal points in the main French position.
This position appeared to him extraordinarily strong, and the approach
to it very difficult. In front of him was a wood, of which he did not
know the character, but which was held by the enemy, while in the
centre of the wood there was a deep ravine, and on the farther side
a bare hillside, which could not he altogether avoided on either the
right or the left ; all this forbade Goeben to anticipate any very great
success. He was indeed in a somewhat similar situation to that of
the 4th Corps at Sadowa. If the 15th Division were expended in
the struggle for the advanced position, Goeben could still make use
of the 16 th in the same direction, and might moreover expect, in
accordance with the order for the battle, energetic assistance from
90 TWENTY-FOUB HOUBS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
the 7th Corps from the Bois de Vaux; but he might very well be
disappointed in this, while he could not take it for granted, or count
upon it beforehand.
First joint From about 12.45 the artillery of the 15th Division were in action
fi^htoTthe a ^ 0ut 740 yards to the west of the road Gravelotte-Malmaison, firing'
7 tL and 8th on the enemy’s artillery at Moscou ; thus the two principal arms came
Corps. into action at about the same time. In consequence of the conditions
which he knew he might expect, and which led him to anticipate a
hard struggle, General von Goeben at once called up the corps
artillery from Rezonville ; these, passing the 16th Division at a trot,
hurried forward into the line of guns, and at once opened fire. Thus,^
at 1 p.m., there were under Colonel von Kameke, 11 batteries of
the 7th and 6 of the 8th Corps ; in all 102 guns were in action. The
thunder of this considerable force of artillery, as heard at that time at
the position of the head-quarters at Fla vigny, drowned that of all the
other guns, while, as we know, Moltke had but a little before (at
noon) ordered Steinmetz only to show his artillery under certain
contingencies. If, in spite of this, the struggle of the 1st Army had
so quickly increased to such an extent, this might have been due to
special circumstances which might call for a closer approach of the
head-quarters to the line of battle ; and, indeed, such special circum-
stances had arisen. Goeben had committed himself to action, having
no knowledge whatever of Moltke’s order of 12 o’clock to Steinmetz,
while he had in front of him a strong position, which, whether it be
considered offensively or defensively, had not been sufficiently attacked
by artillery. The artillery fire from Gravelotte was still increasing
in severity, and Moltke must have gathered from this that his order
of noon had not been carried out. This neglect was due to the
unsatisfactory arrangements for command in the 8th Corps and to the
» force of circumstances. We must observe, in contrast, that the corps
artillery of the 7th Corps did not arrive at Gravelotte until that of the
8th had already been under fire for an hour ! Such delay was suited
neither to the offensive nor to the defensive. The artillery of the 8th
Corps took longer than that of the 7th to range itself, which was due
to the familiarity with the ground which the latter had acquired
before the battle. At a later hour, Lieut.-General Schwarz took over
the command of the artillery of both corps, and thus one main con-
dition of good effect was obtained. As a rule, the artillery of the 8th
Corps fired on the French positions from Moscou to the main road,
and that of the 7th Corps from that point to Rozerieulles ; but the
range was more than 3300 yards, and did * not permit of exact
observation of fire, except as regarded Point du Jour and Moscou
themselves.
Advance of In order to obtain greater effect, it became necessary to push in
Brigade. g reat artillery line to a closer range, which, again, implied a
Capture of previous advance of the infantry ; in consequence of this, the 33rd
to the south J ^ e g im ^ nfc occupied Gravelotte, and the 2nd Battalion of the 67th
of the Malmaison ; but the remainder of the infantry were still to the west of
main road, those two points. Both General von Wedell (29th Brigade) and General
von Goeben were aware of this fact, but before the orders of the former
THE STRUGGLES IN' THE MANGE RAVINE.
91
had reached the 33rd Regiment, and those of the latter had reached
General von Wedell, the companies of the 3rd Battalion of the 33rd,
advancing from the east side of Gravelotte, had captured the opposite
border of the wood, with the 12th and 9th companies extended, and
the 10th and 11th closed in rear. In the wood they followed the
direction of the main road, all four companies being in line with a
firing line in front ; in this formation they crossed the valley of the
Manee, came out on the east side of the wood, and occupied the
quarries in their front which lay to the south of the main road.
During this movement, General von Wedell ordered the advance of
the other two battalions of the 33rd. These both took up the direction
towards the south-east, with the 2nd Battalion in the centre and the
1st upon either flank of it, so that the line of advance of these two
battalions crossed that of the 3rd, but lay behind its front. Both
battalions gained the edge of the wood at their first rush, pushed
through the wood up to the bed of the Mance, and there halted to
recover their order. From the Mance they later on moved directly
upon Point du Jour, opposite to which farm they, at about 2 p.m.,
issued from the wood. The regiment, therefore, was at 2 p.m. in the
following position ; namely, from the quarries to the south of the
main road as far as a point opposite to Point du J our, or with about
1100 yards of front. Moreover, the wood had in this direction proved
no great obstacle to movement. At the above hour, the 60th Regiment
of the 29th Infantry Brigade was at Gravelotte, as the “ Divisional
Reserve. 3 ’ (?) The following was the state of events at 2 p.m. to
the south of the main road; namely, very little resistance had
been, encountered in the wood, the loss had been small, movement
had not been hindered, and on a front of 1100 yards there had
been little difficulty in passing through it by companies. The
enemy’s fire first became destructive as the troops mounted the open
slope beyond.
A little later than the advance of the 33rd, General von Strubberg Extension
pushed forward the 30th Infantry Brigade to the north of the main of
road. It consisted of five battalions less one company, and marched the aoth
through Gravelotte in the following order : the 9th, 10th, and 11th ^| a ^ r
companies of the 67th, the 8th Jagers, the Fusilier, 2nd and 1st ngace ‘
Battalions of the 28th. The 2nd Battalion and the 12th company of
the 67th had been already sent forward in the direction of Malmaison
and Mogador.
After passing through Gravelotte, the three companies of the Capture of
Fusilier Battalion of the 67th remained on or near the main road, the f 0 ie t ^ ood
9th company being in front on both sides of it, with its right in con- north of
nection with the 33rd Regiment, while the 10th and 11th companies ^ d mam
were formed as a half- battalion on the road itself. In rear of them, the
3rd and 4th companies of the 67th followed on the road, in half-section
columns, while to the left of the former were the 2nd and 1st
companies of the same regiment. The two last-named companies at
once captured an advanced corner of the wood, from which the troops
in its front had received a certain amount of fire. The quantity of
fire which in consequence broke out along the whole front of the strip
''Mill®"
r
92
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
Arrival of
the 1st
Cavalry
Division
and of the
16th ,
Division.
y
I ii jH
Advance of
1 H r-i* jj 1
the artil-
lery. Ar-
I I'B'
rival of the
|»
corps-
artillery of
the 8th
iS i|
Corps.
of wood to the north of the main road put an end to any doubt that
the wood was strongly held, and General von Strubberg was thus
obliged to first complete the deployment of the brigade. Consequently,
the four companies of Jagers moved in one line on the left of the 1st
Battalion of the 67th, while on their left were the Fusilier, -1st and
2nd Battalions of the 28th in two lines, of which the first consisted of
the 10th, 11th, 6th, 7th, 3rd, and 2nd companies in extended order,
with the 12th-9th, 8th-5th, and 4th-lst in half-battalions, the
12th company of the 67th being on the extreme left flank.
After the brigade had taken up this formation, it advanced to the
attack of the wood, which (though it was not then known) had its
edge strengthened by abatis and breastworks of stone and earth. The
attack was successful, and the enemy made no further resistance of
importance, but drew back through the wood into his main position.
The losses of the assailants were not inconsiderable. At about the
same time (2.15 p.m.) as the 33rd reached the eastern edge of the strip
of wood, the 30th Infantry Brigade was in possession of the wood to
the north of the main road, and reformed itself in the Mance Valley.
When the 1st and 2nd companies of the 67th had closed up, they
climbed the slope in their front, and pressed forward at a run to the
north of the main road for 250 yards in the direction of St. Hubert,
finding some cover in the folds of the ground. At that time the 3rd
and 4th companies of the 67th stood on the roadway ; to their left
were the 9th, 10th, and 11th companies, while on their left were the
8th Jagers, the Fusilier Battalion, and the 1st Battalion of the 28th.
On the other hand, the 2nd Battalion of the 28th and the 12th
company of the 67th had turned towards the north, where they formed
a flank, just at the spot where the brook which runs from La Folie
falls into the Mance. In these positions, the above troops carried on a
severe struggle, which at first was directed by the brigadier himself.
The front of the 30th Infantry Brigade extended over about 1100
yards.
While the two brigades thus worked their way through, General
von Hartmann had placed the 1st Cavalry Division to the west of
Malmaison, and had reinforced with its battery the artillery line of
the 8th Corps. There were thus at this point, from about 1.30 p.m.,
116 guns in action. Soon after, to the west of Gravelotte, came up first
the 32nd, and then the 31st Brigade, so that at 2 pan. General von
Goeben had a fresh division at his disposition ; as a provision against
a possible retreat on Gravelotte, the 2nd Field Pioneer Company was
directed to prepare that village for defence.
The successful progress of the infantry fight, together with the
arrival of the above troops, made a nearer approach of the artillery
appear necessary with a view to the possibility of more systematically
and effectively firing upon the main position. Even this was not in
excess of a defensive action. The advance was not made simul-
taneously, but in echelons from the left, so that the fire never really
ceased. In consequence of this movement, the artillery line of the
8th Corps at 2 p.m. extended from a point to the north of the height
1009 as far as to the south of the main road, having Gravelotte on
\\ f i
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
93
its right rear; thus the artillery had, on an average, won about
1100 yards of ground. At about the time of this advance (2 p.m.)
of the artillery of the 8th Corps, both brigade divisions of the corps
artillery of the 7th Corps had arrived to the south of Gravelotte, but
only one battery could find room to form line. When the advance
in echelon of the artillery of the 8th Corps was observed, the artillery
of the 7th Corps closed up to the south of the main road, in such a
manner that they at the same time turned half-left towards the north,
with a view to gain more space. In consequence of this, the artillery
of both corps were actually in contact with each other to the south
of the main road, and at this moment the 2nd H.A. Battery of the
corps artillery pushed forward into the line ; on the other hand, the
two light batteries and the 3rd H.A. Battery of the corps artillery
could not yet find room to form line. The number of guns in action
was thus increased to 132.
The three batteries named above, together with the Brigade
Division of the 16tli Division, formed, from 2 p.m., a reserve of 36
guns.
The fire of the 132 German guns proved very effective; Moscou
and Point du Jour burst into fames, while the French artillery, which
had up to that time only temporarily ceased firing, were now for a
period entirely silent, and at 3 p.m. appeared to be no longer able to
continue the struggle. The German artillery could therefore select
other targets, and now fired on the whole front of the infantry
positions, as well as at the advanced post of St. Hubert. Even though
their effect upon the French infantry might not be at once evident,
yet it was to be presumed that a fire kept up for several hours upon
the enemy’s shelter-trenches would result in the destruction of the
hostile infantry ; but to effect this the German artillery must be in
a position to keep up an uninterrupted fire. This might, unfortu-
nately, and very probably, not be the case at the critical tactical
moment.
While the German artillery, as has been shown, had gained con- Second ad-
siderable ground, and had silenced the enemy’s guns, the 30th the loth
Infantry Brigade, which had in the mean time been closed up, had infantry
begun their ascent to the east out of the Mance Valley. Brigade.
It would appear that the Fusilier and 1st Battalions of the 28th The 28th
commenced this movement, advancing from the point where the track
leading to St. Hubert left the eastern border of the wood. The hack,
battalions moved up the open slope in company columns, and made
a rush against the height of Moscou, but were both driven back into
the wood by the weight of fire. The enemy’s fire had broken up all
the companies, and only with difficulty was it possible to collect
again various small bodies out of the several companies, and with
them to hold the eastern edge of the wood, while part of the men,
either wounded or fugitives, fed for shelter to the cover of the Mance
Valley.
A similar attempt to the right of this attack had a more fortunate Capture of
result. We know that, to the north of the main road, the 1st and the
2nd companies of the 67th had fought their way for 250 yards beyond st. Hubert,
■ : >
*
94 TWENTY -FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
to the north the edge of the wood. To the right of the Fusilier Battalion of the
?oadT ain 28fch, these two companies, together with all four companies of the
the 8th ^ 8th Jagers, were pushed on in one line for a long rush over the open
thf' 67 th and g ro ™ d - They followed the direction towards St. Hubert, which to
e * a certain extent was taken as a point for attack by all the troops
fighting in this part of the field. During the rush, the four companies
received a severe fire on their left flank from Moscou, but they,
nevertheless, continued to advance until they had encompassed St.
Hubert on the north-west at a distance of about 200 yards. At this
point, all the four companies lay down and opened an effective fire
against the farm, which was at the same time continually and success-
fully kept under fire by the German artillery.
At a time closely corresponding with that of the rush of the
Jagers, the 1st and 2nd companies of the 67th climbed the bare
slope in small parties, and took up a position on both sides of the
main road, but principally to the north of it, also at about 200 yards
from St. Hubert. On their left, the three Fusilier companies of the
67th, each of which had one section extended and two closed, in rear,
had edged in towards them, and thus were in close connection with
the right flank of the Jagers. Thus St. Hubert, after the troops had
passed by the north of the quarries which lay there, was shut in also
on the west. There were here the 1st and 2nd companies of the 67th
in the first line and in the open, while between them were clustered
three sections of the 3rd and 4th companies of that regiment, the
remainder of these companies having thrown themselves into the
quarries. While the farm was thus encompassed on the north-west
and west, and its garrison were held in check by the combined fire
of infantry and artillery, another portion of the 67th, consisting of
one section of the 4th and part of the 1st company, turned against
that farm from the south of the main road. These detachments
succeeded in getting to within 100 yards of St. Hubert. In this
critical situation, the 11 companies of the 67th and Jagers steadily
persevered in the attack. It is true that the garrison of St. Hubert
had already at this time suffered so considerably that their fire caused
but little injury to the assailants ; but, on the other hand, the latter
were under a heavy fire from Moscou and Point du J our. In fact,
the struggle was at its climax, and neither side could endure this
state of things for long ; it required, in fact, only an impulse to either
party to precipitate an immediate decision.
Advance of tip to the time of the arrival of the 16th Division, General von
infantry Goeben had held hack the 2nd Regiment of the 29th Infantry Brigade
Brigade, (the 60th) at Gravelotte. When this division came up (at 2 p.m.),
SiTgravef- an( l the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 33rd had captured the point
pits/ of wood to the south of the quarries of St. Hubert, as well as the
gravel-pits which lay, in the direction of Point du Jour, 200 yards in
front of the eastern border of the wood, the 33rd Regiment was
extended over a front of 1100 yards in two groups each of six com-
panies (the 3rd Battalion and the 3rd and 4th companies being in
the quarries of St. Hubert and their neighbourhood, with the 2nd
Battalion and the 1st and 2nd companies in the gravel-pits and
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
95
their neighbourhood), in such a manner that between the two groups
there was an open and unoccupied space of about 750 yards. This
disposition for the fight was very unfavourable in front of the strong
position of the enemy, but neither the divisional general nor General
von Goeben, who was at Gravelotte, could observe it. But informa-
tion was obtained from the numerous wounded of the 33rd, and also
from the fugitives, who were streaming to the rear, that that regiment,
in consequence of their long struggle under fire, would soon have lost
all its power of offence (which was entirely incorrect) ; from this, and
from the advance of the 30th Brigade against St. Hubert, which
Goeben had seen, that general came to the conclusion that the time
had now come to give the firing line an impulse towards the capture
of St. Hubert by pushing in fresh troops.
For this purpose there were ten companies of the above-named Attack of
60th Regiment available. These, at 2 p.m., advanced from Gravelotte lhe 60th *
for the purpose of strengthening the attack on St. Hubert, and pressed
on first as far as the western edge of the wood, where they took up
a position to the south of the main road, with the 1st battalion on
the right, the Fusilier battalion on the left, and the 6th and 8th com-
panies in the centre. At 2.30 p.m. these companies began to move,
with the Fusilier battalion leading, crossed the ravine on the main
road, and extended from the left to the south of the road in the
following order: the .11th, 10th, and 9th companies, leaving the 12th
at the border of the wood. The other companies were following these
by the order of the divisional general, when the commander of the
regiment rode to meet them, in order to encourage the F usilier com-
panies, which had been received with a murderous fire ; while doing
so he was severely wounded, which seriously compromised the unity
of all further movement. Nevertheless, between 2.45 and 3 p.m., all
the four Fusilier companies had pushed forward into the interval
between the two groups of the 33rd.
When the 3rd Battalion and the 3rd and 4th companies of the Capture of
33rd saw, from the quarries of St. Hubert, the advance of the 30th of
Infantry Brigade against that farm, they for the most part closed St. Hubert
to the right towards this brigade, and thus shut in St. Hubert on Remain''
the SOUth. road.
While the six other companies of the 60th were still engaged in Capture of
advancing, that is to say, before they reached the firing-lme, the st * Hubert *
detachments which encompassed St. Hubert rose up nearly simul-
taneously for a joint rush, and pressed forward from various directions
against the farm. The garrison did not await the shock. Since
there were no entrances on the west side, the troops which crowded
towards it from that direction pushed out on to the main road, in
order to get into the farm and the garden in company with those
which came up from the south. The capture of the farm was without
dispute the act of the 8th Jagers, the 1st Battalion of the 67th and the
3rd company of the 60th ; for some sections of these troops rushed in
first, while the others, namely, the Fusilier Battalion of the 67th, and
detachments of the 33rd, 60th, and 28th, followed a little later * but,
as far as regards the main portion of the work, it was carried through
:
Distribu-
tion of
troops in
the posi-
tion.
96 twenty-four hours OF MOLTKE’S strategy.
by h The Officii
SSS ^ ti the troops ™ »P*/£^ ji&.t th£
not think M this is q£to S™ torS3(sS Jagors), there
pointmth tte = t,o«f fcjor VOB Bron^ ^ cam6 from *e
was no senior officer ett , fres h troops from the rear has
arrival of the 60th. _ine •, b est form of impulse m
be6 h tisls '^t communicates its movement to the firing-line, and
such crises decisive rush and this is how, according to
induces it to make the . hi success ful attack is to be
information which I have companies 0 f the 60th
explained. At about 3 £* ™ Jg* 1 "the right of and beyond it
had pushed, on ei ei -in ^ a ,,. a ^a t. the latter the troops could gam
towards Point du Joui. r>u » 3 nm. eighteen com-
11th companies of the 33rd; and the lst k 011 0 f the 80th
St. Hubert had been garrisoned by the 2nd Battalion ot tne butn
Fr “t Srf events had shown that the advance of the 60th had
take,! place at the right-that is to say, •* *» '"™ t h„
Whether the direction of tins advanoe^on, the ^ road
most suitable may seem douhtM; but under tne cncu ,
mav well be granted. For at the time when tnes e u asm I
pushed forwards to give their impulse the ! garrison o J St^b
£> closely engaged that they were no longer capab
loss upon the 60th. As a matter of fact the latter ^ ™ question,
loss until later on, and then from Point du . 3 oux The i eai ques
are officeis m • o , 0 , There is no other way of doing
ft U I? under such c rcumstances & as existed here, more troops than
this are med itk more difficult to extend, and the odds are 100 to 1
that, from this cause alone, a reaction will set m Horn the
left which will diminish the force of the impulse. The tactician must
strain every nerve to avoid this, since it is a question of a moial, anc
not of a material, action, of which the conditions ^ e “ am ^ a; [ S tt g r
same, whether on the bridge at Areola or at St. g ub ert. As a ma tei
of fact the troops of the finng-lme stormed St. Hubeit and tney
needed no matell, but only a moral, ™ Se
them to do so; but experience teaches us that when tioops m
firing-line require this kind of support.it must come up from the rea ,
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
97
and that in such cases small detachments are sufficient, provided
only that they are brought up from the rear. They will always
give such support as is necessary; if they fail to do so, then let their
cockades be tom from their dishonoured heads, and their soldier's j
tunic be changed for a convict's jacket. \
The front line of French shelter-trenches, which was then strongly j
occupied by infantry, lay in an irregular shape about 250 yards to
the north of the garden- wall of St. Hubert. It stood at about the I
same level as the first floor of the house, and thus commanded all I
the garden and farmyard, so that a regular occupation of the farm
was a matter of some difficulty. Indeed, it was not properly occupied,
and it is hard to see how it could have been. Major von Bronikowski,
however, looked after the main point, a fire-position with a sufficient
number of rifles in action, and for this he employed the stormers in
the first line (the 8th Jagers and the 67th), who had not even been
re-formed into sections, which, jmdeed, in such cases is not necessary. f
It is true that the want of officers was much felt, but the good
training of the men went far to make up for it. Of the eighteen ;
companies mentioned above, it would appear that at about 4 p.m. 1
eight were employed in the farm itself, while the other ten were in
reserve in rear as far back as the quarry ; this was not a suitable use
to make of them after shedding so much blood, but no one understood
how to arrange for a better one in a fire-position. For further details
regarding the occupation of St. Hubert, see chap. v. pp. 174, 175.
At about the time that the above successful attack was carried Events on
out, efforts to gain ground were made on both flanks of the 15th ^® g ^ aaks *
Division. For some considerable time St. Hubert had been intuitively storming of
recognized as the tactical objective, and it was quite natural that the
effect of its capture should be shared by the troops fighting to the eulies.
right and left of it ; on the right, it was again the 60th Regiment
which directly made use of this effect, and gave the impulse to
attack. The endeavour of the Fusilier battalion, as well as of the six
Musketeer companies, to assault Point du Jour was observed by the
six companies of the 33rd, which were in the neighbourhood of the
gravel-pits. These gallant men rose up at once, with a view to gain
at least 250 yards of ground at one rush. It is true that the companies
on the left (the 6th and 7th of the 33rd) suffered terrible loss, and
were put out of action for the day, for only weak remnants got back
to the border of the wood ; but the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 8th companies
of the 33rd carried the quarries of Rozerieulles, and held them for a
time, while two sections of these companies remained in the gravel-
pits. From that point to the north the men of the 2nd Battalion of
the 33rd were mixed with those of all ten companies of the 60fch
lying along the eastern edge of the wood as far as the quarries of St.
Hubert. 1 will later on give more details about the heroic struggle
which followed in the quarries of Rozerieulles.
The loud shouts of the four Jager companies, as they stormed St. Attacks on
Hubert, which had reached to the right as far as the 67th, 33rd, and Moscou *
60th (Fusiliers), were also heard at Goebens position, as well as by
the extreme left flank of the 15th Division. As we know, the 2nd
H
s a a
11
"S
m
Omissions
and con-
98 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE'S STRATEGY.
Sl & **•
Sg the hollow way which ran towards Moscou ag^t the further
whirh lav in. to Ms front; but be was driven back, lwo luitaei
attacks which were made in the same direction with weaker forces
were equally repulsed. Major Lange now attempted a fourth against
the heights of Moscou, resting his right upon the 1st a ^ d , „
Battalions of the 28th, but this had no better success; on the ^the
hand, the 1st company of the 28th, with parts of
4th, under Major von Keppelow, pressed into St. Hubeit imm - - .V
m r |f\^ e o 4 fc abo a ut3 S 30 p.m., and we must see what in the ^inean
An order was sent at 3 p.m. to the 26th Infantry Brigade to advance
with a battery and a squadron of the 8th Hussars, rom Are agamst
Vaux and Jussy; at 3.30 p.m. the brigade had not yet received the
order, and were consequently still in Ars. The l usi iei ^ a ,
the 77th (28th Brigade) had, with the corps arfcinery. come up i
Gravelotte, and had taken up their position in real of the nghttlank
to the south of that village ; to the south of them, again, were the 3rd
Battalion of the 73rd (25th Brigade), the 2nd Battalion of the 77th.
and the Fusilier Battalion of the 53rd (2Sth Brigade) , the 2nc
Battalion of the 73rd (25th Brigade) was m the Mance mill , the s 2/ th
Infantry Brigade was on the east of Gravelotte; while to ^eastol
the right flank of the artillery of the 7th Corps were the 1st Battalion
of the 77th (28th Brigade) and the 1st Battalion oj J the > 73id _ (2ot^
Brigade), and the 2nd and 3rd companies of the 13th weie m the
valley to the north of the Mance mill. In front of the height 1081
at the northern edge of the Bois de Vaux, were the 7th Jagers, and
the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 53rd (28th Brigade) and also the
Fusilier Battalion of the 13th (25th Brigade), while the 2nd Battalion
of the 13th was in rear. This disposition of the troops is so devoid of
any plan, and the units are so broken up, that it would seem that no
one knew what it was desired to do. Iu i any case, lt was D
time to get the units as much as possible in order, to decide as to
what ought to be done, and to arrange suitable preparatory action,
and this the more, since the 16th Division was present as a reserve at
Gravelotte, and the 2nd Corps was already on the inarch to that
place. What was the good of the infantry of the /th Corps in .this
incomprehensible dislocation of units, and, in addition, m rear of the
front of another corps ? ,, . .. t n „ , , .
ions General von Steinmetz had an order to attack from Giavelottc
n - and the Bois de Vaux.” The instruction sent at 12 o clock, to under
-
. . . '
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RATINE.
99
certain circumstances show only his artillery/’ did not set aside the f^ion of
main idea of the order for the battle, which had been correctly Genera?
thought out and well worded by Moltke ; it merely explained the von
position which he was to occupy in the then state of the battle; and stemmefcz
to a certain extent deferred the action which had been prescribed to
a later hour. A battle is constantly varying and changing, and it
should have been the task of General von Steinmetz, during the
interval since he had received the order of 12 o’clock (which arrived
at 1.15 p.m.), to make such preparations for the attack from the Bois
de Vaux as might have enabled him to energetically support from
that point the struggle of the 15th Division. The fact that nothing
of the kind was done was the fault of the commander of the army,
and not that of the corps-commander. General von Steinmetz had
to give his orders in the spirit of MLoltke’s order for the battle; the
corps-commander had to decide “how” these orders were to be
executed. With this object, General von Zastrow should either have
himself been on the eastern edge of the wood, opposite to the quarries
of Rozerieulles, from 3.30 p.m., or he should have kept some one there
to watch the action for him, and to report to him when necessary.
If this had been done, even the first capture of that quarry (which
took place at that time) would have been known, whereas, since all
this was neglected, the officers in supreme command heard nothing
whatever of either the first or the second capture of the quarry, or of its
final occupation. Indeed, when the fighting troops have been pushed
2000 yards in advance, and there is wooded ground and a ravine
between them and their leaders, the latter must arrange for a chain
of communication, otherwise all connection will entirely fall through.
Of all that should have been done, nothing, absolutely nothing at all,
was done, although from 1.15 p.m. to 3.30 p.m., or for more than
two hours, the whole of the infantry of the 7th Corps, with the
exception of the 26th Infantry Brigade, as well as the five battalions
at the northern corner of the Bois de Vaux, were, under the very
eyes of Steinmetz and Zastrow, scattered over a space of about 2800
yards. General von Steinmetz, equally with General von Goeben,
could see from Gravelotte that the fight of the 15th Division was
progressing favourably, and he knew that the 16th Division was
standing since 2 p.m. to the west of Gravelotte, in readiness to support
the 15th, who were in front of them; he knew, moreover, that the
whole of the 2nd Corps was on the march in this direction as a
second line ; under these circumstances, especially since the fight came
to a head around St. Hubert, should he not, two hours before, have
organized as far as possible the above-mentioned infantry of the 7th
Corps, according to their tactical units (which, given a front of 2800
yards, might have been done by 2.30), have collected them together
in the valley at the Manee mill, in order from this point to have
closed up to the right to the five battalions at the northern corner
of the Bois de Yaux, and then, from this by no means unfavourable
point, have seized with the utmost energy the southern corner of
the quarry of Rozerieulles, which had already been partially captured.
In this case, the battle would have been decided. This southern
100 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY,
comer w„s the weakest point of the whole of
siSriz *» *&«
i-w • U T ’ ve been noted and laid down; there was no flankin D
fi“ the Salients, and only the Minimum ot frontal ire.
Moreover, the 33rd held their ground m i^XSteflanktdby
Uvpn an Aiisicm knows that a salient angle, it it cannot be uanne _ .>
fte e d£»deS the weakest point Did , no one
Did no one know that there was such a point ? The latter is Ji ^
since in the first place, it was shown on the map, and in the feeco
ffSld be seen from the spot where General vor «
EYnm 2 30 to 3 p.m. General von Stemmetz, if he had nndeistooc
what Moltke meant, if he had said to himself that the order of
12 o’clock was by circumstances, without any act on on ^ 1 J,
„„ it <,pt aside miffht have assembled 14 battalions ot tne /wi
Corps m the neighbourhood of the Mance mill, and have used them
with decisive effect in the direction named above. „ . .
Tlfis mass of infantry would, at the northern edge of the Bois de
Vaux, have been increased to 19 battalions by the a (1 dition o le ve
which were there ; he would then have had something in hand, anc
with it might have pushed through the point which had already
with such tactical skill been partially captured by the ^ We
need not consider whether this would have been successful , at any
rate it would have been the right thing to do, and what was right
would certainly have been successful. If dispositions had been made
in accordance with the spirit of the order for attack ot 10.30 a.m.,
the quarries of Rozerieulles would not have been lost again ; me lee s ,
the battle would have been decided at this point at about 4 1 p.n .
What then, should have been the relation of the infantry to the
great artillery-line in their front ? The artillery m this case required
no escort; such a line of artillery can protect itself, especialiy when
it has mastered the enemy’s guns. It it was desned to push l
forward, this was forbidden by the order of 1- o clock ; but it must
be remembered that two hours had passed since then, and that ordeis
are not intended to be eternal; if they were, we should want only
automata and not generals. But we have generals, m order that they
may themselves see and know when they must take upon themselves
the responsibilitv for their own decisions. General von Stemmetz
saw distinctly that the 8th Corps had done rather more than merely
“show its artillery,” while eventually not only was the attack
dictated to him, but even the very direction which that attack should
take. In consequence of the success of the 8th Corps, he ought to
have done what we have here laid down, and to have reported to
Flavigny as follows : ‘"The 8th Corps is hotly engaged in . front, the
7th will support it from the flank (Bois de Vaux) with all its
strength ” The situation demanded such action. But no preparation
was made, nor was any support afforded to the struggle of the 15th
Division which we have described. This was left to take care ot
itself and thus the enemy was able to bring almost his whole strength
against the one division. If this division had had 19 battalions m
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
101
action on its right, who can dispute that in that case it would perhaps
have obtained yet greater success in front? Even if they had not done
so, certainly the 16th Division would. However, General von Stein-
metz, from the beginning to the end of the battle, held fast to the
pure frontal attack; he thought only of the exit by the main road,
and later on, after such omissions in this respect, made the most
inconceivable dispositions to the front, such that, even if he considered
himself to be altogether bound by the order of 12 o’clock, are made
only the more unintelligible by this fact. In short, Generals von
Steinmetz and von Zastrow destroyed here in a few hours the glory
of the whole of their great lives. They moved in complete uncertainty;
they might have had 19 battalions in hand ready to deal with a
moment full of important tactical results, and they had not one.
Thus uncertainty is its own punishment; thus is wasted time never
‘ to be regained ; thus do neglected preparations revenge themselves in
the failure of what must otherwise have succeeded. It is impossible
to make full use of one’s strength ; through irritation that which is
right is left undone, from uncertainty that which is false is accepted.
We may see from this example how very much harmony between the
persons concerned must contribute to success, and how discord may
confuse the clearest matters, orders or instructions, and may so bring
about failure. There was no need here for a genius or for a great master
of war ; all that was required was a general with sound common sense.
Just as the employment of the infantry of the 7th Corps points Passage f°r
to the uncertainty which prevailed on this flank, and, in the same ar 1 ery *
manner as the omissions with regard to this arm, which have been
mentioned, bore their own punishment with them, so also was
it the case with the artillery. It has already been stated in the
description of the ground that the Bois de Yaux was by no means
impassable. It had been in our possession since the morning of the
17th, and there had been plenty of time to reconnoitre the wood, and
to ascertain whether the German artillery could move in the neigh-
bourhood of the height 1081. In that case it would have been seen
that with a little trouble a road practicable for^ artillery might
have been made in the direction of that height, since neither the
wood nor the soil prevented it ; at any rate, it was easier to make
than was that which was cut in darkness on the 18th of October,
f 1806. Why was nothing done, when fighting had already gone on on
this flank, when it was probable that the enemy’s position must be
? energetically attacked, and when this position could be reconnoitred
without any great labour or danger ? It was merely reasonable to
i; consider that it might become necessary to endeavour to extend
German artillery from out of the Bois de Yaux, and that for this
* purpose a practicable road would be required. In any case, it would
I be easier to extend artillery from the Bois de Yaux than, as was the
case later, at St. Hubert. And if the advance of artillery at St,
Hubert was ordered, why was it neglected in front ot Kozerieulles ?
There was finally so much artillery in the front that no one knew
how to make use of a great part of it. Had those batteries and guns
which it was desired to bring into position at St. Hubert, and which
i
The staffs
102 TWENTY -FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
wprp ar>t n all v so brouo-ht, been sent into action against the French
left flank, how different would the < effect have 1 jeen at the ] latter
point, even if that artillery had at this spot ^^ 0 ?^ Hubert’
a=s -we shall shortly see experienced by the artillery of tot. riu e .
bnt if the artillery combat had been begun from the Bois de Vaux
with better preparation, it is certain that at this point there was
no such difficult phase of the combat as that which awahed them
at St. Hubert, and which they -nevertheless ,.0^7^' de
nrovision of a good system of communication thiough tire J3ois a
Lee the Gem,™ infantry held its northern holder, have
been useful, even if only for them. p i :j.u
Generals von Steinmetz, von Zastrow and von Goeben, with then
staffs, were but a few hundred paces from each othen The wlo
behaviour of the latter was quiet and equable and h s appemance m
accordance with his strength. He sat hi the saddle with Ins tall
figure bowed forward, with his shoulders a little drawn up and wi
his head stretched forward, while through his speotades stowed t^»
wise eyes, which shone at times, when a moment o . „
The officers of the other staffs watched Goeben s actions as if they le
that this was indeed the man. Hardly a word was spoken; with h s
glance steadily directed on the enemy, he sat there like a bronze
statue, a sure support both in soul and in brams m any severe work.
A word quietly spoken to this or that general, or to a stafl-officer 01
an adjutant, a calm nod when he received a report ; m this mannei
and without fuss, he did all that a general could do under the circum-
stances, with a degree of certainty, of sequence and of quiet that in
spite of the difficult situation of the struggle, gave all around him a,
feeling of security, which was transmitted, as if by electiieity, o e y
private. We know well that this can be, but we do not know how
it comes about ! A general can inspire confidence where a fool may
be the cause of a panic. I have been assured that Goeben only once
turned his eyes to the rear, at the moment of the arrival of the Ibth
Division, and only once left his place (when the king approached his
right flank), up to the moment when he, at a later period, rode over
to St. Hubert; in this he judged rightly that in such cases to act thus
was the part of a true general. w .
How different was everything in the two other starts. When
gloomy depression rests upon the face of the leader, when he says
nothing, but betrays the conflict in his soul by his gestures and
restless behaviour, when he incessantly tugs at and turns his horse,
and remains silent for a long time, and, when he does speak, shows the
agitation which he suffers inwardly by the sharpness of his voice ancl
accent, there can then be in those around him no quiet and no
courtesy, no feeling of confidence or ot trust. Proof as he was agams
the advice of others, Steinmetz was as headstrong as lie was Tain.
There was no harmony between him and his staff, and no cheerful
spontaneity ; military absolutism weighed like lead on the best
dispositions, and prevented all from delighting in their duty. Geneiai
von Steinmetz was engaged in two struggles : one against the enemy ;
the other, and that the fiercest, within himself, by reason ot the
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
103
!
*
I
I
I-
i
i
continual contest within him, thinking that he stood between Scylla
and Charybdis, yet perhaps knowing what he ought to do, he actually
wasted his strength in himself and against himself, with the result
that he did only harm. In this battle he failed to find, at the right
time, either the strength or the decision to let orders be simply orders,
or to come to a great and good resolve, and then to use all his might
to forward it. There was no harmony between him and General von
Zastrow, and no agreement with regard to the manner in which the
troops were to be employed. There was at no time any feeling of a
clear and certain direction of the fight, and, since the leader himself
oscillated between utter neglect and the most hopeless decisions, the
manner of fighting and the employment of the infantry of the 7th
Corps remained without steadiness throughout the day. The leader
of this corps simply frittered away his infantry, thus making himself
tactically impotent ; indeed, it can scarcely happen that any infantry
will, in any future action, suffer from such tactical neglect and ineffi-
ciency as these did. It was not the fault of the troops ; we know that
the Westphalians can fight as well as any one, and we know, further,
that the men did not fritter themselves away ; it was due to faulty
tactical leading, and this on that flank which had to play so important
a part. If we consider the events of various kinds which had happened
to the 7th Corps since midday on the 17th, what, we may ask, would
have become of this corps under such a leader, if by any chance they
had got into a difficult position ? It is simply impossible to guess.
General von Steinmetz also failed in giving orders, while the 15th
Division were attacking from Gravelotte, for a similar attack from the
Bois de Vaux. At 3.30 p.m. his infantry was scattered over a front of
about 7000 yards, were broken up into fractions, even in the battalions,
and this without any reason why they should be so, and without
their having been seriously engaged ; and they thus remained until
the end of the battle. Under such circumstances, frontal attacks must
run their course without any prospect of success, as indeed was the
case on this occasion.
The 15th Division was also left to itself up to 3.30 p.m. ; it stood
like a wedge opposed to the strongest part of the French front, in after 3 p.m.
advance of the whole of the remainder of the line of battle, and about
400 yards from the enemy's main position, exposed to a constant
frontal and flank fire. It was broken up into a line of irregular
groups, with no fresh support in their rear ; their situation showed
the value of the powerful line of artillery on the heights of Grave-
lotte, and much which would otherwise be unintelligible is explicable
solely owing to this circumstance ; above all, the facts that the enemy,
who was superior in numbers at that point, did not rush down from
the slopes above, and that St. Hubert could be occupied, to say nothing
of its capture. All these found their cause in the great tactical
superiority of the German artillery. Up to 3.30 p.m. the 15th
Division fought with about 10,000 rifles against about 16,000 of the
French 2nd and 3rd Corps, but it was supported by 156 guns against
90 of the French • it had by that time suffered its principal loss, and
may have counted about 8000 rifles. Of these at least 25 per cent.
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
were (scattered in the woods which lay behind the front and theie
were thus at first about 6000 rifles of the troops m the front lme
these had been thinned by fire, and were covering a lme of lullj
2200 yards. Their positions were as follows: in the q™Ties o
Rozerieulles, in the gravel-pits and their neighbourhood— -the 1st and
2nd companies and the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd, and on their left the
Fusilier Battalion of the 60th, with the 1st, 2nd, and 4th companies of
the same reeiment close to them ; in St. Hubert were lb companies i of
the 8th Jagers, and of the 28th, 67th, 60th, and 33rd, with part oi the
3rd Battalion of the 33rd in their rear; to the north of the main load
were the mass of the 28th Regiment and the 12th company of the 67th.
Moreover, up to 3.30 p in., it had not been found possible to establish a
connected fire-position, from which the main_ position might be
attacked later on; but the troops remained, m the above-named
oroups (some of which were far away from the others, while all were
weak on the flanks), in the same condition in which they happened to
find themselves. But if they should fail to take up a fire-position,
from which the infantry could fully prepare the . attack, then any
attack must be without prospect of success, especially it no strong
co-operation were ordered to take place from the Bois de Vaux. Both
of these conditions actually obtained ; no fire-position was arranged,
and no attack was made from the Bois de \ aux, and whim finally
every effort was directed towards carrying out an attack against the
front, without preparation and on the worst possible plan.
General von Goeben was not indeed at 3.30 p.m. fully aware of the
real condition of the 15th Division, but his judgment, nevertheless, told
him that it must have nearly exhausted its spirit of offence. The
strip of wood in rear of their front was crowded with fugitives from
all the troops engaged ; there was there a motley crowd oi white, red,
and blue shoulder-straps, and of men with and without arms, m
helmets, in forage-caps, and even without any covering on then
heads. But there were no officers, except the few which lay there
wounded. The senior officers certainly collected together all the men
who were in the valley, but this was only the minority, since the
majority kept themselves carefully concealed outside of the bottom of
the valley. Such detachments as could be collected were sent forward
again to the fighting-line; but, since they, were almost altogether
without officers, and even without non-commissioned officers, very few
of them ever arrived at it. Practically the strip of wood ^ remained
filled with a large number of fugitives up to the morning of the 19th
of August, and no exception can be made of any particular body of
troops, or of any special province, for the seductive shelter of the
wood claimed some tribute of human frailty from all. From this
fact we may learn the lesson that under such circumstances the post
for officers is in rear of the front line. The wounded from among the
fighting troops for the most part turned towards the main road, which
thus from noon until late in the night served as a drain for the
wounded and unwounded of all units of troops. Most of these fellows
seemed in good spirits, almost all appeared certain of success, and up
to the evening there was rarely any look of real defeat about them.
m
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
105
The attack of the 15th Division had at once called up into their The French
position the two corps of the enemy which stood opposite to them, 3,30
and from the time that the Germans showed themselves to the east
of the Mance Valley an unbroken fire of skirmishers was kept up
from the French line of fire which we have described. By 3.30 p.m.
the French had no longer any lai’ge reserves of infantry available ; the
3rd Corps had already by that hour exhausted its infantry, but the
2nd had still one fresh regiment at its disposal. This condition of
things, which could not then be known, was really a great and general
success. The French artillery had retired their guns for a time, and had
left the German artillery fire unanswered; this did not look as if the
French had any superabundance of strength. Real counter-attacks,
with the exception of some from the neighbourhood of Leipzig and
Moscou, had not up to this time been undertaken, while those which
were made, though energetic, were but in small force. All these
circumstances must have shown the Germans that the entire force of
the French was fettered to the heights which lay to the front, that
they were all drawn into the fire-fight, and that there was no longer
any chance of a counter-attack in force. If this opinion were correct,
the Germans might hope that an attack carried out according to a
settled plan against the front and flanks of the main position might
succeed. Such an attack ought, therefore, to have been thought of
after 3.30 p.m. It was thought of — not on any plan, but without
system altogether, and an unfavourable time and unpropitious con-
ditions were chosen for it.
As far as concerned the arrival of the 29th and 30th Brigades of ^
Infantry, their leading and behaviour was generally suitable. Of hading of
the 29th Brigade only the 33rd came into action. It first captured the German
the wood, and then re-formed its ranks in the Mance V alley with a bnga es ’
view to pushing on up the slope. The leader of this brigade kept
up at first a close communication by means of reports with the officers
in higher command, and the 30th Brigade did the same to the north
of the main road. The tactical advantage which was obtained up to
the time when they began to mount the open slopes to the east, was
due entirely to the excellence of the leading from the brigadiers
downwards, and to the co-operation of the two brigades against St.
Hubert. The issue of the 2nd Battalion of the 28th to the north was,
under the circumstances which prevailed, a great tactical advantage,
whether it was so intended or not. Since hut for the thorough cover
afforded to the ffank by this battalion, by repeatedly assuming the
offensive in strength, it would have been at least doubtful if the
infantry could have persevered in their advance up the eastern slope,
in which case the artillery of the 8th Corps might have run some
risk. If Marshal Leboeuf had wished to really threaten the Germans
on this slope, he ought to have energetically attacked the fork of the
valley from Leipzig; but he did not know where to find sufficient
force for such an attack, and the repeated counter-attacks of the
French, being made in insufficient force, failed; they disturbed and
distracted the attention of the Germans who occupied this (for an
attack against Moseou-Point du Jour) most important point, but they
106 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S strategy.
in no way jeopardized the bold advance of the loth Division. Even
at a later hour the marshal could not collect any force with which to
make use of the advantages which offered themselves to him from
this direction; but the Germans could not know this. If, therefore,
the Germans proposed later on to press forward with an energetic
attack against Moscou-Point du Jour, it was necessary that they
should throw out beforehand an ample force to hold the fork of the
valley and its neighbourhood. General von Strubberg, who came up
to the spot, correctly recognized this fact, and neglected nothing to
direct attention to it. This fact must also be kept well m mmd when
considering the conduct of the fight at a later hour. The roops in
general committed the error of crowding directly forward to the spot
where before there had been only loose lines of skirmishers, that is
to say, towards the exit of the main road in front of bt. Hubert
This can never be entirely avoided in attacks which converge, but
every effort must be made to diminish the evil., lo some extent all
went wrong ; in the wood the men broke up their formation too soon
and too much; thus they advanced from it still too scattered, and
then crowded themselves together at the very moment when they
ought to have been dispersed. But we must here remark that the
position of St. Hubert naturally induced the mistake, faking it
altogether, however, it was no easy tactical task to smoothly carry
through an attack with two brigades fighting side by side, to then
push them through thickly wooded ground, to collect them anew
into their units, and then to work them against St. Hubert so well,
that really it was scarcely possible to do it better ; for the mam force
of both brigades, which had been engaged from the beginning, was
brought directly to bear upon that object for the attack which was.
later on pointed out to them by the situation, though not by t ie
orders which they received. . , , ,
The On the whole, the attacks were generally carried through by
companies, which knew how to work together in spite of the difficult
the smaller conditions from which they suffered. At the same time, the behavioui
“nits. :/, of the four Jager companies is full of instruction, and was most suc-
cessful; they kept up their fighting strength, which is so necessary
for an energetic offensive, although they were m a long line , of
skirmishers without any reserve; they rose up first for the storming
of St. Hubert, after they had kept up an effective fire on the farm,
and they held their ground in the farm itself until nightfall, lhen
loss was not small (12 officers and 197 men), and their manner of
fighting seems to me to have been nearly ideal. I own that with
such excellent material (Jagers and Rhinelanders too), it is easier to
carry on than with the ordinary average of men, but, nevertheless,
example has a real tactical value. There is yet another point which
is worthy of notice— the 15th Division was formed provisionally from
various units, but no tactical difficulty arose from this fact; on the
contrary, the system of command worked remarkably smoothly.
The Fusilier and the 1st Battalion of the 28th seem to have had the
smallest part in the main success, but circumstances were unfavour-
able to them; at any rate, their loss was not heavy (22 officers and
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RATINE.
107
341 men), and it is not easy to avoid the impression that the loosen-
ing influence of the wood upon the leading and the cohesion of the
units was particularly disadvantageous to them; hut, on the other
hand, the loss of the 67th, which distinctly suffered from most
unfavourable conditions, was not heavy, being 29 officers and 844 men.
It would have been better if the rush of the troops (the 60th and
28th), after the capture of St. Hubert, had not taken place. Indi-
vidual companies could do nothing against the main position ; indeed, \
nothing whatever was possible without a previous systematic pre- . . 1
paration, and there had been none of this — thus the problem still
awaited its solution. Individual companies (of the 33rd and the ]
60th) certainly succeeded in getting to within what was then the
normal range (200 yards) from the main position, but there the enemy’s f
power of fire was far superior to theirs, so that they had to turn back
' again, and could not make a stand until they arrived again at the
eastern edge of the wood. Reaction of this kind is positively invited
by such advance under superior fire, and experience shows us that
troops melt away under it, and lose too much of their tactical value.
Such combats of companies on their own account must be avoided,
especially when there is no distinct object in front to be attacked, as
was the case here. Fortunately the enemy up to this moment was j
content to drive them off* with fire ; if, as he did at a later hour, he
had himself passed to the attack at the right moment, a panic would,
! as ever, have been the result of such tactics, and the troops would
1 have been as good as lost ; and this not so much on account of their
material loss as owing to the bad moral effect of a counter-attack
by the enemy, if made at such a moment. Mitigating circumstances
can be pleaded in excuse of the rush to the front by companies
which took place up to 3.30 p.m. ; the same cannot, however, be
said of the later period of the action, during which, even until
night, the same mistakes which had been made from midday, were ■!
continued to an ever-increasing extent. Rhinelanders, Prussians.
Brandenburgers, Magdeburgers, Thuringians, Pomeranians, and Poles,
working, so to speak, as an army on a small space, and trying to do
that which they had so often failed to do, show us how bad were our ;
tactics of that day, not with reference to the special bodies of troops, {
but with regard to the army as a whole. This example has much in t
common, in the succession and in the character of the mistakes, with
the successive attacks of the Prussians on the French at Jena, and
* showed just the same obsolete tactics. We used mainly shock tactics
without any sufficient preparation ; indeed, even without any prepara-
tion at all, for we never took up an effective fire-position with the 1
infantry. Shock tactics should not have been employed until after
systematic fire tactics had held sway ; but we had then no sufficient |
knowledge of the power of fire of the enemy’s rifle. j
B. From the Capture of St. Hubert to 5 p.m. \
General von Goeben, at about 3 p.m,, became convinced of the^eben^
necessity of reinforcing the 15th Division, which was then in action, g p>m>
108
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
the 7th
Corps.
■in the direction of Moseou. Judging from his position at the time, and
considering the circumstances, he could not well come to any other
conclusion. He consequently ordered the artillery of the 16th Division
and one of the brigades which still remained at his disposition to
come into action. Both of these decisions were correct, considering
the time and the circumstances. But if General von Goeben was of
the opinion that (at 3 p.m.) a reinforcement was required by the
15th Division, which was somewhat pressed, or, in other words, if
he thought that without such an access of strength this division
would no longer have been able to meet a counter-attack by the
enemy (and he could not know that the French had no reserves
available for this purpose), how was it that the Generals von Stein-
met z and von Zastrow, whose position was quite near to his, had
even before this hour come to the conclusion that the enemy was
overcome, and was even ready to abandon his fire-positions ?
The feeling What special symptoms were there of such a thing? 1. General
artmery von Goeben had, at 2.15, informed Steinmetz of the successful progress
position of of the struggle of the 15th Division; this was before the capture
of St. Hubert. But this could have raised no special hopes in
Steinmetz, even omitting the fact that Steinmetz must have known,
from his own observation, the contents of this report, and, as a
matter of fact, did know them. 2. Soon after 2.15 p.m. General von
Wedell had sent a report, from the south of the main road, that a
turning movement round the enemy’s left flank would result in the
capture of the heights which the French held. General von Goeben’s
report was correct, and General von Wedell’s proposal was so exactty
adapted to the circumstances, and so distinctly demanded from
General von Steinmetz the occupation of a suitable preparatory
position and the bringing up of a mass of troops— which, considering
the time and the conditions, might perfectly have been carried out —
that from this time forward the conduct of General von Steinmetz
becomes a complete riddle.
I must here refer the reader to what has been said with regard
to the distribution of the infantry of the 7th Corps at the time
(2.30 p.m.) of the receipt of General von Wedell’s report by Steinmetz.
Even if General von Steinmetz had not of his own accord come to
the conclusion at this moment that the mass of troops could and
must be pushed forward from the Mance mill against the Rozerieulles
quarries, he could not, after the receipt of General von WedeU’s
report, be any longer doubtful as to what he ought to do. This
general had distinctly laid the idea at the feet of Steinmetz ; indeed,
he had thought for him, and all that the latter had to do was to see
what was put before him, and to be willing to do it ; in which case
he could not go wrong, tactically speaking. The preparatory position
of the whole of the above-mentioned infantry of the 7th Corps might
have been occupied in the spirit of Wedell’s report, and they might,
in accordance with it, have been already set in motion in the direction
named by him at 3 p.m. General von Steinmetz did nothing of the
kind, nor did he think of any useful measures. 3. Half an hour
later, in the long and constant advance of the battle, St. Hubert fell.
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAIVNE.
109
From the general's position conld be plainly seen the retreat of the
former French garrison, while the enemy's artillery, and even his
infantry, ceased to fire. But soon afterwards, when the defenders
of St. Hubert had cleared the front, the latter fire reopened along
the whole line, but only as a slow fire of skirmishers. Different
movements of columns and lines close in rear of the crest of the
heights by Point du Jour were, as I have been informed by trust-
worthy witnesses, clearly to be seen with glasses from the line of
the artillery of the 7th Corps. Moreover, life and movement could
be distinctly observed in the shelter-trenches, etc., of the main position,
while nowhere was there any sign of their abandonment. In the
artillery line of the 7th Corps the opinion was that the enemy's
infantry was reorganizing in the shelter-trenches, and that, in the
anticipation that an attack on the main position would follow the
capture of St. Hubert, the reserves had been pushed in closer to
the crest of the heights. This was at the moment the universal
impression produced upon the artillery officers of the 7th Corps who
were engaged in the observation of the fire. This impression was
correct, as was evident later on.
Whilst these officers considered that the enemy were now first impression
preparing themselves for some great and final action, and that they ^^ eneral
had principally on this account allowed a pause to take place in steinmetz.
their fire, General von Steinmetz and General von Zastrow found
■ yet a third opinion, namely, that the enemy was retiring and aban-
doning the shelter-trenches. It is not proposed to enter into the
question here, but there were various opinions, and the senior officer
had the right to decide, and also the responsibility for the decision.
If this was the real view of the two generals, how was it that at
3 p.m. they had forgotten the hint of General von Wedell? This no
one can answer. Both generals belonged to that description of men
who do not like forward inferiors to interfere with anything ; more-
over, since 1866, General von Steinmetz had regarded himself as
infallible. It was, therefore, scarcely worth while for any one to
have an opinion, since throughout the zone of command of General
von Steinmetz there was allowed to be but one opinion, his own.
Such a general of necessity produced on the people around him the
effect of a nightmare, while to Moltke he seemed a surly army leader,
troublesome, difficult to manage, and a hindrance; and so he was
indeed !
General von Steinmetz, in spite of Moltke and Wedell, allowed
the enemy's left flank to remain their left flank ; he saw the enemy
running away, whilst he was in fact preparing for action ; and when
the bull was ready for the charge, he rushed in from the front upon
his horns.
To return to Goeben. In accordance with his orders, the batteries GoeWs
of the 16th Division were, at 3 p.m., brought into action immediately tSlt"
to the north of the main road, so that from that hour 156 guns in 3 p.m.
one line were playing upon the enemy’s main position. Simultaneously,
the 31st Infantry Brigade (29th and 69th Regiments), under General
Count Gneisenau, commenced to move from their first position between
110 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
Mogador and Gravelotfce. The 29th Regiment was on the right, with
the 1st Fusilier and the 2nd Battalions, in the above order, m l reanof
each other on the main road, to the north of which were the 69th
in line of company columns, and a little to the front; the battalions
from right to left were the 1st, 2nd, and Fusilier, the 2nd being at
first a little in rear of the others. Before the brigade commenced
to move, it was called upon to support the 30th m the direction
of the fork of the valley towards La Folie. The Fusiliei Battalion
of the (39th at once turned in that direction from Mogador, and was
shortly afterwards followed by the 7th and 8th Companies o e
same regiment. Thus at least a quarter ot the brigade moved at
once in a direction which was not that originally desired by Goeben ;
but the fork of the valley was so important a point, and. its possession
was so indispensable to any attempt on the front which the troops
in that part of the field, who belonged to the 15th Division, had sp
strongly carried through, that this branching off must be appio\ ec .
There therefore now remained only eighteen fresh companies dis-
posable on the front Moscou-Point du Jour, which was held most
weakly to the north of the main road (by the 1st and Fusilier
Battalions of the 28th) ; but this force was ample for a reinforcement.
It is not known whether General von Goeben reported these measures
to General von Steinmetz. Even if he did not do so, which was
certainly possible, the advance of the 31st Brigade was visible from
the position of General von Steinmetz. He must, therefore, have
known that the main road was occupied by infantry, and that the
29th Regiment, before 3.30 p.m., had not been able to make its way
through the passage. . . ...
Disposi- Whilst Goeben had issued his instructions with the above mten-
General tions, and the measures which he had taken were being carried out,
von General von Steinmetz, at 3 p.m., gave orders, not for an attack, but
steinmetz. a pursuit. Observe this 1 Goeben gathered from what had
taken place, that a reinforcement was necessary; from the same
circumstances Generals von Steinmetz and von Zastrow, who were
standing close to him, judged that a pursuit was required. Experts
may thus look at the same things from totally ditieient points of
view 1 Steinmetz and Zastrow seem thus to have wished to outbid
each other, so that neither should outdo the action of the other, or
should snatch from the other the palm of victory on the walls of
Metz. At least, this is the only way in which to explain what
happened. .
Again, how unsuitable were the dispositions which they made
for their “ chase ” ! General von Steinmetz, at 3 p.m., sent the following
order to the 1st Cavalry Division, which was then to the west of
Malmaison : —
“ The 1st Cavalry Division will advance at once across the defile of
Gravelotte ; the regiment of the advanced guard, supported by the fire
of the batteries of the 7th Corps, which will advance with the division,
will wheel to the left in rear of St. Hubert in the direction of Moscon
farm, and will charge the enemy, who is inclined to give way; it will
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANCE RAYINE.
Ill
carry on this charge up to the glacis of Metz. The remainder will follow
this regiment.’
In the second place, the 26th Infantry Brigade, which was in Ars,
was to advance thence towards Yaux. This was the combination
arranged by General von Steinmetz for a frontal and flank attack, or
for whatever else we may like to call it.
If the enemy were giving way, it was necessary that the cavalry
should trot, otherwise there was no prospect of reaching the foe,
before he had taken up a fresh position. The commander of the 1st
Cavalry Division rightly understood the order in this sense, and the
division at once trotted off. It might now have been reckoned that at
a trot they would reach St. Hubert in seven or eight minutes, and that
probably word would have to be passed to the columns of the 29th,
at the point where the main road rose 20 feet above the Mance Valley,
to hold their fire, since at this point neither of the arms could take
ground to the right or left. It does not require much imagination to
conceive the consequences, supposing General von Steinmetz to be
wrong, and that the enemy was not giving way.
Again, from Gravelotte to Ars is more than 4£ miles ; the order,
therefore, which was sent from Gravelotte at 3 p.m. could scarcely
reach the 26th Infantry Brigade before 3.45 p.m. The brigade would
then have to march from Ars to Vaux, 1\ miles, while it was the same
distance from Yaux to the enemy’s flank; it was thus hopeless to
exy>ect the attack on the enemy’s flank to take place before 4.30 p.m.
But if the enemy was giving way, what would be the use of the
arrival of the brigade at that hour on the field of battle? They
would have found no foe there to attack ! What happened here was
the last thing that Moltke desired. General von Steinmetz could not
see the wood for the trees. The 26th Infantry Brigade could certainly
have advanced in the direction named, but they might with equal
right — in accordance with the order for the battle — have been called
up at 1 p.m. as at 3 p.m., for no new reason for the movement had
arisen in the mean time ; but it ought to have been arranged that at
3 p.m. fourteen battalions of the 7th Corps, which were around
Gravelotte, etc., should be in movement from the Mance mill against
the quarries of Kozerieulles.
The cup of misfortune now first began to overflow ; at the same Diaposi-
time as the above order of General von Steinmetz, General von ££ ns of
• General
Zastrow directed the whole of the artillery of the 7th Corps “to take von
up a position on the farther slopes to the south of the main road to Zastrow *
Metz;” while, as their escort, “the 27th Infantry Brigade will be pushed
forward as far as the western border of the wood.” The commander
of the artillery of the 7th Corps, when he received the order, could not
believe his eyes or ears. Foreseeing the inevitable catastrophe, and
conscious of his responsibility, he took refuge in a stratagem. While
apparently instructing the officers who were under him in the sense
of the order which he had received, he directed the officers carrying
this order to ride along the line, and to whisper it to the field-officers
in turn; but he added to it: “You must manage to make something
to do, as if you were not able at once to limber up, in order to gain
f
112
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
The catas-
trophe.
a couple of minutes. This couple of minutes may save us. Delay a
little before you do anything. As a matter of fact, this stratagem
did save many of them, but not all !
As has been, before mentioned, the 3rd and 4th, and the 3id H.A.
batteries of the 7th Corps could not find space to come into line.
These three batteries were, therefore, ready to advance. Although
the commander sent the order to them last of all, no further loss of
time was possible in their case, and the three batteries at once began
to move, while, since all this had happened before the 1st Cavalry
Division received the order, the artillery, owing to the short distance
between them and the main road, found themselves at the head of the
column. Let us now think how matters stood. 1. The eastern exit
of the main road had been obstructed by a wire entanglement ; the
infantry who had already passed had cut through this, but not across
the whole width, so that the obstacle still existed to some extent.
2. Though St. Hubert had been stormed, and though the 60th and the
83rd had directed their furious charges against Point du Jour, these had
brought about a second obstacle, since hundreds of wounded extended,
like a huge snake, along the main road, and there were even more
fugitives and others who were helping the wounded. 3. Towards
these the above-named 29th Regiment was advancing, and way had
to be made for it as far as possible. 4 This infantry did not as
vet know that masses of cavalry and artillery were to follow it.
5 The mass of cavalry had no idea that they would find infantry and
artillery masses in front of them, and in a defile under the enemy’s
fire 6 None of the three knew that they would meet nocks ot men
coming out of action. 7. On the other hand, all three were in hot
haste The infantry were marching in sections, the artillery m
column of route, and the cavalry at first in sections. The cavalry
and the artillery, at a trot, caught up the infantry before they had
o-ot through the wood, and then the following sight was to be seen :
In front were the 3rd light and the 3rd H.A. batteries, and in rear of
them the 4th Ulan Regiment, with the 4th light and the 4th heavy
batteries beside them. In this massed formation the long column
pressed forwards.
What an extraordinary sight ; and what an extraordinary system
of leading ' There was only one road, and that was under the fire of
the enemy; upon this one road, at the same time, were crowded, from
five separate units of command, an infantry regiment (the 29th),
while beside it were two others (the 39th and the 74th), a cavalry
division with its battery, and four other batteries, and m addition the
9th and 15th Hussars (the former from the 8th and the latter from the
7th Corps), who had not even been placed under one command; and
these masses had no previous understanding with each other, nor had
any order of advance been laid down, so that they were left entirely
to themselves to wind through the narrow road as they best could.
The 31st Brigade was sent as a reinforcement, the 1st Cavalry Division
was to pursue a beaten enemy, the 2/th Brigade was to act as a
reserve to the movement, and the batteries were to support the
attack ! Here was a hideous scene of confusion in all and each
m
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MA.NCE RAVINE.
113
the system of leading, in the importance and the duties of the various
arms, in the grasp of the tactical conditions, and in the estimate of
the events which had gone before. How could such a beginning have
a o-ood end, even under more favourable circumstances ? The soldier’s
art consists of order, simplicity, and clearness, and in holding to these
three with inflexible firmness. But there was nothing here^ of the
kind. Picture to yourself a continuous wall of smoke, out of which
the flames of Point du Jour and Moscou rose up to heaven, 144 guns
in action (at that very moment) in rear of the valley, with the head-
quarters coming up in rear of them, while in front were masses of
infantry, cavalry, and artillery crowding into the ravine, some of
them pressing on to the front, others falling back under the pressure
of the enemy’s fire as the range got shorter, wounded and unwounded
men, infantry in order and in disorder streaming in opposite directions
and jumbled together, the echo of the shell as they burst in the wood
or above the trees, the -whistling of the bullets from either side as they
rushed overhead, and over the whole a column of dust which darkened
the sun- you will then understand that every one who took part in
the struo-vle felt himself tremble as he wondered what would be the
end of alHhis. But anything -which men undertake with doubt in
their hearts must fail, and nothing could save this from soon ending
in a catastrophe. ' . . ,
The order which was given to the 1st Cavalry Division has become
famous in military history. A simple glance at the map must have
told General von Steinmetz that, granting his suppositions to be
correct, the charge must have come to an end at the valley ot Ghatei,
and not on the glacis of Metz. But it was well known that Steinmetz
demanded “ deeds,” and that only the extraordinary had any charm
for him. A charge over 2200 yards is no great “deed;” but it was
nearly four miles to Metz through country in which, as a rule^there
was not space sufficient for one squadron to charge. “Energy’ may
sometimes turn to madness ! . ,,
The masses of cavalry, artillery, and miantry, who were thus The pas-
crowding on to the main road between 3.15 and 3.30 p.m, at this ®»g® ngli
moment attracted almost exclusively the attention of both friend and &e Manee
foe. Since the artillery and the cavalry were moving at a trot, the
latter who were at first in column of sections, had to break into cavalry
threes on the road ; then began to rise the huge, thick, white clouds
of dust which showed the waiting enemy that something extraordinary
was in preparation. The dust on the road soon became so thick that
the troops in the column could rarely see each other, and could at
most only feel and hear. Moreover, there was the uncomfortable
feelino- that, as they descended into the valley, the artillery fire
ceased almost altogether, while the infantry fire was only moderately
kent ut) At the head of the column, as has been stated, were the
3rd and 4th Light, the 3rd H.A., and the 4th Heavy batteries, while
the batteries of the 14th Division had fortunately wasted so much
time that there was an interval between them and the others.
Whilst the first-named batteries trotted past the 29th, the 1st Cavalry
Division at the same moment pushed forward at a trot, ilie artillery
Ail
114 TWENTY-EOUR HOURS OR MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
of the 14th Division consequently remained halted, but limbered up
to the south of the main road, in order to. allow the 1st Cavalry
Division to pass, proposing to follow m their turn. Their fare was
thus altogether lost, since they were for a considerable time meiely
spectators. The 1st Cavalry Division was moving m the following
order: The 1st Cavalry Brigade, leading, with the 4th Ulans in front,
then the 2nd Cuirassiers, and then the 9th Ulans with a H.A. battery ,
the 2nd Cavalry Brigade had the 8th Ulans in front, then the 31-
Cuirassiers, and then the 12th Ulans. The change from column ot
sections to column of threes caused such an interruption that the leai
brigade had first to halt, and then to move at a walk In the mean
time, the 9th and 15th Hussars shot by from the right, also in thiees
and got up beside the 2nd and 3rd Cuirassiers. There was a good
deal of hustling among the thirty-two squadrons who were wedged
together, and the tail of the division had to halt again It may .be
added in anticipation, that in the mean time the leading batteries
had formed line near St. Hubert; suddenly two ammunition- waggons,
belonging to these batteries, rushed from St. Hubert with then
horses mad with terror, back into the narrow neck of roa .
crowding and the stoppage now became intolerable; the load was
absolutely blocked, and for some minutes no one could move
backwards or forwards; the whole mass had, in fact,, made itself
defenceless. When at this moment the 4th Ulan Regiment, which
was leading, endeavoured to deploy, the concentrated fare of the
enemy’s artillery and infantry was suddenly poured in on the unlucky
troops. The crowding, the pushing, the hustling and the noise
increased to a terrible extent, every one felt the helplessness ot the
position, and the approach of a catastrophe ; then “Threes about . was
sounded from the rear at the moment when the tail of the 1st Cavaliy
Division had reached the road to the east of Gravelotte. The intense
strain lasted for half an hour, and at 4.30 p.m. the 1st Cavalry Division,
with the exception of the 4th Ulans, was again halted, at Malmaison.
General von Hartmann, the commander of this division, had m the
mean time perceived that the order given to him could not be executed.
Even though General von Steinmetz must bear the mam blame
for this occurrence, yet General von Hartmann cannot be entirely
absolved from a share in his fault. The order which was received
from General von Steinmetz was so distinct that it entirely excluded
anv doubt as to the correctness of his judgment of the state of the
action Nevertheless, General von Hartmann, from his position neai
Malmaison, could perfectly well distinguish all that the enemy were
doing and he ought by no means to have set his division in motion,
until ’he himself had ridden across the Mance Ravine, and had con-
vinced himself as to the possibility of carrying out the order which
he had received. The general omitted to do this, and his neglect
consummated the evil. , . , . .
2. The When the tail of the cavalry division began to be hampered, the
a A ler y artillery of the 14th Division saw that it was no longer of any use
Division, for them to think of crossing the valley, and they therefore turned
back into their old position, and resumed their fire from it. I hus,
' ‘.I ;
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
115
after they had remained out of action for half an hour, they had to
range themselves again; but if everything had happened exactly as
was intended, no gun should have left its position or interrupted its
fire, for the enemy’s artillery and infantry should have been restrained
with all possible energy. The fact that both of these arms were able
to open suddenly an overwhelming fire was especially due to a great
part of our artillery (that of the 14th Division) having ceased to fire,
while that of the 18th Division were preparing to limber up, and
thus fired only an occasional shot. Thus the fire of the whole of the
artillery of the 7th Corps fell off, to a certain extent, at the decisive
moment, while the Germans themselves abandoned all the advantage
which they had gained up to that time ; and the error could never
afterwards be remedied.
The commander of the corps-artillery of the 7th Corps, Colonel The corps *
von Helden-Sarnowski, was, together with General von Zimmermann, artillery *
at the head of the first batteries which crossed, with the object of
choosing near St. Hubert a suitable position for the four batteries
named above. But, since the batteries followed at a trot immediately
after these officers, there was no time for the commander to make
sure on the ground whether it was possible for artillery to hold its
own near that farm. This was no reproach to the commander ; if the
batteries had not been so hastily pushed forward, it might have been
possible — and it certainly would have been under other conditions —
to have sent them back in time. When Colonel von Helden-Sar-
nowski arrived near St. Hubert, he felt that the four batteries had
been betrayed into a terrible situation. Nevertheless, he exerted
himself to find a suitable position for them, in which he was assisted
as much as possible by the battery leaders. But so far as the colonel
could see, the position of St. Hubert was thoroughly bad ; the only
cover towards the enemy, whose front was at a higher level, was that
furnished by the garden wall, which was only knee-high. If a
position were taken up in rear of our front, and facing Moscou, the
right flank was exposed to the enemy’s infantry at Point du Jour at
a range of from 300 to 400 yards ; if a position were taken up facing
the latter place, then the left flank was exposed to the enemy’s
infantry fire. It might have been possible, perhaps, to extend to the
right and left of the farm, fronting towards Moscou and Point du
Jour, but artillery is composed of horses, men, and guns, and experi-
ence shows that under infantry fire the falling horses, etc., spoil the
best intentions. In such a case, it is impossible to do what we wish,
we can only do what we can. One has to stay at whatever point
circumstances will allow us to reach, and fire away as hard as we
can; as a rule, the guns were able to get as far as the south of St.
Hubert. From that point it was certainly possible to give an effective
fire on Moscou, and this was done with such success that the enemy’s
infantry, who, before the evening, made at least twenty counter-
attacks from Moscou, never succeeded in carrying an attack through.
But the position had the great disadvantage that, supposing that the
artillery of the 7th Corps had really been able to get up to it and its
neighbourhood, it was from it possible only to fire on the nearer
T |
The arrival
| | 1
at St.
|j
Hubert.
The leading
battery *
(Traut-
mann).
116 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
sk£mM.»i and m “eplatem where the ““f ' ^idTe^'be
SrS Se W pLK :td°^r P Xo"re™Lre to ad,—
infantry fire. Thus from the point of view of pure artillery tac a,
»p, with the «h t Li|ht
eijStf’A an unearthly
stillness reigned over the heights of Moecou and n ohnV.r.^ l
“ aTLtof Lto te "oTtoible vitality, ft- Moseon to l?omt
du Jou^was one incessant flash from rifles and guns, and m a moment
the Xoll slpe was shrouded in a white cloud of smoke, fmm whi h
streamed tongues of flame. No one knew how nea^ they
to the enemy, and an unceasing hail of bul > ]
iT.g bat c r aptain Lemmer was killed at once, and
Trautmann was severely wounded. As he y hrinv it into
batterv passed on, and he even then exerted himself: to bring it into
position P But the front gun had already been stopped, owing to the
feaders being shot, and only five guns of the battery ^nder L ieutenant
Humann I formed line to the south-east of St. Hubert. As tne}
Sme up toto position, horses .nd men fell dead 1 and womded, but
they succeeded in unlimbering and m opening -when the
not for Ions! Scarcely had a few rounds been fired, when t
. . , ® -i i * n i, +rs rr f>v rushed with the limbers towards
re^rrown S e e ck this moment the 4th Ulan*
were striving to gain the open ground. The e °^ usl ^ S ^^tei ° still
•wl-mle of the cavalry, which was then on the road, lhe batteiy sun
pSssi one limber and five guns, hut ^detachments were shot
down and only one or two gunners remained with the guns, ine
iZevv was Entirely out of action. Efforts were made, the two
remaining officers assisting, to bring off the guns by means of the
oX limber left, but besides these officers there were only one
sergeant and three gunners unhurt ; two guns were, however, brought
away but the other four remained out m the open until the evening,
when they were brought back by reserve teams. The brave batteij
leader lay near them in his blood; he saw his battery, which ha
been so smart, shattered; to pieces before his eyes, gun after gun; his
loud stern voice, which his men so dreaded, could not pierce the roai
of the battle; he crawled like a snake along the ground in the
endeavour to reach his guns, but he could not resist fate, and he nov
commanded only ruined material, which has no human soul and
cannot hear. The haggard man with his pale features, ate o
the living, at once self-possessed, eager and fierce, had to dree his
weird; hut the joy of battle did not leave him, though lie could no
longer fight. Prostrate on the ground, he turned his face towards the
k
THE STBUGGLES IN THE MANGE E A VINE. 117
heights which the enemy held, and when he saw a shell burst well,
his voice rang gladly over the field of death.
Captain Hasse followed the five guns of Lieutenant Humann I. The second
The H.A. battery, taking ground to the south of the main road,
moved like lightning through this hell of fire- The wheel could be
observed from Gravelotte, and all hearts throbbed to see what would be
their fate. Would they be able to form line ? The battery commander
who was leading at a headlong pace, with a sign of his hand swung
the battery round, as if with a magic wand, until it faced Moscou ;
every one was at once off his horse, and all six guns let fly immedi-
ately. But the infantry fire from Point du Jour’ swept the right
flank of the battery, draught and riding horses fell in heaps, while
others rushed away through the guns; three officers, of whom the
battery leader was one, were at once wounded, and a young lieutenant
took over the command. But the leader soon returned to his guns,
and his small, thick-set figure mated about everywhere, as his
Westphalian blood began to boil. Suddenly there was a howling
shrieking detonation ; a shell struck the axle of No. 1 gun, and
destroyed it; but order was still preserved, and the battery fired
without intermission upon Moscou, and made hit after hit on the
ranks of the enemy. But gradually also this battery leader saw his
battery melt away; the heap of dead horses in rear continually
increased, while between the guns there was a confused mixture of
dead and wounded — of both armies, for the French had before held
this spot. After half an hour, only five guns could be served, and
two minutes later the remainder of the detachments were only
sufficient for three guns, while, when this was arranged, a further
reduction had to be made, until as the two hours under fire drew near
their end, the leader had, including himself, only enough men left to
serve one gun. The limber ammunition had been all expended, the
ammunition-waggons could not be brought up, and the guns were
defenceless, powerless, and unable to move. The fortunes of the
battery had been from the beginning watched from Gravelotte, as
it clashed from the defile like a column of dust driven by a hurricane;
it could be seen with glasses how gun after gun was crushed, and
how the living organism changed into a motionless, black, dense, ^
helpless mass. There could be no doubt that this battery also had
met its fate. Lieutenant-General Schwarz consequently sent it an
order to abandon its untenable position. But, impressed with the
necessity for holding his ground, Captain Hasse answered that he
would rather die than fall back. The order was repeated ; but it was
now too late, for the battery had in the mean time lost the power to
move. Still Captain Hasse found means to delay the catastrophe.
There was a limber near Humann’s Battery, and the brave gunners
made their way backwards and forwards to it, until they had fired
the last shell in it. Thus two hours passed, after which the enemy’s
fire slackened, and Major Coester appeared with some fresh teams.
They endeavoured to hook in, but scarcely had they got the fresh
horses into their places than some of them fell by the fire of the
enemy. At length perseverance triumphed, and it was just possible
118
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
The third
battery
(Gniigge).
The fourth
battery
(Lemmer).
The de-
ployment
of the 4th
Ilians,:
to drive off. But in what condition was the battery ? The limbers
and carriages were covered with bullets ; the gunners and drivers
were on foot, and the limbers were laden with the severely wounded ;
thus the battery retired at a walk through the long road. The last
gun, which had only two horses, and was heavily loaded with
wounded, had Major Chester’s special care, and he kept his eye fixed
on it as it left the field of battle. Just as it was hoped that the zone
of fire had been passed, a horse in the last limber was shot. It had to
halt again, and fresh aid had to be procured ; but when the gun had
been again rendered capable of movement the battery began to
slowly climb up the road to Gravelotfe. Here it was greeted with
loud cheers, and General Schwarz kissed the battery leader before
all the troops.
The 3rd Light Battery (Gniigge) formed line behind the knee-
high garden wall of the farm of St. Hubert, having, while the two
first-named batteries left the road to the south, followed the main
road at a gallop as far as the point at which it unlimbered. It was
therefore the farthest to the east of the three, and, like Hasse’s
battery, offered its left flank to the enemy at Point du Jour, while
its fire was directed upon Moscou. Captain Gniigge did not open
fire so quickly as Captain Hasse, since at the very beginning a con-
siderable number of horses and men were shot down, so that the guns
were not ready for action for several minutes. But after this they
produced an excellent effect, so much so that the two batteries (Hasses
and Gniigge’s) reduced the enemy to the strict defensive. Gniigge’s
battery also suffered severe loss, but it held its ground, after Captain
Hasse had been recalled, until night brought the battle to an end.
At about 6 p.m. General von Goeben rode up to Captain Gniigge, and
confirmed him in his decision to hold the position.
Much light implies much shadow, and thus beside this heroism
we find a less attractive example. The last battery which arrived
on the scene of the struggle was the 4th Heavy. The officer who took
over the command after the fall of Captain Lemmer was, with the
battery, at first in rear of the 3rd H.A. Battery. With the latter he
moved into the open ground to the south of the main road. At this
point the leader seems to have lost his head, for the battery did not
succeed in unlimbering. Seeing the road to Gravelotte occupied by
the cavalry who were streaming to the front, and finding no space
on which to form line, the battery drew off* into a wood track which
led away into the Mance Ravine ; passing through this, it came upon
impassable ground, where it stood fast, and where it was discovered
on the morning of the 19th !
The 4th Light and the 3rd H.A. Batteries were in front of the
4th IJlans, while the 3rd Light and the 4th Heavy were on their
left flank. Before the point of the Ulans approached the eastern
exit, Colonel von Radecke (of that regiment) had pushed to St.
Hubert, in order to make certain of the situation. Radecke there
met Colonel von Helden, who at once informed him as to the difficult
situation of the struggle. Colonel von Radecke then observed the
late of the 4th Light Battery, and, while the 3rd H.A. and the 3rd
J
THE STRUGGLES IK THE MANGE RAVINE, 119
Light Batteries were unlimbering, the 4th Ulans had started at a
trot. At this moment Colonel von Radecke rejoined them from St.
Hubert, and led the regiment at a quicker pace, but in good order,
across the main road to the right (south).
Since at this time the 4th Heav}r Battery was on the left of the
4th Ulans, Colonel von Radecke was unable to attempt to carry out
the order of General von Steinmetz, which directed him to form line
towards Moscou and to charge ; he would thus have been compelled
at this critical moment to wait— that is to say, to halt — while that
battery marched past him. Considering the mass of cavalry which
was following, Radecke held this to be impossible ; he therefore deter-
mined to choose the lesser evil, and to form with his front towards
Point du Jour. As he was carrying out this movement, and when
the 4th Ulans had reached the right of the 4th Light Battery, Colonel
► Radecke heard behind him the trumpet-call, “ Retire ! ” which was
sounded by the order of General von Hartmann. Under the fearful
tire which at this moment was poured upon the artillery and the 4th
Ulans, a retirement appeared to Colonel von Radecke to be a very
i doubtful proceeding ; but it was also impossible for the regiment to
f remain in their then position. He therefore ordered the “ Gallop ! ” to
be sounded, and at this pace the regiment advanced directly on the
gravel-pits. When the point was within about 200 yards of the
latter, Radecke ordered “ Front ! ” to be sounded ; but the trumpet
of the colonel’s trumpeter had been pierced by a bullet, and would
not sound. In this difficulty Trumpeter Rohleder shouted, “Mine is
all right,” and blew a loud <f Front ! ’ The movement was carried out
in good order as far as the rear sections of the regiment, which had in
the mean time obeyed the call “ Retire ! ” But even these sections took
up the right direction in good time. Thus the 4th Ulans were now-
deployed in line, and fronting towards Point du Jour, being about
, 450 yards from the enemy’s shelter-trenches; about 200 yards to
their right were six companies of the 33rd, who reached from the
gravel-pits up to the quarries of Rozerieulles ; in rear of them were
the remnants of the 60th Regiment, while to their left was the 4th
Light Battery, which had in the mean time been put out of action,
j j and of which the men were engaged in bringing off the guns. An
insignificant fold of the ground somewhat diminished the height of
the line of cavalry, and most of the shot passed over their heads ;
their loss was thus comparatively small. Colonel von Radecke held
* his ground for about an hour/ but since he then saw nothing which
i he could charge, while the 4th Light (and the 4th Heavy) Battery
had abandoned the struggle, and the losses increased, Colonel von
f Radecke gave orders to retire. The two squadrons on the left, under
: Major Ritgen, began the movement through the wood by the side of
the main road, while the two on the right remained at first halted,
*
* So says the regimental history of the 4th Ulans. In my opinion, this is improbable,
and even impossible; for in that ease the charge which the French later on made from
Point dn Jour would have affected the 4th Ulans. But the latter wore no longer present.
1 cannot think that the Ulans held their ground for more than thirty minutes, but even
this was a grand feat.
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
Losses of
the troops
under Colonel von Eadecke, in order to cover tke withdrawal ok the
wounded. After this had been completed von Eadecke iolbwed wit
both squadrons along the road to the lance mi .
Eadeeke’s horse was shot, but he mounted another and led Ins me
beyond the Mance Valley back to the starting-point ot the undeitakin^
He arrived again at the 1st Cavalry Division, at Malmaison, at
7.30 p.m., Major Eitgen having got there at 6.30 pan. The regimen
lost 3 officers, 49 men, and 101 lrorses, while the 1st Cavalry Divismn
lost 7 officers, 88 men, and 177 horses, ihe loss of the foui batteue.
was as follows : —
The moral
■ and
material
reaction
from the
attempt.
The 4th Heavy
The 3rd Light
The 4th Light
The 3rd H.A.
Killed and Wounded.
1 officer and 6 men.
1 officer and 15 men.
2 officers and 12 men.
3 officers and 35 men.
I have not been able to ascertain exactly the loss of the individual
batteries in liorses; it was not throughout large ; the heaviest was
in the 3rd H.A., which lost 70. The comparatively small loss of tne
3rd Light Battery, which held its ground at St. Hubert until nigh ,
is remarkable
After the 1st Cavalry Division had returned to Malmaison, their
battery re-opened its fire in the former position of the 8th Corps.
The two hussar regiments (the 9th and the loth) also tell back
to their old positions.
Bad as was the impression which the failure of this attempt made
in rear of the line of battle upon the staffs and troops which weie
around Gravelotte, its material and tactical evil consequences, m
addition to the general moral loss which it involved, were yet greatei.
After carefully searching into the matter, I may refer the reader, oi
the reasons why this attempt must of necessity have failed, to wliat
has been already said, for everything is contained in that, bpcm a
false hypothesis, without suitable dispositions, and without lust
making certain by reconnaissance whether the hypothesis was correct
(which, considering the uncertainty of the situation, was undoubtedly
the duty of the superior commander who gave the orders for the
entire plan), a crisis which lasted for altogether about 14 hours was
brought about. During this time the greater part of the artillery
of the 7th Corps had been compelled to watch the fight in diminished
strength, and when this artillery had again to open fire from their old
position, the circumstances had so changed that the order which had
before existed in the line of fire could not again be re-established.
Moreover, the space available for the batteries when they re-opened
fire could not be carefully divided, so that a second disadvantage
followed that of the long cessation of fire, in that Major von Lynatten
had, owing to want of room, to draw back two light batteries and
one heavy to the west of Gravelotte, where from 4.30 p.m. they
remained out of action. In the third place, the attempt had cost
the 7th Corps two batteries (the 4th Light and the 3rd H.A.), which
had been crushed, while a third (the 4th Heavy) had in the mean time
TO '’'W. , :
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
121
“lost its way 5 ’; thus, since three other batteries conlrl not find room,
there were altogether, after 5 p.m., no less than 86 guns missing ; that
is to say, one-third of the whole available artillery of the 7th Corps.
This was a diminution of strength so marked that the French could
not fail to again recover their breath. And they did indeed recover it !
The French observers of the drama which has been described
could not believe their eyes. They could not guess whether it was ^ithiregard
an act of simple madness, or of an amount of courage which would to taking
have been previously thought impossible. Whatever it might be, the
enemy, full of astonishment and wonder, at first watched the progress
of events, hut finally poured in the whole force of their fire, which had
been held back for a long time. They watched the destruction of
the Prussian batteries, who were within charging distance, and the
regiment of Ulans, which formed line in front of the wood, and which
for a considerable time masked the infantry fire along our front, and
the artillery and the cavalry seemed to them a sure prey, as after
about an hour they prepared to drive them hack again. Moreover,
the capture of the southern part of the quarry of Rozerieulles (at
8 p.m.) by the 33rd had greatly troubled General Frossard. This, as
he saw, was the point from which he might be utterly destroyed, and
it was therefore worth while to run all risks in order to recapture the
quarry. The commanders of the 2nd and 3rd French Corps issued
instructions to this effect. But an attack which started from Moscou,
and advanced directly upon St. Hubert, was nipped in the bud by the
effective shells fired by Hasse’s and Gniigge’s Batteries • a second, in
smaller strength, which was undertaken against Gniigge s Battery alone,
came to an end in the same way, after which from this side and in
this direction no other counter-attack really took place ; they all failed
at the outset.
The case was very different with the 2nd French Corps. Frossard Frossard’s
had observed the destruction of the Prussian batteries and the partial Recapture
capture of the quarry of Rozerieulles, and had near Point du Jour of the
prepared an infantry reserve of several columns in anticipation of a quarry *
favourable moment. It consisted of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the
55th, part of the 1st Battalion of the 76th, and three companies of the
77th, in all about three battalions. As the 4th Ulans were drawing off*,
these troops burst out straight to their front from Point du J our in a
long line, which reached from the quarries to within about 350 yards
to the south of the main road. The attack was carried out with
extraordinary energy and rapidity, and was thus completely successful
along the whole line ; the quarry was recaptured, and even the gravel-
pits were temporarily lost by the 33rd. As the attack rushed on, it
swept along the rear of Gniigge’s Battery, at a distance of about 200
yards, but came in contact neither with this battery, nor with
St. Hubert, nor with>the main road and all that was on it, which had
been selected as its prey. The 1st, 2nd, and 8th companies of the 33rd
were completely run over ; other parts of the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd,
and also the 1st and 2nd companies of that regiment, had turned back
to the eastern edge of the wood, but were in the excitement of the
moment received as they approached with such a hot fire by the 60th,
122 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
who were there, that the last bonds of discipline gave way, and both
regiments rushed to the rear in panic fear, and in complete confusion.
The impression made by the terror in their faces, weary as they were
with the long struggle, as they rushed without helmets or arms from
the western edge of the wood, certainly did not tend to raise the moral
attitude of the troops at Gravelotte, who were still suffering from the
former failure, and many staff officers now began to glance gloomily
towards the rear. The zone of the enemy's infantry fire was visibly
advancing; large quantities of their bullets fell in Gravelofcte and
among the artillery who were to the south of that village. The
horse of Prince Adalbert of Prussia was here shot under him by a
bullet, and the staff of the 1st Army did not escape.
The details General von Goeben had observed the events which have been
forcement - "" described. Though he foresaw the inevitable end, he possessed
of the 15th neither the right nor the power to ward off* the unavoidable conse-
Dmsion. q Ue nces ; since he had let the 31st Brigade out of his hand, and had
been left in ignorance of what Generals von Steinmetz and von Zastrow
had arranged, he could for the moment do nothing but wait, and he
counted the minutes with a beating heart until this waiting should
find its end. Every minute seemed an hour. What had in the mean
time become of the 31st Brigade ? The disorder in rear of the 15th
Division, which has been described, for a time distressed him anew,
for how would it be if an energetic attack from Moscou should now
take place against the northern side of the main road ? In that case,
the 15th Division would be lost, and with it St. Hubert and every-
thing which had been won up to that time. Pushing to the front, in
order to see things with his own eyes, he yet could and dare do
nothing, though the need for action weighed heavily upon him.
Goeben was delighted to see that the attempt of Generals von
Steinmetz and von Zastrow came to a better end than he had
expected under the circumstances. The enemy at Moscou had up to
this time gained no advantage; but when the rush from Point du
Jour seemed to progress in favour of the French, Goeben watched
most earnestly to see whether anything of the same kind would be
undertaken from Moscou. But the enemy was there in a very
different condition, and Goeben was calm, as he saw clearly how the
shells of Gnugge's Battery nipped every attempt in the bud.
Goeben breathed again, but felt that he must speak to the leader of
the battery ; the old soldier-spirit drove him still farther to the front.
But a leader in war must repress^ such impulses, for he has first to
deal with more important matters.
We have already shown how the dispositions of Generals von
Steinmetz and von Zastrow had doomed the artillery of the 7th
Corps to inaction for a long time, and a great part of them (36 guns)
to permanent silence. We shall now show how these same dispositions
also delayed for a full hour Goeben’s plan for reinforcing the 15th
Division, and then made this reinforcement almost altogether illusory.
The reader will thus be able to grasp the unpleasantness of Goeben’s
situation, since he had to suffer, for the errors of others, without being
able to do anything to remedy them..
PJ
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
The point of the 29th, marching on the main road, had passed the
eastern edge of the wood, when the events which have been related
with respect to the artillery of the 7th Corps and the 1st Cavalry
Division took place. Since the 29th were in sections, the depth of the
column of the regiment was very great. Since the artillery and the
cavalry rushed forwards, as they were compelled to do, the 29th were
cut in half and obliged to halt ! In this manner Goeben’s intention
was hindered and upset. The regiment now came up between the
quarries of St. Hubert and the eastern edge of the wood. At 4 p.m.
the position was as follows, passing from left to right : —
The Fusilier Battalion and the 8th and 7th companies of the 69th
were engaged towards La Folie-Leipzig. At this important point,
therefore, the 15th Division seemed amply strong, and in this direction
Goeben’s intentions had been suitably carried out.
The 6th and 5th companies and the 1st Battalion of the 69th to
the south of the above, rested their right on the main road, having
pushed forward on to the 28th, and having later on taken up a front
towards Moscou-St. Hubert ; here also the reinforcement had been
carried out in good time.
On the other hand, the ten rear companies of the 29th were, at the
point specified, separated from the two leading companies, so that only
the 1st and the 4th companies could carry out the reinforcement to some
extent simultaneously with the other portions of the 31st Brigade;
the other ten companies could not come up. Of the two companies,
the 1st, after a useless rush towards Point du Jour, had turned towards
St. Hubert ; while the 4th, after a similar unsuccessful rush in the
same direction, were lying in the open on a level with Gniigge’s
Battery. It was not until the road had been again cleared that the
3rd and 2nd companies were able to follow ; the 3rd moved towards
St. Hubert, while the 2nd remained to the west in the quarries. Thus
this action also was foredoomed to failure, and nothing could be
altogether worked out or carried through, since the troops came up in
small fractions, and since the later fractions attempted the same
impossibility as the earlier (and finished with the same calamity), in
that they steadily insisted in attacking in companies over open
ground, without thinking of first establishing an infantry fire-position
within effective range. If this had been provided, if* they had set to
work to produce an effect from it, and had brought up their reserves
in rear of it, then, and only then, would they have satisfied the
conditions which govern success ; while, after the example of the 3rd
Light and the 3rd H.A, Batteries, and also that of the 4th Ulans,
it is impossible to deny that it could have been done. But each
body of troops, whether they had red, blue, or white facings, kept up
the same faults as the others until late into the night. After the
1st Battalion of the 29th had been mowed down to the south of
St. Hubert, the Fusilier battalion of the same regiment met with the
same fate, to the north of that farm, when attacking Moscou. Both
of its attacks were energetically undertaken, but the Fusilier battalion
also had to go the way of all flesh. The greater part of the battalion
fell back to the fork of the valley to the south-west of Leipzig, while
11111111
1
124
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
the smaller part (two sections of the 12th, and one each of the 9th and
11th companies) retired towards St. Hubert.
After the Fusilier Battalion of the 29th had been shattered, the 2nd
Battalion came up into action. It followed the same direction as the
other two battalions, and did exactly the same as they did ; the 6th
and 7th companies attacked Point du Jour with great courage, and
got to within 150 yards of the shelter-trenches, but at that point
they fell to pieces ; the commander of the regiment led up the 5th
company, with the object of bringing aid to the Fusilier battalion.
He now tried to do with one company what he had previously failed
to do with four, while in order to make some use of the 8 th company
also, he told it off to serve as escort to Hasse’s and G-niigge’s Batteries !
This is an excellent example of the manner in which, in those days,
our infantry was made to fight ; no one seemed to remember that the
men had rifies, for what was done here might just as well have been
carried out if they had had clubs ; at any rate, absolutely no one had
any idea how to reap any of the advantages of the rifle. Eventually,
all that remained of the 2nd Battalion of the 29th fell back like the
others to St. Hubert. At about the same time, all that was left of the
1st Battalion of the 69th also appeared at St. Hubert ; they had
endeavoured also to carry the heights of Moscou in companies and
without firing a shot, even though the several companies had, “ owing
to the thick wood, lost their direction and their coherence/’ The only
sensible ones were the 5th and 6th companies ; they did nothing at
all, but fell back on St. Hubert. When no one understood how to take
a battalion under fire in a reasonable manner, and how next to bring
it up to the attack, could we possibly expect to be able to capture
such a position? It is true that we had got as far as fighting in
companies, but as for doing so in battalions, regiments, or brigades,
we knew nothing about it. Why could we not do it ? In peace, we
played about with brigades on the drill-ground, but in war we did
not know how to fight with battalions; this was because “ we had
not learnt to fight.” We may judge from the 10th company of the
69th how the troops came helter-skelter “through the wood;” it
drifted from the left flank of the brigade to the right, and fortunately
got also to St. Hubert ; the very counterpart of the cross-march which
the 33rd had been carrying out since midday. Thus, under the
circumstances which have been narrated, the right wing of the 31st
Infantry Brigade required nearly an hour and a half to bring up a
reinforcement over about a mile and a half. We were indeed very
lucky, for during this time much might have happened if — if
Supposing that, as has been before said, cuttings had been made in the
wood, the troops would not have lost their direction, they would not
have “ crossed each other,” they would not have “ lost their way,” they
would not have attacked “ by companies ” and “ in close order ; ” we
should not have seen 32 squadrons, 5 batteries, and 3 battalions, all
belonging to different units, crowded and jumbled together, etc., etc.,
etc., or, at any rate, we should not have been “ compelled ” to do all this.
But in tactics there is always one grand excuse — the circumstances.
We should then have had fixed grounds upon which to deal with time
THE STRUGGLES IN' THE MANGE RAVINE.
125
and space, and sufficient lines of communication to admit of reinforce-
ment and direction. Goeben might then have been certain that the
81st Infantry Brigade would have come up along the whole line by
3.30 p.m. at the latest.
Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the 2nd and 3rd Arrival of
companies of the 29th, Colonel Eskens had brought over the ravine, tlie 39tl1 *
to the south of the main road, first two battalions and then the 3rd
Battalion of the 39th. The three battalions extended along the
eastern edge of the wood, and pushed on into the fight in the space
to the south of the quarries of St. Hubert and halfway to the gravel-
pits. They took little account of the enemy’s fire, and kept their
order excellently, so that their shock brought the French attack from
Point du Jour first to a standstill, and then to a retirement. This
would perhaps have been the moment for a successful general attack,
if only sufficient force had stood ready on the right, and if any one
had known how to use it.
When the 39th advanced into the fight, the 7th Corps spread into Mixture of
the sphere of action of the 8th ; it is true that the batteries of the j£ e
7th Corps, which have been previously mentioned, had already either 7th and l °
done this or tried to do it, but only in very rare cases does the mixture 8th Cor i )S *
of the artillery of different units with other artillery, or with other
arms, cause any tactical disadvantage. This is far from being the case
with infantry. If it be desired to hold together a force, with which
it is proposed to deal a heavy blow, any disturbance of the units of
command which is not inevitable must be avoided. In this case, it #
was desired to strike a great blow, but the means which were taken to
that end made such a blow impossible ; there was no necessity for thus
mixing two corps. For, even if what was done had been tactically
correct, the 32nd Infantry Brigade, which had been ready for a long
time on the west of Gravelotte, ought to have been used. But the
time for this was not yet come, since the reinforcement of the loth
Division by the 31st Brigade had not yet made itself felt, and Goeben
did not wish to lose command of the 32nd Brigade until a fresh
reserve (the 2nd Corps) was in readiness in rear of his front. But
this was not yet the case, since the 3rd Division had only just got to
Rezonville. The mixture of the infantry of the 7th and 8th Corps
in the neighbourhood of St. Hubert was not intentional, and was
therefore a fault. While at 4 p.m. the garrison of St. Hubert was
already both too mixed and too large, it had by 5 p.m. increased to
forty-three companies, which belonged to seven different regiments
(including the 8th Jagers), and it was hei*e that took place what
some have called the “ hotch-potch ” of the infantry. A “ hotch-
potch ” of this kind is unmanageable, and a terrible cause of waste
of strength. Up to 3 p.m., neither General von Steinmetz nor General
von Zastrow had understood how to hold the numerous infantry of
the 7th Corps, who were distributed around Gravelotte, in readiness
for an attack from the Bois de Vaux, or how to lead them in the
direction which was tactically suitable. By 5 p.m. two more hours
had passed, during which equally nothing whatever was done in this
respect. There had been there, ready for this purpose, the three
126
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
1
if
!• ft
'I
1 1
:• *
I
1
attack.
battalions of the 74th, the three battalions of the 77th, three of the
73rd, the Fusilier Battalion of the 53rd, and the '2nd and 3rd
companies of the 13th, in all ten and a half fresh battalions, with which
no one knew how to do anything useful, whilst all the steps of which
we have spoken, which were intended to result in a “ pursuit ” on the
opposite slope of the Mance Valley, had produced nothing but a series
of repulses. What was tactically prudent and practicable was not
recognized, attempted, or ordered, while what was tactically foolish
and impossible was striven for with an amount of energy which
would have been both necessary and successful at another point,
and with suitable measures.
C. From 5 p.m. to 7 p.m.
Pause in After 5 p.m. there was a pause in the action along the entire front
interru° n * Army* which by chance coincided in point of time with a
tSnoTtke similar pause of the 2nd Army. Both German armies had now to
German sn ff er f rom the disadvantages caused by unsuitable and, tactically
speaking, too hurried handling ; in the 1st Army this was due to the
higher commanders; in the 2nd, on the contrary, to that of the
junior officers ; the sources of error were thus diametrically opposite.
The very best of men may err, but we ought to be able to abandon
mistakes which we have recognized as such. It is true that not
everything in the 2nd Army had up to this time been exactly all
that might he wished, yet, owing to activity of the supreme leader
and his suitable dispositions, which show a sure guidance and a
striving after a great strategical aim, entirely conforming to, and even
surpassing, the grand views of Moltke, it was possible to tide over
the crisis comparatively well and quickly; but with the 1st Army,
in spite of the certain knowledge of the governing tactical conditions
which had been possessed since 5 p.m., this was by no means the
case. After that hour, as before it, everything remained uncertain,
objectless, planless, and confused. The 1st Army, up to 5 p.m., had
not suffered very great loss; there could be no question of an
exhaustion of its strength, and it had merely, as regards the greater
part of it, crumbled away owing to its being badly led; for the 15th
Division alone could be considered as being much injured, and that
had actually lost about 20 per cent, of its strength in the battle.
If after 5 p.m. it was proposed to undertake some general move-
ment against the enemy, now that full information had been obtained
with regard to their condition, there was ample time and a sufficient
number of troops available for this purpose; but no use .was made of
either the one or the other. Before anything else, order should have
been established in the firing-line of the infantry on the eastern slope
of the Mance Valley, and orders should have been given for some
such action as we have proposed in Chapter V. There would still
have been time for it. No thought of all this seems to have arisen,
although the behaviour and the perseverance of the artillery and of
the 4th TJlans irrefutably proved the possibility and the practicability
of the instalment of an infantry fire-position. No one even succeeded
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
127
in holding with infantry, as a firing-line, the ground in a line with
Gniigge’s Battery. The latter indeed remained, until near the evening,
to the south of the main road, and in a position in front of the firing-
line of the infantry. The bodies of the men and horses of the infantry,
the artillery, and the 4th Ulans had, since 5 p.nx., much diminished
the possibility of movement to the south of the main road. At this
point, the field of battle offered a scene of confusion ; abandoned guns
with capsized and broken limbers were irregularly mingled together.
No doubt the heaps of corpses, both of men and horses, and the
masses of material might have afforded a certain amount of cover,
but no one tried to use it. At 5 p.m. about two and a half regiments of
infantry were standing in columns, one behind the other, between St.
Hubert and the eastern edge of the wood ; they were all penned up
together in confusion, in all kinds of units, and beyond all power of
command. These masses, standing thus, and exposed for a long time to
the fire from Point du J our and Moscou, afforded a distant target for the
French ; yet during two hours, between 5 and 7 p.m., no one seems to
have thought of withdrawing these masses, which must have hindered
the development and movement of any fresh troops, who might pro-
pose to pass to the north or south from the main road to the field of
battle; this would have been absolutely necessary, and this infantry
might then have been reorganized and have been prepared on the
eastern edge of the wood for some other task. In this manner we
ourselves deprived ourselves of our main fighting strength at these
points, and, moreover, hindered later on the development of other
troops.
It is not possible for any one to believe — at least in the Prussian
army, in which the so-called “ drawing-on ” through defiles has always
been one of the best-beloved “ schemes ” of the drill-ground (every-
thing belonging to it having been literally crammed up) — that no one
here, from the commander of the army to the junior lieutenant, had
the presence of mind to remember this simple lesson. Thus the
situation remained the same during two hours; or, in other words,
the natural defile was prolonged, by living walls of crowded masses
of men, up to within a short distance of St. Hubert. We thus deprived
ourselves later on of the last means of obtaining a tactical develop-
ment, while the troops, who, during two hours, had formed a human
wall towards Point du Jour and St. Hubert, were, at the time of the
last counter-attack of the French (about 7 p.m.), and of the arrival of
the 2nd Corps, morally so worn out that, for the most part, they no
longer knew their right hands from their left, or their friends from
their enemies; and when the 3rd Division reached the Mance Valley
with drums beating and bugles blowing, and, as they climbed up the
eastern slope, unfortunately opened fire from the rear upon these
demoralized infantry, the latter suddenly fell to pieces like a house
of cards, and poured to the rear in a wild panic, rushing, shouting,
and quite out of their senses, to an extent indeed which has seldom
happened in the history of war. All this, following the law of cause
and effect, was simply the result of the mode of leading, and was
really due to the supreme commanders. A few hours before, the same
:
||||;|' y. ■ 1 1
128 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
drama had taken place on the same spot; was it therefore necessary
considering the failure of every
^French. ^ the Germans, np to 5 p.m., to gain ground towards Point
du ° Jour ° and Moscou, as a decided tactical success On the other
hnnd the defender had entirely expended and exhausted his strength
S>Xiout; thus a pause in the battle at this moment was
the most welcome thing which could have happened. If, howevei,
the ten Ind a half battalions of the 7th Corps, of which we have spoken
had at this moment attacked the south-west point of the quarries of
Rozerieulles, the position would at that very horn have fallen into
our hands. And this was exactly the tactical step which the time
and circumstances called for, and which was ripe for action until
5 pm. There can be no question in this case of any outcry as to
LnSing tactics or criticism, for it was absolutely obligatory to thus
act, having regard to what was ordered and what was known about
tlie Scad of this, the Germans contented themselves for an hour and
a half with a simple, and not always actively conducted, artillery combat.
The French used the time skilfully and energetically ; it was actually
to them a stroke of luck which saved them, and their behaviour was
exactly what it should have been— which cannot be said ot that of the
Germans. The troops were re-organized, the position newly occupied,
the supply of cartridges filled up, and the reserves withdrawn, in
short, breathing time was given all along the line, which is the surest
means of prolonging the endurance of moral force. It was impossible
for the Germans to find out all this from their position ; but much
of it was observed, with the result that they realized that the enemy
was preparing himself against a new attack from them. If this was
to be carried out in exactly the same direction as the former attacks,
they would again fulfil the hopes of the Irench ! Nothing but the
consideration of all these things, taken together, will make clear the
tenacity of the enemy and the failure of the German infant!} fiom
the first to the last of their many attempts to attack.
Want of The head-quarters had been at Flavigny since the commencement
harmony of the battle. It had, at 10.30 a.m., ordered the attack by the 1st
the head- Army to be “simultaneous” with that by the 2nd, and had further
quarters di rec ted it to take place from Gravelotte and the Bois de Vaux; it
l stf. Army, had, moreover, directed General von Steinmetz “only to show Ins
artillery in case it was necessary to do so m order to prepare a later
attack. General von Steinmetz received these instructions at
1 15 pm. For reasons which, have been given, more had happened on
the German right than this last instruction supposed; but the main
idea which ruled everything was the order to attack (ot 10.30 a m ),
and this set the principal task, while the instructions of 12 o clock
served only for guidance in a certain special case, lhis must be
strictly borne in mind, and care must be taken not to reverse the
importance of these two things. The cause of the instructions were
“the isolated struggle in front of Yerneville which is now (12 o clock)
audible.” If this cause ceased. General von Steinmetz was completely
j”"'
fH; •
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
129
free to make what decisions he pleased, and the instructions of
12 o’clock had no longer any importance for him, since they were set
aside by the lapse of time and the change of circumstances ; thus the
general had to concern himself only with the contents of the order of
attack, but this he must carry out fully.
When the instructions of 12 o’clock arrived (at 1.15 pan.), the
1st Army no longer considered that the thunder of the guns on their
left was a mere engagement, certainly not an isolated struggle. By
1.15 pan. both their eyes and their ears told them that it was a
general action ; and by 2 p.m. they could have no doubt whatever on
the matter, as regarded themselves. Thus the cause had ceased, and
the instructions no longer affected Steinmetz. Everything, therefore,
which took place at the front, up to the capture of St. Hubert, was
accurately arranged, correct, and in accordance with the spirit of
the order of 10.30 a.m. ; on the other hand, General von Steinmetz
carried out this order on one side only, namely, in his front from
Gravelotte, and not on his flank from the Bois de Yaux. The order
(of 3 p.m.) to the 26th Infantry Brigade ought to have been given
immediately after the receipt of the order of 10.30 a.m., and to have
been then despatched, after which the further steps of which we have
spoken should have been taken. The action of General von Steinmetz
after 3 p.m. was faulty, not because he acted in opposition to the order
of 10.30 a.m., but because the maimer in which he executed that order
showed that he failed to grasp it or to carry out its intention.
But whatever may be our opinion on this point, Moltke’s orders
of 12 o’clock could not have been understood by General von Steinmetz
otherwise than that further instructions would follow, which would
prolong the thread of the former ; and these threads should have been
prolonged, since the instructions of midday seem incomplete both in
their contents and in their form, and, so to speak, were like an A
which must be followed by a B, that is to say, by instructions “ as to
when the moment had arrived when Steinmetz was to attack ; that
he was to attack simultaneously with the 2nd Army ; since the
engagement at V erneville had ceased to be a mere engagement, and
was certainly no longer an isolated struggle.” Such instructions
ought to have been received by General von Steinmetz from General
von Moltke. But no such instructions ever arrived. They did not
arrive, because Moltke at Flavigny, soon after the despatch of the
instructions of midday, came himself to the conclusion that the
grounds on which these instructions were founded had themselves
no foundation. When Steinmetz received nothing more after the
instructions of midday, he must have said to himself (considering the
increasing severity of the battle), that no such instructions had been
issued ; since at the head-quarters they could hear what was going
on as well as he could. For this reason Steinmetz, as far as regards
all that took place in his front up to 3 p.m., was entirety right;
though certainly, when we say this, we must mark the difference
between that which Steinmetz ordered, and that which Goeben
brought about.
Although all this is now quite clear and distinct, yet the evidence
II
am
130
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
of the Official 'Account brings a charge which is plainly directed
against Steinmetz. I have not endeavoured to hide the points where
Steinmetz was in fault, and in the same manner I am prepared to
defend him where the Official Account does him groundless wrong.
Steinmetz was very much to blame ; he was so in points of which the
Official Account says nothing, but he was not so with regard to
matters on which it wastes many words. The flagrant neglect to
scout in front of the 2nd Army, the crossing of the 12th and the
Guard Corps, etc., have been glossed over, although these two faults,
to say nothing of others, were sufficient to destroy Moltke’s sequence
of ideas ; while with respect to everything else which happened, with
or without Steinmetz, all the blame is heaped upon him, and attention
is even drawn to it by the use of italics.
But no further instructions from Moltke to Steinmetz could exist,
since Moltke himself did not receive “ any distinct information con-
cerning the circumstances ” of the 2nd Army “until a late hour in the
afternoon.” Why is this “late hour” not exactly stated? It was
really 5 p.m., and thus Steinmetz is from this point of view justified
up to 3 p.m. It is incorrect to state that the main idea of the
instructions for the right wing was —
“ A delaying action on the part of the main force, until the left wing
of the 2nd Army had fully observed the condition of affairs on the
northern lines of retreat of the enemy, and, supposing the French Army
to make a stand to the west of Metz, until their right flank had been
turned from the north.”
Moltke, no doubt, thought of this, but he did not send any instruc-
tions based on this to the 1st Army. He did not inform them where
the right flank of the French really rested, when the 2nd Army
attacked “simultaneously.” Later on in the afternoon, since Moltke
could have sent Steinmetz more exact instructions, there would still
have been time to commence an attack of the 1st Army “from Grave-
lotte and the Bois de Vaux.”
The head-quarters had, after 1 p.m., drawn nearer to the right
flank, since, at 2 p.m., it changed its standpoint from Fla vigny to
Rezonville. After the 2nd Corps had been ordered to remain tem-
porarily at Rezonville, the head-quarters rode on farther to the front ;
at 4.30 p.m., that is to say, after the unfortunate “pursuit,” it arrived
in rear of the right flank of the 1st Army ! Up to that time General
von Steinmetz had carefully informed the head-quarters of every-
thing which had happened in chronological order; first as to the
success of the artillery against the batteries of Point du Jour, then
the capture of the woods, then that of St. Hubert, and finally the
advance of our cavalry and artillery over the valley of the Mance.
Since the orders for the last of these were given at 3 p.m., and the
head-quarters were then still at Bezonville, there is some appearance
of probability that at this time it was there considered that the
decision would be brought about near Gravelotte, and that they for
this reason left the bad position which had been selected, in order that
they might be near to the decisive point.
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RATINE. 131
But if anything more than “ showing the artillery ” on the part of
the 1st Army was contrary to the intentions of Moltke, why did the
latter, after receiving this chain of information from General von
Steinmetz, issue no further instructions with regard to “ a delaying
action of the main force ” of the 1st Army ? How, then, can General
von Steinmetz be blamed on account of the steps which he took up to
3 p.m. ? At 4.15 p.m, Steinmetz reported the failure of the attempt to
"pursue,” and, moreover, that “the battle in the front was indecisive;
and that in order to obtain success in this direction, an attack in force
against the right wing of the enemy would be necessary.” This
report reached the head-quarters at about 4.30 p.m., and is so far of
tactical importance as it teaches us that then (at 4.30) Steinmetz did
not find himself in a position “ to attempt any progress to his front.”
But instead of calling upon the 2nd Army for aid, Steinmetz should
have called upon himself, and should himself have immediately and
energetically commenced an attack on the enemy’s left flank, for the
prosecution of which he had, at this hour, ample force and time. But
General von Steinmetz did not go beyond the order given to the
26th Infantry Brigade. This brigade, which received the order
“during the fourth hour after noon,” had by 6 p.m. slightly driven
back the skirmishers of Lapasset’s Brigade, and had captured the
weakly held and yet more weakly defended Jussy, at which point
their action ended. The enemy’s general met this force with the
97th Regiment of Infantry, one company of the 14th Chasseurs and
two batteries, and did not find it necessary to use the 84th Regiment
of Infantry. But General von Steinmetz, when at 3 p.m. he received
the orders which have been mentioned, had intended to “make an
energetic advance against the enemy’s left flank” with this brigade ;
but no one could call what the 26th Brigade did an “energetic
advance.” This seems also to have been recognized, since, when the
brigade contented itself with the occupation of Jussy, General von
der Goltz had, “as his main duty, in the spirit of the instructions
received from the higher commanders, to facilitate the advance of
the Prussian troops from the Bois de Vaux, and to secure the
communications of the 1st Army with the rear.” Further on it is
stated that the position which had been captured was the best to suit
both objects. We must, however, ask what instructions General von
der Goltz had really received. The Official Account, on p. 828,
vol. iL, names only one. Yet on p. 833 we suddenly hear of
instructions, exactly such indeed as would have been absolutely
correct. According to this, General von Steinmetz really had had an
intention to carry out an advance of the Prussian troops from the
Bois de Yaux, though at the same time the dispositions and the
omissions of that general show that he never intended an attack at
any point against ttie left flank of the French. He gave no order for
an attack from the Bois de Vaux; on the contrary, at 4.15 p.m. he
begged the head-quarters to arrange for an attack by the 2nd Army
against the enemy’s right flank.
In consequence of the dispositions made by General von Steinmetz
on the early morning of the 18th, General von Manteutfel moved the
'*"' r
r
132
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
i
4th Infantry Brigade (5th and 45th Regiments), one squadron of the
10th Dragoons, and two batteries, in the direction of Vaux, with
the result that the point of these troops arrived at Augny at 4.30 p.m.
These troops were evidently not sufficient for the purpose.
Speaking of the action of these two brigades, the Official
Account says : —
“ The establishment of the 26th Brigade in front of the extreme left
wing of the French Army had a special bearing upon the course of the
battle, inasmuch as Marshal Bazaine allowed himself to be distracted, by
the increased apprehension thereby caused to his left flank, from turning
sufficient attention to the more important parts of the battle-field. The
movements of troops taking place along the right bank of the Moselle
might also appear to him to he connected with the appearance of the
26th Brigade.”
<f Sufficient attention 55 can only mean the provision of reserves !
The 26th Infantry Brigade had started to march at about 4 p.m. (?),
while Bazaine had, in the very words of the Official Account, already
at 3 p.m. employed all his reserves with the exception of one brigade
of infantry and the cavalry. How are we to reconcile these statements %
As a matter of fact, the arrival of the two brigades had no special
importance, and the battle ran its course exactly on the lines on
which it had been previously commenced. Bazaine made no change
after the arrival of these two brigades, except that he reinforced
Lapasset’s Brigade by a battery or two of the Guard, and brought a
few other batteries into action at St. Quentin. The French made no
use of the 84th Regiment of Lapasset’s Brigade, which was available.
The order of events is readily displaced, and it is easy to speak of
“ instructions” which were really not given beforehand, while the
narrator is liable to forget what he has already said in few and good
words, so that in the end a picture is drawn and a sequence of events
is laid down, such as in reality neither were nor could be true.
This remarkable proceeding is followed by a no less remarkable
“ variation ” as to what the 1st Army ought to have done and did.
According to my narrative, no doubt can exist on this head ; and so
much the more wonderful is it that we find in the Official Account
as follows : —
“ The original task of the 1st Army, that of drawing the adversary upon
itself, was fulfilled, and by the impetuosity of the troops even in a certain
respect exceeded. For whilst the 7th Corps, in accordance with its former
instructions, had in general limited itself to maintaining those places
which it had originally occupied, the 8th had, with the capture of St.
Hubert, moved close up to the enemy’s main positions. The French must,
therefore, have expected an attack at any moment upon their left wing,
and kept, in consequence, their reserves in rear of the centre until it was
too late to support the right wing.”
It is to be noted that this refers to the hour of 5 p.m., and we may
say that every word, and all the efforts to obscure and put on one
side the true objects, dispositions, and events are simply so many
incorrect statements. The original task of the 1st Army was not to
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
138
draw the adversary upon itself, but, simultaneously with the 2nd
Army, to attack from Gravelotte and the Bois de Vaux. The impetuosity
of the troops did not exceed the task which they were supposed to
have had given them (but which never was given) ; but this was done
by the Generals von Steinmetz and von Zastrow, by their dispositions
for pursuit which were made at 3 p.m. The capture of St. Hubert
was, however, absolutely necessary, whether the 1st Army was used
in the offensive or in the defensive. A bombardment with artillery
neither “ maintains positions ” nor “ draws the enemy upon one's self,”
nor is this a way to attain an effective defence; if this be intended,
infantry must be employed to keep a hold. All Goeben’s dispositions
up to this time had been in accordance with the situation ; but, on the
other hand, what Steinmetz had ordered, as well as what he had
neglected to order after 3 p.m., was out of place. Bazaine had,
generally speaking, placed his reserves, not in rear of his centre, but
behind his left ; and he did not hold them back until 5 p.m., but had
already at 3 p.m. expended them, with the excex3tion of a remnant so
small as to be of no importance.
The head-quarters had, as has been stated, moved slowly forward Events at
towards the right wing of the battle, and had at about 5 p.m. taken quarters
up a position to the south of Malmaison. Colonel Count Wartensleben afters p.m.
here made a verbal report concerning the condition of affairs with the
1st Army. Lieut.-Colonel von Brandenstein arrived soon after at the
head-quarters from the 2nd Army; from his report was obtained
the first certain information with regard to the French right wing.
From the news regarding the latter it was obvious that the disposi-
tions of the 2nd Army were being carried out exactly in the spirit of
the views which prevailed at head-quarters ; indeed, that the advance
which had been already made into the valley of the lower Moselle, the
idea of which occurred simultaneously to Prince Frederic Charles and
to the Crown Prince Albert of Saxony, had gone far beyond the bounds
of a tactical turning movement. Since at that time the second line of
battle was closed up in rear of the first, and was ready to hand, the head-
quarters could regard the progress of affairs with the 2nd Army with
confidence. Nevertheless, the head-quarters failed, until much too late,
to obtain an opportunity of forming an opinion on what was going on
from their own observation, leaving out of the question the position
they had selected for themselves. Up to this time they had been too
far from the field of battle, and were, moreover, in rear of a wing, so
that communication with the other (the 2nd Army) required far too
much time. Now the head-quarters certainly came up into the sphere
of action, but the disadvantage with regard to the communication with
the 2nd Army still continued, since even now they were too far distant
from Prince Frederic Charles. Even though this was not especially felt,
as regards the leading of the 2nd Army, owing to the activity and the
initiative of Prince Frederic Charles and the Crown Prince Albert, yet,
owing to the great distance of the head-quarters, there was, up to the
end of the battle, more or less uncertainty with respect to the progress
of the action of the 2nd Army, and as to what they had succeeded in
doing; that is to say, the reports of the 2nd Army had too far to come,
134 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
and thus arrived later than they would had the head-quarters been
placed more in the centre. So long as it was possible to believe that
tliG ene m y would be met in tbo direction between Bezonville and Vilie-
sui'-Yron, that is to say to the north, there was something to say in
favour of Flavigny as their position ; but this was not the case after
the issue of the order for attack (at 10.30 am), and after the opening
of the battle their position was a real fault. No one, therefore, ever
endeavours to give a reason fox* the selection of the position ! When
at last the head-quarters moved forward from Flavigny to Malmaison,
it was in every respect too late as regards the guidance of the battle.
The head-quarters concluded from the report of Lieut.-Colonel von
Brandenstein, and from the fire which was audible to the north, that the
battle was progressing in that direction. Considering this, and also-
what they saw going on before them, it appeared that the moment
had come for the intended simultaneous attack, and that under the
circumstances all that was needed was simply the issue of instruc-
tions to this effect to the 1st Army. But whilst the 2nd Army was
striving energetically to place itself in a favourable position to deal a
heavy blow, and had made all preparations for this purpose, so that all
that was required was sufficient time to x'eap the results, the 1st Army
was by no means in such a position, but had, on the contrary, neglected
everything suitable to the spirit of the order for attack. Though it
was not the duty of the head-quarters to interfere without reason in
the sphere of command of the commanders of the units under them,
yet we may very well ui'ge that, if the head- quarters, as might have
been quite possible, had been at Malmaison at 1.30 p.m,, and had from
that point observed what was going on, the battle might on the
German right have run another and a better course. The ideas which
governed the events of 3 p.m. and later would certainly have found no-
favour with the head- quarters, and the attempts to cany out those ideas,
would therefore have undoubtedly been prevented. The fact that the
head-quarters did not arrive in good time upon the field of battle was.
severely punished even when they did at last airive, and later on was.
punished yet moi‘e. What were the causes of the late arrival of the
head-quarters, and of the unsuitable selection made of their position,,
is quite unknown ; many things happen in war, which afterwards no
one could believe to be possible, and for which, search as we may, we
can find no explanation. This fault, with regard to the position of
the supreme commander during these hours, is one of such things.
Indeed, the strategical idea of the order of attack, and the intention
that the attacks should be simultaneous, demanded the greatest care
in the selection of the best position for the head-quarters, and also-
that this position should be taken up as early as possible.
Count von Wartensleben gave the King of Prussia at Malmaison a
clearer idea of the previous events which had taken place with the
1st Army than could be obtained from the various reports of General
von Steinmetz. Soon after 5 p.m. it was observed from Malmaison
that the severity of the enemy’s infantry fire was diminishing, while
their artillery was at times altogether silent. But it was correctly
concluded that this was a sign merely of flagging energy, and by no
i
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANCE RAVINE.
135
1
means one of a tactical victory, and it therefore resulted that the Ring
of Prussia now decided on a simultaneous attack, and took steps to
this end.
But an attack by large masses requires certain preparations, such
as suitable arrangements, points for the posting and concentration of
the troops, reconnaissances, and (in order that the attacking troops
may be generally correctly employed) roads and communications for
their advance and extension, together with a distinct decision as to the
object of the attack. This is the more necessary when one army is to
attack simultaneously with another, and under such circumstances as
regards nature and art as were here experienced by the 1st Army, and
were already exactly known to them.
But, although General von Steinmetz was aware of the order of
attack of 10.30 a.m., and although the efforts and attempts made
through the defile of Gravelotte against Point du Jour had up to
5 p.m. one and all failed, yet afterwards, as before, he clung persistently
to these roads and directions of attack. It is impossible to attack
simultaneously by only one road. This is simply in accordance with
the nature of things, especially when this one road is a defile which is
under the fire of the enemy. But if General von Steinmetz was to
attack simultaneously with the 2nd Army, it was obviously necessary
that his own army should attack simultaneously throughout. But
from noon to 5 p.m. nothing of the kind happened, for nothing was
looked to or cared for beforehand with this object. Many lines of
attack (roads) are necessary for a simultaneous attack, and if such an
attack is to be carried out — especially if on the front and the flank, as
was the case here — and there are no roads for its development, they
must be made. Neither General von Steinmetz, nor, it would appear,
any one else, thought of this, otherwise all that has been described in
Chapter V. might have been carried out both in the front and on the
fiank without difficulty, and might have been completed by 5 p.m. ;
while if the troops had been at this hour suitably posted at the
tactical points, Moitke's simultaneous attack might have been brought
about, and successfully executed — at least by the 1st Army.
General von Steinmetz had, still after 5 p.m., the following infantry
immediately at his disposal : —
1. Four battalions of the 32nd Infantry Brigade of the 8th Corps,
to the west of Gravelotte.
2. Ten and a half battalions of the 25th, 27th, and 28th Brigades
of the 7th Corps, to the east and south of Gravelotte.
If at this hour there had been any thought taken as to how to
break through the enemy, these ten and a half battalions might have
been set in action in the direction of the quarries of Rozerieull.es. But
no one understood either how to make use of the ground, or how to
collect the troops together in good time, and to place them in readiness
at the proper points. Everything after, as well as before, that hour
x^emained indistinct as to its aims, and without order as to the means ;
no fire-position was established for the infantry, and no lines of
communication to it were made for the troops told off* for the attack.
Nothing could therefore be carried out as a wholes since no one had
The 2nd
Corps
under the
orders of
General
von
Steinmetz,
The 32nd
Brigade
come into
action.
136 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
beforehand either thought or acted logically. It is true that the
German artillery, after, as well as before, 5 p.m., produced good effect
upon’ the enemy’s position; but no artillery can drive away good
infantry by their fire. This task calls for the full force of good infantry.
To such leading, which had shown itself so entirely unequal to its
task, destiny decreed that the 2nd Corps should be handed over,
though in such hands it could not meet with any other fate than that
which the other troops had already endured. It is very doubtful
whether at this hour the head-quarters had really any idea of the
omissions of General von Steinmetz, or had any complete conception
of the failure of his measures, or any certain knowledge of the dispersion
of the 7th Corps, or, above all, had any notion that General von
Steinmetz had practically done nothing, attempted nothing, and
prepared nothing for an attack from the Bois de Yaux.
At 5.30 p.m. (?) the king ordered General von Franzecky to place
himself with the 2nd Corps under the orders of General von Steinmetz
at Gravelotte. Of his corps, at the time of the receipt of the order,
the 3rd Division, coming from Buxieres, and consisting of eleven
battalions, four batteries, and two companies of pioneers, was assembled
at Rezonviile; at the same place, on their way from Buxieres and
Onville, were six batteries, one battalion, and four squadrons, while
the point of the 4th Division, which was also on the march from
Onville, and was composed of twelve battalions, four batteries, four
squadrons, and one company of pioneers, was just entering Rezonviile.
At 5.45 p.m. (?) General von Franzecky moved off* the 3rd Division
from the south of Rezonviile, and the corps artillery from the north
of that village towards Gravelotte; while at 6.30 p.m. the 4th Division
followed in the same direction. This seems to me to be too late, and
my inquiries have convinced me that there must be here some
important error as regards time. It is probable that the order was
sent to General von Franzecky exactly at 5 p.m., in which case the
other times would fit in, since it was four good kilometres from the
rendezvous at Rezonviile to Gravelotte. Halfway between the two
villages the troops were deployed, and from that point they advanced,
with colours dying, and on the front of a brigade, over the open,
clear, and level plateau.
When these i*einforcements drew near Gravelotte, General von
Goeben directed the four available battalions of the 32nd Brigade
(viz. the three battalions of the 72nd and the 2nd Battalion of the
40th) towards the Mance Yalley, while he had already ordered the
3rd Battalion of the 40 th to the fork of the valley and the 1st Battalion
to Malmaison to cover the left flank. As the 32nd Brigade moved off,
General von Goeben received from General von Steinmetz orders to
carry out the measures which he had already directed. General von
Goeben at once rode off to St. Hubert, and passing along the edges of
the wood to the north of the main road, formed the opinion that the
whole position on both sides of St. Hubert was sufficiently secure.
At St. Hubert the general shook hands with Captain Gniigge (of the
3rd Light Battery), encouraged him in his intention to hold his
ground, even after Hasse’s Battery had been driven back, and informed
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
137
him that from his position he had been able to see the effect of the
two batteries on Moscou, and that he might continue to fire with the
same success. St. Hubert itself was sufficiently strongly held, and
a certain amount of order existed in the farm. But this was not the
case to the west of it. At this point, on both sides of the main road,
stood detachments of the strength of regiments made up from the
most varied units, and crowded in close masses, in which it was
difficult to introduce any form of order, since the enemy's shot were
continually cutting lanes through them.
The case was not very different at other points yet farther to the
west. General von Goeben could not himself attend to the organiza-
tion of these men, but he sent orders to various officers to rally
them and to lead them back into the front of battle. He then
returned to Gravelotte. The rallying of the men unfortunately was
.scarcely carried out at all, since there were not a sufficient number of
officers to do it. Consequently, the field of battle at this point, after,
as well as before, this hour, presented a by no means pleasant appear-
ance, which was not without its effect upon the troops which came
up later. Fugitives were continually drifting into the woods, and
thence to the rear; or else they cowered in the valley behind any
little patches of cover, which might serve to shelter them from the
eyes of the officers and from bullets. This flow of fugitives did not
cease until late in the evening, since fifty-nine companies were jumbled
together in and around St. Hubert, and served, as it were, as a
reservoir, from which the men dropped out as the hours ran by.
In the mean time, the 3rd Division and the corps artillery of the order for
2nd Corps had, at 6.30 p.m., arrived to the west of Gravelotte, and ^ e p^ k
the king at once gave General von Steinmetz the order “to move all da Jour,
available forces against the heights of Point du Jour.” It was 6.45
p.m. before General von Steinmetz had issued instructions in this
sense to Generals von Zastrow and von Franzecky, and the enemy’s
lines were then again in movement with the object of striking
another blow.
On the side of the enemy, during almost two hours, the battle had Attack of
been only sufficiently fed to prevent it from dying away ; as to the tie Hrenc *
rest, everything was prepared for a last great stroke. The fire-
positions on the line from Moscou to Point du Jour were re-occupied,
reserves were distributed to each brigade, the firing-lines were
supplied with fresh ammunition, and the reserves were posted at
suitable points. The artillery, who knew the exact range, were ready
to advance into their positions with loaded guns, and at about 6.30
p.m. the enemy’s front, as if by a signal, was shrouded in fire and
smoke. Why was this ? The nearly fiat ground from Rezonville to
Gravelotte was then quite unoccupied. If one stood on the highest
point near Point du Jour (1102), and looked towards Gravelotte, it
was possible to see about halfway a slight cavity (924), which towards
the west rose up to 960. Considering the distance, which was nearly
4^ miles, this was a very small difference of height. In this direction
there was a German corps on the march, of which the 3rd Division
and the corps artillery, now halfway towards Gravelotte, could be
138
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
easily seen by the French to be advancing on a deployed front and
with colours flying. They were the more visible, since, as Marshal
Leboeuf has frequently assured me, the mass of helmets glowed in the
rays of the setting sun (it was between 6 and 7 p.m.), and this over
the whole distance between Gravelotte and Rezonville. None of the
French generals were able to rightly estimate the number of this
imposing and majestic field of helmets as it moved forward. It was
thought to be “ a reserve army under the King of Prussia,’ ” and was
considered to consist of at least two corps ; others estimated the mass-
at three corps. (This is intelligible at the present day, since we now
know that the 2nd Corps was formed in three groups.) The French
felt themselves no longer capable of dealing with such masses ; from
this moment, therefore, they had no longer any idea “ of winning
a battle/' but thought only of getting out of “ the affair with honour/'
while for this no other means was available than to gain time, which
might be best done by a counter-attack ! Generals Leboeuf and
Frossard agreed in this opinion, and determined to attack the
advancing mass of the reserve army from Moscou and Point du Jour,,
and to attack them at the moment when they should extend out of
the Mance Yalley, and in this effort to employ the last forces at their
disposal. It will be seen from the manner in which this attack
was carried out how difficult such an offensive is for the defenders,,
for, as a matter of fact, no simultaneous attack was carried out
from Moscou and Point du Jour, since it took place only from the
latter, and was then far too early; indeed, it would appear that
Leboeuf held back altogether from the offensive, as he had not got
his troops in readiness when Frossard burst forth, while, by the time
that Leboeuf was ready, Frossard's attack had been broken up, with
the result that Leboeuf, very wisely, entirely gave up his movement.
Thus the French offensive took place earlier than was intended, and
with probably only one-half of the force which it had been proposed
to use. This fact makes it quite clear why no attack whatever was
made upon St. Hubert. Nevertheless, this attack was the most
energetic of the day, and its effect was proportionately great. It was
carried out, not only by the troops of Bastoul’s Division, but also by
those of Verge’s Division, and the advance was as well managed as it
was swift. To the south of the main road, and between 200 and 300
yards from the first French shelter-trenches, lay various bodies of
troops of the 7th and 8th Corps in irregular masses and groups; these
kept up a rather feeble fire fight, and no longer expected any attack
by the enemy. If all these German detachments between tire south
side of the main road and the level of the gravel-pits were added
together, they would at the most amount to twelve companies, which
were mixed and jumbled together, and were for the most part without
leaders. On the edges of the wood to the south of the main road
were, it is. true, other detachments; these were, however, in little
better condition, and were also, as a rule, without leaders. The hot
fire of the French artillery and infantry, which had suddenly begun
again, made a strong moral impression upon the groups of German
skirmishers; while, before they had become accustomed to this new
■
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
13 &.
phase of the struggle,, swarms of the enemy's skirmishers poured out
of the smoke along the whole front from Point du Jour to the quarries
of Rozerieulles, followed at a short distance by columns distributed
at fairly regular intervals. As these troops came on down the slope
at a run, and in excellent order, the rear lines of the French infantry
suddenly ceased firing, and in place of the roar of their rifles the
sound of bugles and of drums, and shouts of “ en avant ” and “ ccmr&ge ”
rang through the air along the entire line. Rushing on with the
velocity of a ball, bounding down a hill, the French infantry very
quickly reached the German skirmishers, who, owing to the little
fight left in them, and to the fact that they were surprised, were
swept away along* the whole line.
The drama could be watched with the naked eye from the heights The first
of Gravelotte, and those so watching it thought that the French pamc *
attack had reached the eastern edge of the wood, and was pushing
on through the latter on Gravelotte. The rapidity with which the
event had taken place, the thick cloud of smoke which had preceded
it, and the equally thick cloud of dust which followed it through the
twilight, together with the confusion, which had been first observed
at St. Hubert around Gntigge’s Battery, when everything was so
enwrapped in a mist of smoke and dust that nothing could be seen
but shapeless masses, from which individual atoms were torn away
to the rear; all these, together with the fact that the fire of the
battery was becoming weaker, brought about for one moment a feeling
of distress upon the heights of Gravelotte. Most people thought that
Gniigge's Battery would be captured, and they were uncertain whether
the guns were moving forwards or back, or were remaining motionless.
After a few minutes had been passed in this state of excitement, the
cloud of smoke and dust lifted a little, and it was then seen that
Gniigge’s Battery w T as firing with three guns on their old front
towards Moscou, while three had been pushed about 100 paces to the
south, and had now taken up a front directly against Point du Jour;
all the six guns were in action, but in the confusion some of the
gunners were missing, so that only three guns were still firing, until
Captain Gniigge obtained some infantry soldiers, who worked the
guns very well indeed in the place of the gunners who were wanting.
This is a very remarkable circumstance. Captain Gniigge applied
that one of these men (named Koch) might receive some mark of
distinction, and he was given the Iron Gross.
At Gravelotte and Malmaison, where attention was now being
paid to the dispositions for a general attack upon Point du Jour, it
was not possible to judge with what strength the enemy had attacked.
His strength was estimated to be altogether about a division of fresh
troops. In neither respect was this estimate correct, though it might
have been so. The German artillery had followed the enemy's
advance with their fire, and it was noticed that the hostile infantry,,
owing to the many hits made by the shell, became looser and looser ;
but it was impossible to say whether the enemy's attack would, or
would not, be brought to a standstill to the east of the wood by the
fire of the German guns. While this point was still uncertain, swarms-
IIHe J L .i 17 ' — *
140
TWENTY -FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
Attack of
the 32n&
Infantry
Brigade.
of panic-stricken infantry of all regiments, with white, reel, and blue
shoulder-straps, burst suddenly, along the whole front to the south of
the main road, out of the western edge of the wood, and poured in
upon the artillery who were in action. It was impossible at the first
moment to distinguish whether this “ played-out rubbish ” was com-
posed of friends or enemies. Since the men, driven on by fright and
terror, having entirely lost their reason and all moral power, were
rushing along and yelling as they went, it was quite possible that
they might be French assailants. There was, therefore, great anxiety
in the line of the artillery of the 7th Corps ; many eyes were turned
to the rear on the 2nd Corps, and officers promptly sprang to the
front from the batteries, in order to ascertain how the situation stood.
These saw nothing but masses of German troops who had lost their
heads. But, what masses there were of them ! Their morale was
gone, and they listened neither to words of command or to orders.
Many artillery officers threatened them with drawn swords, and others
shouted to them that they would open upon them -with case from
their own guns — but nothing had any effect upon them. Under such
circumstances the soldier becomes irresponsible for his actions. Since
it was impossible to collect this dross into any formation, an effort
was made to turn them off behind the artillery ; but this, too, failed.
Driven on by fright and terror, the fugitives ran in a straight line
upon their own guns, and poured through the intervals, for even
the strong expostulations of the gunners was unable to bring them to
their senses. The mob did not stop until it had arrived in rear of
the line of artillery, where they were met by officers of all arms, and
of all ranks, from generals to lieutenants. Even the head-quarters
and the commander of the 1st Army were not undisturbed by this
event. The efforts to bring about a counterstroke were redoubled ; but,
as ever, neglected preparations and loss of time cannot in such cases
be made good, and one failure necessarily followed another — from
the past negligence was born the present rashness !
As a matter of fact, the French infantry which attacked consisted
of only about a brigade ; moreover, they never got as far as the
eastern edge of the "wood, but, as was shown by the bodies, were
brought to a standstill about 150 yards short of it, and then rushed
back in irregular flight into the main position. It was impossible
for the Germans to know this at the time, nor could they then know
that the might of the enemy’s attack had already given way before
the German artillery fire alone; all that could be clearly seen was
that no attack was made from Moscou, and that St. Hubert had not
been lost.
It has already been stated that General von Goeben had, soon
after 6 p.m., set in motion the 32nd Infantry Brigade towards the
Mance Valley. Of this brigade, two battalions of the 40th had already
entered the battle in a northerly direction, and the remaining four
battalions, the 72nd Regiment leading, with the 2nd Battalion of
the 40th in rear of it, had moved forward along the main road and
reached the quarries of St, Hubert at the very moment when the
French attack which has just been described had reached its climax.
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
141
Was General von Goeben right, at G p.m., when no attack by the ;
enemy on his front was visible, in allowing four fresh battalions to go
into action in the direction of St. Hubert ? j
Considering the situation of the battle, we must, under the circum-
stances, answer the question in the negative. At the hour named
there were in and around St. Hubert forty-three companies. Goeben
could not have had any exact knowledge of this, but he did know that ,
the greater part of the infantry of his corps were huddled together at I
that spot. If he had known the true state of affairs, it would have been :
better to have taken thirty companies away from St. Hubert, in order \
to use them somewhere else, than to have sent sixteen fresh companies
there ; for it must have been possible to hold the position with thirteen
companies. The other thirty companies would have been welcome,
especially to the north of the main road. But in war one never knows !
r exactly that which one ought to know, and, although it is impossible j
to find a reason for using the 32nd Brigade in the direction which has |
been mentioned, its presence there proved in the highest degree effec- 1
tive. General von Barnekow (the commander of the 16th Division),
who was in front of the four battalions, was just the right man to carry )
out the task, which called more for decision and action than for great 1
ability. The four battalions were no mox*e successful than their pre- j
decessors in obtaining a suitable tactical development and grouping —
for this no leader seems to have been able to allow time — but their \
attack with drums beating was in no way inferior in energy to that j
of the French ; detachments of various troops which found themselves
to the right and left of the fresh column clung to it, and the French
onset now stopped entirely, and their lines turned and fled back in !
disorder. It appeared from St. Hubert as if General von Barnekow
<1 might really have carried Point du Jour by storm from the front.
I ■ The garrison of the former farm, whom the French had squeezed
j past, eagerly followed the advance of the four battalions, but a little J
in front of the height 1076 a regular hail of bullets struck the latter;
they stopped, and this attack also, which had begun so hopefully,
failed altogether. This was the first time, during all these long
hours, that several battalions had been used simultaneously against
the enemy, and it was the first important attack of infantry upon j
Point du Jour. Though General von Barnekow had not been sue-
j cessful, yet he had completely re-established the battle, and on this 1
? particular day that was much to be thankful for. During the attack
^ of General von Barnekow, Gniigge’s Battery had for the first time
to cease firing, in order not to endanger their own infantry. i
j But Goeben s action must be examined from yet another point j
] of view. The 32nd Brigade, as we have seen, carried out an important
j duty, but this was due to sheer good luck ; Goeben had neither
known of it beforehand nor wished to do it, nor had he intended
anything of the kind. When Goeben sent the 32nd Brigade into
action, he gave up his command over his last infantry reserve. For
this he is not to be blamed, since he knew that the infantry of a
whole corps would come up in their place. But the question is,.
} whether the 32nd Brigade, considered as a reserve, was posted at
-ir
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142 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
the correct tactical spot ? And to this we must answer, No : No leal
danger threatened the 8th Corps, except from the 3rd French Corps
from the Bois des Genivaux and from the direction or La Tohe-
Leipzig ; and its mass of artillery might have been swept away by
the fire from there, if Marshal Leboeuf had been a tactician. By good
luck nothin** of the kind took place ; but we ought always to take
account of the normal order of things. The battle of Gravelotte con-
sisted of two battles: (1) That of Gravelotte; (2) that of St. Pnvat.
The chain of the German connection in the centre between these two
was very loose, and exactly opposite to the faulty spot stood Marshal
Leboeuf, with at the beginning four massed divisions, with the reserve
•of the army available near at hand up to 3 p.m., and after 3 p.m. with
one brigade of that reserve at his disposal, and another ready to
•support him. Even though General von Goeben knew nothing of
this at the time, yet he could have no doubt with regard to the weak
•centre. His reserve ought, therefore, to have been posted near
Malmaison, in the vicinity of the height 977, and should have
remained there in readiness to meet an offensive stroke by the
enemy ; at any rate, this should have been the case until the German
3rd Corps had deployed in rear of the 9th. Even then such a reserve
would not have been superfluous in that position, while it would
have been more favourably situated for the support of the 15th
Division in the direction of Moscou.
It has been said, and I have myself so written, that Leboeuf had
already by midday brought his last reserves into action. But this
must not be taken to mean that the whole of his infantry had actually
been extended as skirmishers, and were thus held fast by the Germans.
This was not the case at all. Leboeuf had really made the great
mistake of letting all his four divisions get out of hand, without
arranging for any reserve for himself. This he first obtained
from the 1st Brigade of the Voltigeurs of the Guard (at 3 p.m.), and
even from this force he sent one regiment into action without any
special reason. But if Leboeuf himself had no reserve, or only a very
weak one, all his divisions, with the exception of Aymard’s, had com-
paratively strong reserves up to the end of the battle. It would
therefore have been easy lor the marshal to collect at any houi
infantry up to the strength of a division, and to use them foi a
•decisive attack by breaking through the German centre. The best
proof of this fact is to be found in the small losses suffered by a large
number of regiments, always excepting Aymard's Division. We may-
be quite sure that it was not owing to our tactics, or to our dis-
play of force, that nothing unpleasant took place from La Folie-
Leipzig ; for that we have to thank the foolish action of all the
generals of the French 3rd Corps. The 32nd Brigade ought therefore
to have been on the height 977* where Goeben should have left it
until the 3rd Corps was in a position to take over that post. But
this was not the case until 7 p.m.
Advance of The 32nd Brigade was followed by the 9th Hussars (belonging
the 9th to t he i6th Division). General von Goeben had given no order for this
Hussars. advance> 'phat muc h i s certain ; but it is uncertain whether such an
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
143
■order was given by General von Barnekow, or whether the regiment
on its own initiative followed the last brigade of its division. Inquiries
into this matter have given no distinct result ; the question, therefore,
remains open. But, since the consequences of this event might have
been very grievous, its tactical side, about which, unfortunately,
nothing has been said, must now be placed in the proper light. The
9th Hussars had followed the main road in column of threes, had
passed the Mance Valley in this formation, and had halted in the
same formation to the west of St. Hubert, It thus pushed an entire
cavalry regiment among the already close walk of infantry which
stood there. When the hussars halted at this spot, General von
Barnekow had already stopped the enemy's attack, and had com-
menced his counter-attack, which was at first successful, so that the
cavalry did not suffer at all from the French offensive. Neverthe-
less, such a hot infantry fire fell upon them that the commander of
the regiment allowed his men to dismount at the moment when the
tail of the column had reached about the middle of the strip of
wood to the east of the ravine. There can be no doubt that this
was the very worst thing that could have been done under the
circumstances.
The succession of misfortunes seemed on this day and at this place The second
to have no end ; for, while the hussars were halted in the above pamc *
manner on the main road, the reservists of the regiment (which, as is
well known, had left Treves without them) came up mounted on the
horses which had been added on mobilization, and the commander
of the regiment, instead of sending them back at once, formed from
them a fifth squadron, which he placed at the tail of the other four.
This fifth squadron was, under the circumstances, a very undesirable
addition, since the horses were not trained to stand fire, and were
nervous and excited, and, in fact, were unbroken. When the attack
of General von Barnekow had been brought to a standstill, the
enemy's fire increased in intensity, the hussars saw their infantry
retiring, and the commander therefore gave the ohder to mount,
intending to draw the regiment back a little. The trumpet-call
“ Threes about— march ! ” was correctly obeyed by all the squadrons,
as was also the call “Front!” The squadron with the reserve horses,
however, misunderstood both calls, and retired at first at a trot, after
which the pace grew faster and faster, as the untrained horses grew
frightened at the clatter in the defile through the wood, and rushed
swiftly through it. As if this was not enough, this fifth squadron
carried with it half of the fourth. Shot crashing into them, and
impediments of all kinds, increased the difficulties of the situation,
until at length, to the astonishment of all observers at Gravelotte, a
mass of cavalry burst at the top of their speed out of the western
entrance of the wood ! For the first moment every one was stupefied
with terror. The event excited the greater apprehension at Grave-
lotte, because, as has been stated, there had already been a similar
panic to the south of the main road. But since rushing quadrupeds
are swifter than rushing bipeds, and do not lose their breath so
quickly, the maddened horses dashed over the fiat on the main road
M
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144 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
into the remnants of the infantry of different regiments (principally
of the 60th and 33rd) which had been there collected. But worse was
yet to come. On the right-hand side of the main road were waggons
of all kinds and led horses, which had up to this time been in the
best possible order, so that the whole of the left side of the road had
been quite unencumbered. The teams of these waggons, startled by
the rush of the hussars, turned about and crowded into mixed masses.
Nothing was of any use, though many officers rushed with drawn
swords among the wild masses of men and horses, and endeavoured
to stem the raging flood ; hussars, infantry of various units, led horses
and orderlies, with baggage and other waggons, were all jumbled up
together, and rushed tumultuously along the road to the rear. The
confusion was indescribable, and the head-quarters and the staff* of
the 1st Army angrily watched the hateful scene. The advancing 2nd
Corps, magnificent as was its appearance, could not efface the terrible
sight. No one could find out any cause for the panic, and every one
was boiling with excitement for no reason whatever. Horses and men
had lost their senses, sabre-cuts and curses rained upon the idiots
without effect, and it was not until the lungs of both horses apd men
gave out that the wild flood was brought to a standstill, and could
be collected together far in rear of the 2nd Corps. Many of the
fugitives did not stop until they got to Vionville and its neighbour-
hood, shouting everywhere “ We are beaten ! ” In this manner some
officers lost their led horses, and never found them again ; among
others, three of the 9 th Hussars.
The other three and a half squadrons remained near St. Hubert
up to the end of the battle. When General von Barnekow saw that
his attack had failed, he ordered Captain von Ihlenfekl to charge.
The squadron galloped by the right of St. Hubert, wheeled by sections
to the left, but “ saw nothing to charge, but only their own infantry
retiring, followed by hostile skirmishers.” They wheeled again by
sections to the right, in order to make room for the infantry, and
took up a position to the south of the main road and about 150 yards
in front of the eastern edge of the wood. The remaining two and a
half squadrons continued in threes on the main road, while Captain
von Ihlenfeld’s squadron (the 1st), after about half an hour, placed
itself in rear of the 39th, whose field of fire it had masked up to
that time, and remained until 10 p.m. in a clearing of the wood.
Every soldier ought to know of such cases as this, in order that he
may not judge incorrectly the behaviour of other troops, and may
understand the causes of a panic, about which there is no reason to keep
silence, since they are very natural and, in this case, very instructive.
The fact that the head-quarters had witnessed this panic could
only strengthen and support the opinion as to the necessity for a
strong counter-attack with fresh troops.
D. Up to the End of the Battle.
of^the^in 8 Th e first order of the king to the 2nd Corps “ for the march on
to Oeneraf Gravelotte,” was correct under all circumstances. The second order
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANCE RAVINE.
145
of the king, “ to attack Point du Jour with all available forces," may von
be judged differently as regards its correctness. If suitable prepara-
tions had been made for carrying it out, and if the attack had been 2nd Corps,
directed concentrically on Point du Jour, it must have succeeded
with the forces available ; but the main attack should have been made
on the right against the enemy's left flank, and not on his front.
In order rightly to judge of the matter, we must first remember the
request made by General von Steinmetz to the head-quarters at
4.15 p.m., in which the general, who had convinced himself of the
uselessness of an attack in front, begged that the 2nd Army might
“be instructed to combine against the enemy's right flank." Thus,
at 6.80 p.m., that is to say, after an interval of two and a quarter hours,
the head-quarters distinctly disregarded the recommendation made
by General von Steinmetz at 4.15 p.m., with regard to the direction of
attack; since an order was then given to do that which General von
Steinmetz had recognized as impossible, and had reported as such.
Had Steinmetz then brought forward his objections to this course, as
he should have done, or had he omitted to do so ?
It would appear that Steinmetz did not do so, and it is easy
to explain this. Fox*, when the head-quarters came up in rear of
the 1st Army, General von Steinmetz went to the king and made
a report to him concerning the state of affairs. The meeting of the
king and the general took place at too great a distance from their
staffs for the latter to be able to know what the king said to the
general ; but the witnesses judged from the forcible gestures of the
king, and from the seriousness of his face when Steinmetz left him,
that the king had expressed to the general his disapprobation of the
steps which he had taken up to that time, especially with regard
to the prematui'ely engaged attack of the 1st Army — and this was
the case. From this moment a yet more marked ill-humour took
possession of General von Steinmetz, and it would seem that he was
now no longer inclined to seek the presence of the king, or to express
to him his opinions on this matter. From that moment the general
simply carried out what he was ordered to do. Although Steinmetz
no doubt was not blamed on account of having attacked, but because
he had attacked prematurely, yet there was a peculiar fatality in the
fact that he was now ordered to attack in the very direction which
he had recognized as objectionable. There is no need to inquire more
exactly as to how far the blame attached to General von Steinmetz
was well founded ; bufc it is easy^to understand that even the king had
at last realized the unpleasant state of affairs which had up to then
existed in the head-quarters, owing to the many differences between
Steinmetz and Moltke, and his Majesty could at such moments speak
very plainly.
But though General von Steinmetz — situated as he was — raised
no objections against the second order, these objections were raised
in another quarter, namely, by General von Moltke.
After the second order of the king had been issued, and its execu- Moitke’s
tion had begun, those near the king could see that the 2nd Corps
was moving in an unsuitable direction (towards the front). It had
L
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146 TWENTY-FOUR HOXJKS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
first to change again into column of march, had in this formation
to pass the defile in the twilight, and had on the farther side to
extend for the attack under yet more unfavourable conditions than
had been the ease with the troops which had already been engaged
here, namely, as regards time, in the twilight and. darkness on-
ground covered with every kind of obstacle, and, .with respect to
support by fire, in all probability without any assistance from the
German artillery ; and the consequences of the order which had been
given became so clear to Moltke’ s eyes that he brought forward
strong objections both against the suitability of the attack generally,
and with respect also to the direction of the attack. Moltke had
already distinctly ordered, at 10.30 a.m., that the attack should be
made from Gravelotte and the Bois de Yaux. Since he had been
near Malmaison (from 5 p.m.), he had observed that sufficient had not
been done against the enemy’s left flank from the Bois de Yaux,
and had also in the mean time learnt the events which have been
narrated more clearly than he had previously been able to ascertain
them from the reports of General von Steinmetz. He had, since 5 p.m.,,
himself seen and himself remarked that General von Steinmetz did
not understand him, and that the measures of the latter in no way
corresponded to the distinct idea of the order lor the attack. Moltke
was unpleasantly disturbed by this ; yet in this very difficult situation
he entirely preserved his quiet manner with his subordinates, and his
peculiarly careful modesty towards the king. He now observed the
panic which has been described above, while the 32nd Infantry Brigade
was already in motion in the direction of the defile towards St.
Hubert, and the 3rd Division was preparing to . follow them.. There
would still have been time to stop the 3rd Division, or to give them
another direction ; even if the attack by the French should really
result in the loss of the wood, which was very improbable, there were
collected at Gravelotte fresh forces of such great numerical strength,
that the enemy could and must be destroyed in the Mance Yalley by
their counter-attack, without our having been in any way in an
unfavourable tactical situation. ,
The continued, even though irregular and slow, fire of Gniigge s
Battery was a sign to Moltke that the enemy’s attack had had no
great result ; and, moreover, he credited the artillery line at Grave-
lotte with sufficient fighting power to be able alone to successfully
defend itself if necessary. If, nevertheless, the 2nd Corps were pushed
forward in the twilight through the defile, without any sufficient
preparation and without any support from the Bois de Yaux, Moltke
foresaw that success was impossible. The distance and the dispersion
of the infantry of the 7th Corps proved to Moltke, at 7 p.m., that
nothing could be carried out by them from the Bois de Vaux. Had
he in the mean time learnt that the 26th Infantry Brigade (the only
one which was concentrated) had not received its first order to work
against the enemy’s left flank until 3 p.m., though he had at 10.30
a.m. ordered beforehand the attack from the Bois de Yaux? Under
these circumstances nothing but a new. frontal attack could be carried
out against Point du Jour, unless it was decided to give up anything
i
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANCE RAVINE. 147
of the kind, and at least to move the 3rd Division in the direction of
the Mance mill. Though Moltke strongly supported his opinion, yet
the king did not accept his advice, but shortly and firmly insisted
that his ideas should be carried out, and gave an order to that effect
to General von Steinmetz, to whom, however, he left the decision as
to the manner of the advance.
Owing to the advanced hour, there was a strong desire to bring
about a decision after so much toil. This was quite intelligible, and
there was also considerable reason to believe that the strength of the
enemy had been reduced. We cannot, therefore, theoretically speaking,
at once disapprove of the king’s idea ; but care should certainly have
been taken to give the attack the best direction and the best forma-
tion. If Moltke, nevertheless, raised objections against the king’s
intentions, the reasons which he assigned appear very much to the
point ; and if we compare Moltke’s order for the battle of 10.30 a.m.
with the king’s order for the attack of which we are speaking, we
shall find little harmony between them ; for Moltke expressly laid
down the lines by which the attack was to be delivered, while the
king left these undecided. If we further consider what reports and
information had up to this hour been received by Moltke, what he
had himself seen since 5 p.m., and the direction which the attack
actually took, the discord of opinion between Moltke and the king
appears very probable on these various grounds.
The expectations which Moltke was justified in forming with
regard to the 7th Corps were not fulfilled, the manner of the frontal
attack of the 2nd Corps did not meet with his approbation, and
finally the systematic offensive came to an end without having
:* brought about the desired decision. The field-marshal speaks as
follows with regard to this important matter : —
| “ At this moment King William had ridden forward with his staff to
the height to the south of Malmaison. But even thence it was impossible
to see how events were progressing on the left flank of the army, which
was more than four miles distant. The fire of the Trench artillery along
the whole front from La Folie to Point dn Jour had almost ceased, whilst
the roar of guns was increasing to the northward. It was past 6 p.m., the
day was drawing to an end, and a decision must be brought about. The
king therefore ordered a renewed advance of the 1st Army, and with this
■ object placed the 2nd Corps, which was just coming up after a long march,
; under General von Steinmetz for the purpose of bringing it about.
^ “ In consequence of this, those battalions of the 7th Corps which were
ti still available, after keeping back a reserve of five, were once more pushed
* forward across the Mance Valley. The battalions which were posted in
the Bois de Vanx closed in to these in the direction of Point du Jour
; and the quarries.
“ The division of the Voltigeurs of the Guard was added as a reinforce-
J ment to the 2nd French Corps which was thus attacked. The whole of
the reserves came up into the foremost line. The artillery redoubled its
r activity, and an annihilating infantry fire was poured upon the advancing
f enemy. The French then advanced themselves to the attack in strong
|:l swarms of skirmishers, and drove the smaller detachments, which were
jf lying in the open and were without leaders, hack to the border of the wood.
148
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
“But this attack was here checked, while there was still the strength
of a fresh army-corps available.
“ Having been the last of all to be despatched by rail to the theatre of
war, the 2nd Corps had followed the movement in advance by forced
marches, withont, np.to the present time, having been able to take part in
any of the actions. Having started at 2 p.m. from Pont a Mousson, the
corps, marching by Buxieres and Bezonville, had arrived by the evening
at the south of Gravelotte. The wish of the Pomeranians to get at the
enemy that very day was loudly expressed.
“ It would have been better if the chief of the staff of the army , ivho was
present on the spot, had not allowed this advance to take place at so late an
hour of the evening. A nucleus of troops which was altogether intact might
have been most desirable on the following day , but could scarcely on this
evening bring about a decisive change.
u Hurrying forward through Gravelotte, the leading battalions of the
corps pushed to the front as far as the stone bridge, and to within a few
hundred paces of Point du Jour. Those which followed soon found them-
selves in the press of the detachments which were standing under fire to
the south of St. Hubert, and their further advance against Moscou came
to an end. Owing to the darkness which had come on it was impossible
to distinguish between friend and foe, and the fire necessarily ceased. It
did not finally end until 10 p.m.
“It was certainly fortunate that the fresher 2nd Corps formed the front
fighting-line for the night, and that the much mixed detachments of the
7th and 8th Corps could again assemble in rear of it.”
Although the first part of this quotation, as far as “ available,”
refers to the events which I have already described, I have inserted
the whole of the description, in order to render possible a survey of the
connection, of events. The words, “ keeping back a reserve of five,” are
directed against General von Zastrow ; “ the wish of the Pomeranians
to get at the enemy that very day ” offers some sort of reason for the
tactical mistake, and the assembly of the 7tli and 8th Corps in rear
of the fresher 2nd sets the evil results of the entire handling of the
troops under a favourable light. Moreover, it is an error to say that
the whole division of the Voltigeurs of the Guard “ were added as a
reinforcement.” Of this division there was, since 3 p.m., only one
brigade on the spot, and that was at Moscou, and not at Point du
Jour, while the second brigade remained near Marshal Bazaine. But
the sentence which is in italics, with regard to its general sense,
entirely corresponds with Moltke’s idea on the 18th of August and
with my narrative ; it is, however, at its close inconsistent with my
statement, since Moltke’s word, “ allowed,” leaves no doubt that he
thus wishes to express that he had no objection to make against the
spirit of the second order and the bringing into action of the 2nd
Corps. The question as to the direction of the attack Moltke leaves
quite unmentioned, but this must now be here taken into account.
The sentence in italics at first puzzled me very much, and I was
already thinking of altering my statement, when I received fresh
corroboration of it from a quarter from which I had up till then not
asked for information. In this I found not only a complete agreement
with what I had formerly related in accordance with the reports made
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANCE RAVINE. 149
to me by eye-witnesses, but also the following fact : — When Moltke saw
that no attention was paid to his advice, and when the king’s idea
had become an order, and the 2nd Corps were marching towards the
defile, he slowly turned away from the king, moved about one hundred
paces to the right, and pretended to be busy about something. He
intended to thus give it to be understood that he did not approve of
what was coming, and those around who saw this action so under-
stood it; indeed, the scene made a great impression upon them.
When, later on, the point of the 2nd Corps was approaching the
western edge of the wood, Moltke followed it for a few paces along
the main road, and a number of staff officers came up to him, while
the king, with Bismarck, Boon, and Podbielski, remained near Mal-
rnaison. The head- quarters were not collected again until it was
dark, and even then were not all collected, when Moltke obtained the
consent of the king to the cessation of fire.
These are the circumstances as they have been related to me by
various persons. Though it was at first somewhat painful to me to
give this complete publicity, in opposition to Moltke’s statement, yet
I said to myself that what I have here related was already perfectly
well known among officers, and that, owing to the number of wit-
nesses, the true facts would sooner or later be brought to light. This
at once determined me to adhere to my narrative, and I was further
confirmed in this by the circumstance that it would have been
scarcely possible that Moltke should not have recognized on the spot
what was faulty in a step which he afterwards altogether condemned
in the above form and at so great a length. It is very improbable
that Moltke would so fail, and if it be asked, what could Moltke
mean by such words, and why should he take upon himself the
responsibility for an act which was done in opposition to his advice,
I can explain this to myself by the character, the mode of thought and
the feelings of Moltke, since he hoped to thus see an end put to a
controversy, without detracting from the services of any one, and
with the object of defending his king from all criticism. Moltke’s
own words harmonize with this opinion : —
“ All that is published in a history of a war is invariably coloured by
the success which it met with ; but patriotism and the love of our country
make it a duty not to destroy the amount of prestige which the victories
of our armies have conferred upon certain individuals.”
It is thus intelligible that Moltke should decline to say a depreci-
atory word with regard to General von Steinmetz, who had obtained
so much prestige in 1866, and was in this case the enemy of his
own fame; similarly, he was careful not to destroy the prestige of
William I., while he himself, by his self-criticism, gains as much as
a man as he loses as chief of the General Staff. Moreover, what stain
could the confession of a failure inflict upon Moltke ? Since
Moltke really considered so much the prestige of certain personages,
we may be astonished at the many places where, following his
account, the prestige of the Grown Prince Frederic William and of
fiir’wJr, as -
150 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
Prince Frederic Charles is entirely demolished for those who under-
stand how to read between the lines of Moltke’s criticisms.
Execution General von Steinmetz had received an order to set m movement
all available strength against the heights of Point du J onr. Mow
by General and by what roads the general was to carry out this duty was lelt
von . to his discretion; thus “how’ it was carried out may be attnbuted
Steinmetz.
In the mean time the troops of the 2nd and 7 th Corps had remained
in movement against Point du Jour, for General von Steinmetz, at
about 6.45 p.m., had ordered r +1 7t1
1. General von Zastrow : “To lead those battalions of the /tl
Corps which were yet on the near side of the wood across the valley
of the Mance ; ” whether from the west against the front, or from tne
south-west rather against the enemy’s flank, is not known. .
2. General von Franzecky: “To advance against the front ol
Point du Jour, and, in conjunction with those troops of the /th Coips
which were on his right, to capture the enemy s position at ail
li£iiZ8irds« 5! .
The' ruins of Point du Jour were to serve as a point of direction
for both corps. In the then positions of the infantry of the two
corps, it was scarcely possible, owing to the want of time, to make
their movements simultaneous, if the infantry of the 7 th Corps was
to co-operate from somewhere by the Mance mill against the JBienc
left flank. Since the direction for the 2nd Corps was now distinctly
laid down, General von Zastrow was, to a certain extent, forced on to
the road to the Mance mill, otherwise he would perhaps not yet have
realized flow his infantry ought to be used.
Measures But since a great part of the infantry of the 7th Corps were now
of General g0 faJ a from t hi s point that they would come up too late, and
Zastrow. another part seems to have been forgotten altogether, General von
Zastrow acted as follows > — ...
1. The 1st Battalion of the 77th, from its position m the. Mance
Valley, exactly opposite to the gravel-pits, was to advance against tne
latter and thence on again to Point du Jour. . .
2. The three battalions of the 73rd, which were in the neighbour-
hood of the Mance mill, were also to attack Point du Jour from there.
In carrvino* out this movement this regiment fell m with the 1st and
4th companies of the 13th, which were already on the eastern edge
of the Bois de Yaux, opposite to the quarries of Eozeneul es, so that
there were here three and a half battalions collected under Geneial
von Osten-Saeken. Consequently, General von Zastrow set only lour
battalions in motion, although General von Steinmetz had expressly
ordered that “those battalions of the 7th Corps which were still on
the near side of the wood were to be led forward over the valley of the
Mance.” What was then to form the reserve ? The 2nd Corps hacl
taken over this role.
General von Zastrow held back ,
1. The 74th Regiment, because it was too far from the roads to
the Mance mill, since it stood to the south of the main road and close
to it, on the western edge of the wood.
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANCE RAVINE.
151
2. The Fusilier Battalion of the 53rd and the 2nd of the 77th,
which were to the north-west of the Mance mill.
3. The Fusilier Battalion of the 77th, to the south of Gravelotte
as a reserve.
Thus he retained six battalions out of ten. The 2nd and 3rd
companies of the 13th clung close to the left of the 73rd. The way
by the Mance mill, which was used by the 73rd, was short in
comparison with that for the 2nd Corps, and that regiment would,
therefore, reach its object of attack earlier than the leading infantry
of the 2nd Corps.
Even before General von Franzecky had received the above- Action of
mentioned order of General von Steinmetz, he had, as far as lay in his ^ eral
power, informed himself by his own observation as to the situation Franzecky.
of affairs. The active little general, with the strong head and his
piercing restless eyes, sitting on his historic war-horse, had been a
witness of the panic which has been already described, and had, on
receiving the order of General von Steinmetz, formed the opinion that
the action could not bring about any further unfavourable conse-
quences. It seemed to him to be too late for that. But the general
was also too good a tactician to be particularly pleased with the order
which he had received. Though he saw that it could not be carried
out, he was too well acquainted with the character of General von
Steinmetz to expect any success from a remonstrance. He therefore
determined to take things as they were. He knew that at this point
the troops had over and over again entered the wood (the defile) by
brigades, and had moved forward to the attack on the farther side
by companies, and that these had been completely broken up. He
also knew of the events at this point between 3 and 4 p.m. What had
then been demanded from a cavalry division, two infantry divisions,
under the pressure of circumstances, had now to carry out. As it
already began to grow dark. General von Franzecky had from the
first to give up any idea — since the limits within which he was
to employ his corps were settled beforehand — of first allowing his
infantry to work through the wood to the south of the main road and
on a broad front, with a view to re-forming on the farther side, and of
then attacking Point du Jour from a wide starting-line. Just as
between 3 and 4 p.m. the character of the wood forced the cavalry
and artillery masses on to the main road, so now the same effect was
produced by the want of knowledge of the troops of the wooded
ground, combined with the darkness which was coming on. The
effect of this, as regarded the French and Germans, was the same at
the beginning, and it turned out the same as the movement went on.
General von Franzecky therefore made the following disposi-
tions : —
I. The infantry, with their tactical units well closed up, were
to follow the main road, and the point, after passing the eastern
•edge of the wood, was immediately to bend off to the south, was
to gain ground to the front, and was in this position to await at first
the development of the rear echelons, in order, when that was
completed, to overwhelm the enemy in a compact mass. It was hoped
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTI£E’S STRATEGY.
that thus, by means of a better military discipline, we should ^ve-
in our favour all the advantages of a night action ; for whic i lere*
are, even in the present day, many ardent advocates. Everything
considered, the leading division (the 3rd) could not be deployed on
the farther side and ready for the attack before 8p.m. Tim infantry
was strictly ordered to remain in close order until the quarries otbu.
Hubert had been passed, and to keep their formation with all their
might; when the quarries had been passed, they were to extend at
the double as far as possible to the south. ;
2. The whole of the cavalry were to remain in rear at Gravelotte.
3. The corps artillery was to halt to the ^ south and west of
Gravelotte, and only two batteries and one section were to prolong
the artillery line of the 7th Corps to the south.
After the general had issued this order, he went to the western
edge of the wood, close to the south of the main road, from which
spot he encouraged the troops as they marched past him, and impressed
upon them afresh that the preservation of their order must be the
basis of success.
General von Franzecky did not then know with certainty whether
St. Hubert was occupied by the Germans. If this were the case, it was.
possible that, before the point reached St. Hubert, the fight might
assume a different complexion; in short, the general gave no special
instructions with regard to St. Hubert. Attention is drawn to this
point, not in order to make the general alone responsible for the
unpleasant episodes which took place later, but in order to show why
it was that the general was not in a position to give any exact orders.
As has been stated, the head-quarters were at this time convinced
that St. Hubert had not been lost, while, as will presently appear,
two-thirds of the quarries of Rozerieulles had been captured by
detachments of the 33rd, 39th, and 40th, between 6.45 and 7 p.m.
This last, and, under the circumstances, most decisive tactical fact was
still unfortunately entirely unknown to all the higher commanders.
This was due to the fact that in the 1st Army, between the fighting-
line of the infantry and the leaders, there really nowhere existed any
proper means of communication with the various tactical units ; at
least there was none between the advanced portions of the 7th and
8th Corps at the Bois de Vaux and the quarries of Rozerieulles, and
the superior leaders who were at Gravelotte. Since these localities
were, however, the most important, and the battle had already lasted
for seven hours, it throws a curious light upon the superior leaders,
to find that no attempt was made to continually watch the fight
around the quarries of Rozerieulles and their neighbourhood from the
eastern and northern edge of the patches of wood, and to do this with
observers possessing tactical skill, to whom instructions should have
been given to report everything of moment as quickly as possible to-
the superior leaders. This important step was neglected, ^and this
fact tends to prove that nowhere in the 1st Army or the rib Corps
was the tactical situation rightly appreciated, that nowhere was
Moltke’s order for the battle of 10.30 a.m. understood, and that no one
knew how to take advantage of events. ^
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANCE RATINE.
153
When General von Franzecky was instructed, at 5.30 pan., by the Reflections
head-quarters, to “ place his corps at the disposition of the 1st Army ^ceming
at Gravelotte," General von Steinmetz, it is hardly necessary to say, Ittack°. Iltal
was at once informed. What could the 2nd Corps do? Either
attack, or ward off an attack by the enemy I If General von
Steinmetz then (at 5.30 p.m.) received no more exact instruction with
regard to this point, it was his duty to at once make sufficient
preparations, so that the 2nd Corps should be able to fulfil both tasks.
If Steinmetz was to act on the defensive, the place in which the 2nd
Corps was to be used was obvious ; if he was to attack, the 2nd Corps
must receive from him, who must have exactly known all the
circumstances, such a direction for their advance, that they should
be able to move to the attack under the most favourable conditions
possible, that is to say, they must at once be sent in that direction
in which a tactical success might be anticipated. Whatever this
direction might have been, it was certainly not that throiigh the defile
of Gravelotte. General von Steinmetz neglected this point, and this
was the more faulty since a good hour had passed since the order
from the head-quarters to attack Point du Jour. General von Stein-
metz ought, therefore, after the receipt of the order to attack, to have
given full value to his conviction, which was founded upon experience
in this very spot, that a frontal attack had no prospect of success.
The proper tactical direction for an attack was then undoubtedly by
way of the Mance mill, and the 2nd Corps ought thus certainly to
have followed, as regarded the mass of its infantry, the track of the
73rd. One brigade in front would have been more than sufficient.
Was this possible ?
General von Franzecky had not received from General von Stein-
metz any instructions pointing in this direction, but nevertheless had
brought up his troops suitably for an attack by the Mance mill.
This was not by accident, but by intention ; consequently, before the
order “to attack Point du Jour" had arrived, the whole of the
infantry of the 3rd Division was massed to the south and south-we^t
of Gravelotte, in the direction rather of the line Mance mill- quarries
of Kozerieulles than in that of St. Hubert. Mot only this, but the
3rd Division, moving from their place of assembly on the Mance
mill, would have had to pass only for about two-thirds of the
way through a defile, until it had reached the eastern edge of the
wood, while between the Mance mill and the quarries the direction
was straight, that is to say, the most favourable for the development
of the attack. On the other hand, this division, moving from its place
of assembly through the defile, and extending against Point du Jour,
had to pass through almost a geometrical half-circle, and then had to
extend itself from the right far to the south under the enemy's fire.
If, on the other hand, the 3rd Division, following the 73rd, marched
on the Mance mill, it would move exactly on the diameter of this
circle, and this by the shortest and easiest way, as well as by that
which was tactically the most favourable for the attack itself, and,
moreover, without exposing itself to such a fire from Moscou and
Point du Jour as was th§ case when moving by the defile. On this
• T'tmV's
;:'h-
154 TAVENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
last line the troops were in a re-entering angle, and were thus under
a cross-fire (and one also by tiers) ; whereas if they advanced by the
Manee mill, they would have been in a salient angle, and would have
met with neither a cross-fire, nor any artillery fire, nor fire by tiers,
and would, moreover — though this was not known beforehand — have
found the quarries of Rozerieulles already in the possession of our
troops. If General von Steinmetz now, at about 7 p.m., after all the
error and neglect which had taken place since General von Wedell’s
report, and since General von Zastrow had at last understood the
order of 10.30 a.m., and had brought the 73rd into the only suitable
direction, was not yet clear upon this point, it must be acknowledged
to be a perfect riddle. The fact that the 2nd Corps, owing to the
king s order, had been forced into the most unfavourable position for
attack which could be imagined, imposed upon General von Steinmetz
the duty of making his remonstrances heard; and this the more,
inasmuch as General von Franzecky had, by the direction of the
deployment of the 3rd Division, already pushed forward the attack in
a direction which was tactically the best.
But with regard to this matter there was another point of
importance. During all the former attacks against Point du Jour
the German artillery had throughout co-operated, and had always
energetically continued their fire during the advance of our infantry,
since the artillery could in daylight both observe and shoot well.
To this fact it is due, for example, that the events which took
place between 3 and 4 p.m. did not end in a frightful catastrophe,
that the French could not arouse or assemble themselves for thorough
action, and that St. Hubert was held throughout. But it could now
be foreseen, judging by the hour at which the order of General von
Steinmetz reached the Generals von Zastrow and von Franzecky, that
it would be dark while the attack was being carried out, and that
thus the German artillery must first slacken and finally altogether
cease their fire, unless they were prepared to run the risk of hitting
the German infantry. For at 8 p.m., at such ranges, all observation
was impossible for our artillery, who could not distinguish between
French and German infantry, or between the two firing-lines. Just
as we had up to this time had in our artillery a sure support and a
powerful weapon of offence, so now both of these were wanting ; we
were obliged to fall back upon the fighting power of our infantry,
which the artillery could not support, while on the other hand the
enemy’s guns could now employ their fire, which had up to this time
been able to give no assistance or effect. The tactical conditions were
entirely reversed, since the advantages of the superiority in artillery
were altogether lost to the Germans, and were on the other hand
gained by the French, who thus profited doubly, both by the loss of
power of the Germans and by their own improved condition. It
might have been easily foreseen that, under such circumstances, an
infantry attack in the evening, and made from a defile, would have
little chance of success, even if a large and fresh force were employed
for it; but in that case, steps ought to have been taken to start the
attack and carry it out from the Mance mill.
THE STRUGGLES IN' THE MANCE RAVINE.
As has always been laid clown, that the advance of the 2nd and 7th Attack of
Corps ought to have been simultaneous; but, as a matter of fact, it was m^on.
nothing of the kind, nor was there any sort of unity in their attacks,
a matter which it might have been difficult to arrange even under
easier circumstances. In the mean time the advanced guard of the
3rd Division (composed of the 2nd Jagers and the 54th Regiment, in
all four battalions, of which the former was at the head), had by a
direct order from General von Steinmetz been brought from the south
of Gravelotte on to the main road at the western edge of the wood.
At this spot were then the Generals von Steinmetz, von Moltke, and
von Franzecky. As the Jagers moved along the main road the
bugles struck up, and these were followed by the drums of the
battalions in rear. General von Steinmetz accompanied the column
in full assurance of the result, and the even marching of the troops
was observed from all sides with admiration ; indeed, it made a very
marked impression. But the Germans had already at this point once
offended the goddess of battle, and she was not to be won over by any
means, for this goddess requires not only that men shall die like
heroes, but that they shall also think like heroes. All the wooing,
which had been offered in such a clumsy way, and without any grace
to this the most capricious of all coquettes, was not only refused by
the goddess of battle, but she even each time allowed the punishment
to follow swiftly upon the act of awkwardness. Why did the troops
advance with clanging bands over this road which had been ever
since midday consecrated to death ? No tactician can understand
why 1 If it was desired to make the enemy’s work easier, and to
draw his attention to the moment when he ought to open the gates
of his hell, the Germans could have thought of no better way of so
doing. Not only did they enter a defile, which lay under the fire of %
the enemy, in close order and under the disadvantages as regards
darkness which have been mentioned, but they did this with the
greatest possible amount of parade. If the whole of their cartridges
had at least been taken away from all this infantry, and they had
been ordered simply to march on, it would have been, at any rate —
considering what was desired, and the dispositions which had 'been
made — a logical proceeding, and it might also have averted the fatal
confusion which was soon after to set in.
During the march General von Franzecky gave the 2nd Jagers Extension
the “direction on Point du Jour, with the object of carrying out the ^^ 2nd
main attack by way of St. Hubert.” The Jagers extended in accord- ' ag
ance with the order — and did it well and quickly — to the south along
the eastern border of the wood, with their right extending as far as
the gravel-pits. In this position the 39th, whose behaviour had been
most excellent, were in front of the Jagers, and when the latter drew
forward to within about two hundred yards of Point du Jour, and
there lay down and occupied the position, the 39th joined them.
The Jagers and the 39th had, therefore, carried out their task with an
amount of order worthy of all praise. But this was only one battalion,
and the smallest part of the work. Extension
In rear of the Jagers was the 54th Regiment ; and when the former of the 54th.
Ml II 41 iff 1^4
156
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
The third
panic.
r
extended towards the south, the 54th turned at the double towards-
the farm of St. Hubert, the Fusilier battalion leading, and the two-
others a little farther to the rear. Being under the impression that
St. Hubert had been in the mean while occupied by the enemy, the
54th opened fire upon the living wall of German infantry. It can be
imagined what a scene of confusion was the result. The fire of the
54th did not so much fall upon the troops which were in St. Hubert
as upon the remains of the 69th, 72nd, 40th, and 39th, which had
been pushed forward farther to the south. The whole of this
movement was also preceded and accompanied by misfortune. It
might have very well been arranged that the 54th should have been
informed with regard to the condition of affairs at St. Hubert, and
this was the more necessary since they had to encounter the darkness.
This was the duty of the higher leaders, but the commander of the
54th also clung too closely to his men. But no time had been left to-
obtain this information, for the advance with drums beating, etc., and
then the doubling, and lastly the amount of obstacles both in material
and in the bodies of men and horses, etc., had excited the troops,
whose order found a fresh enemy in the various obstacles encountered;
and, the men having thus got out of the hands of their leader, the evil
was done — one shot was heard, and was at once followed by a wild
fusillade.
When wild animals have been hunted about throughout the day,,
all those of them who escape the enclosure into which endeavours-
are made to drive them, crouch down behind what cover they can
find. Fear and dread prevent them from seeing or hearing anything,
and they cower flat in the hollows of the ground. If then a shot
is fired, or a shout is raised, the game jumps up and rushes away
from it without consideration of where it is going. The case is
exactly the same with broken men who have lost their morale , and
with the skulkers in rear of them. The remains of the 43 companies,
which we know to have been in and around St. Hubert, had been in
the mean time increased by the addition of 16 companies to a total of
59. From these, under the cover of the falling darkness, men dropped
off* one by one, running from the reservoir on the height into the
valley ; so that at the time of the passage of the Jagers and the 54th,
through the bottom of the Mance Ravine, a considerable number of
fugitives had collected there. The noisy bands of the troops were to
these a signal to rise and “ assemble ” towards the rear. These skulkers
were so entirely deprived of reason that they could no longer dis-
tinguish their own bands from those of the enemy, and they rushed
through to the rear. This caused some delay and difficulty to the
advancing troops, though they were not very much troubled by it. But
when the troops in and near St. Hubert received a fire from behind
them, the small bodies which were still there lost their order, and a
flood of fugitives of every unit poured out upon the 54th. Under the
pressure of this mixed mass, which had lost its head, and actually
broke through and ran over the 54th, the fresh battalions naturally
got out of the intended direction, and since other bodies of troops-
were moving along the main road close beside the 54th, the fugitives-
•*
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANCE RAVINE.
157
poured in again into the valley on the top of the attacking troops,
and here also it was possible only with the greatest trouble to keep
up some amount of order. There were thus at this point two opposing
streams — and this in darkness. One was flying without any order or
any leaders from the front to the rear, while the other was moving
in the opposite direction. This state of things lasted for hours, until
the 2nd Corps had massed itself in a position a short distance from
the enemy’s front, and until total darkness had shrouded friend and
foe. Under such circumstances there could be no idea of carrying
out a night attack, and, owing to this fresh panic, the worst and the
longest of the whole day, all attempt at simultaneous action at this
point was from henceforward nipped in the bud, and it was a matter
for rejoicing when it was found possible to put a stop to disorder, and
to deploy the mass of men and columns into a line directed against
Point du Jour. That this difficult work was carried out was due
solely to discipline, for it was done on ground which was crowded
with obstacles, and which was in the highest degree unsuited for the
movements of troops. It was obviously useless to think any more of
fighting, since all the preliminary conditions for it were wanting. A
more detailed description of this panic, and of its effect in rear of the
line of battle, is impossible, since total darkness shrouded the shouting,
the howling and the crush, and night is discreet. But the soldier
who knows war, and possesses some imagination, can picture to him-
self the scene of confusion. It was a mercy that, as usual, both sides
were exhausted, otherwise a fresh and well-directed brigade of the
enemy might at this moment have obtained a complete tactical victory
of a local character, and might have decided”the battle in favour of
the French, since the other parts of the 3rd Division were then, owing
to the circumstances in which they were placed, to a certain extent
incapable of defending themselves. Wedged up in the wood, near and
on the road, the masses were flowing back from the front and pressing
forward from the rear, and piling themselves up at the most dangerous
spot in the defile, each of them in the way of the other ; while, owing
to the wood and the darkness, those who strove to advance were
unable to deploy from the order of march. This was in fact the climax
of all the crises which had come about at this spot during the course
of the day ; but the goddess of battle was this time gracious to the
Germans. The “ tacticians of darkness ” may test in this occurrence
their brain and heart, and must finally keep silence as to their theories,
otherwise some 18th of August may come to quite a different end I
I must especially draw attention to the fact that the garrison of
St. Hubert was not disturbed by this panic.
The 54th, after they had allowed a passage to the fugitives
shouting “ Through ! Through!” moved forward in two groups, the
battalions being mixed together. The lltli, 5th, 2nd, 4th and 12th
companies reinforced and prolonged (to the north) the line of* the 2nd
Jagers and the 39th; while the 9th, 10th, 8th, 7th, 6th, 3rd, and 1st
companies turned towards St. Hubert, and, after having “ captured ”
this farm with firing and shouting, took up the direction of Moscou.
The attacks, which were made with drums beating, had no better
158
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
The second
capture of
the quarries
of Eozeri-
eulles, and
the fight
there.
result than all the earlier ones. They came to a standstill at the line
of German dead, which already marked the extreme limits of the
German advance on Moscou and Point du Jour. There the men lay
down, and tactical leading came to an end. The 2nd Corps had
gained no more ground than had already been won by others in the
course of the day.
It is now necessary to go back to some other events, which really
took place shortly after 7 p.m., and which, strange to say, do not
receive the slightest mention in the Official Account, though they
were the climax of the tactical success gained during the whole day
in this part of the field of battle, and moreover prove to us that the
way was paved for a satisfactory decision, before the main body of
the 3rd Division had been let slip, and whilst General von Zastrow
was arranging for the attack from the Mance mill. But we must
remark that the junior leaders — from the brigade downwards — received
either insufficient orders or no orders at all with respect to what they
were to do, but were simply told to “ attack ” or to u advance.” Such
remissness may perhaps be excused as regards the 8th Corps in
connection with their frontal attack at the end, for under such
circumstances there is not much need for special orders, though during
the two or three hours which the corps had spent in rendezvous forma-
tion in the neighbourhood of Villers aux Bois, there would have been
plenty of time to inform every one of the impression which Goeben
had imparted to the higher leaders ; but the necessary communication
between these higher leaders and the troops in front did not exist,
and thus the latter remained in complete uncertainty with regard
to decisive events. They might have known at last that St. Hubert
was held by our men, since this could be seen from Gravelotte.
The case was quite different with respect to the quarries of
Rozerieulles, and, in order that the circumstances may be realized,
everything with regard to this shall he related consecutively. It is
known that the 33rd, somewhere about the time when St. Hubert
was stormed, had risen up in the gravel-pits with a view to taking
possession of the quarries of Rozerieulles. The Official Account
mentions this only casually, and relates it quite falsely, for it says
that the 33rd were driven hack by the overwhelming fire of the
French, and thus did not capture the quarries.
When I was under the surgeon's hands in 1870, I had already,
before the Official Account appeared, learnt from men who had taken
part in the attack that the opposite was the case. After the Official
Account appeared I inquired continually into the circumstances, and
I now state that that history is incorrect, as has been proved to me
beyond dispute, by those who were present during the attack. The
quarries of Rozerieulles formed the natural object for an attack from
the front and right flank (from the Bois de Taux, according to Moltke’s
order), in the direction of Chatel St. Germain. From the edge of the
wood to their south-west point was about 350 yards. The quarries
were about 550 yards long, with an extreme width of about 330 yards.
I have myself ascertained these dimensions, and I have been assured
by inhabitants of those parts, that at the time of my visit they were
)
?> H, '
[ • k „
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE.
159
exactly in the same condition as on the 18th of August, 1870. I found
that the bottom of the quarry was so flat that any one who held the
southern point could perfectly see into and overlook the inner space,
as far as the third of the quarry which lay to the north. This was
separated from the southern two-thirds by a mound which stood
across the quarry, but in such a manner that from the southern end
it was possible to observe what was going on at the northern end.
The Germans who attacked could, of course, not be aware of this
before the attack ; but they realized it at once, as soon as they had
reached the southern point. Beyond this mound there was really no
cover worthy of mention on the bottom of the quarry. The con-
sequence of this was that it was possible to penetrate into the quarries
at many places from the north, south-west, or south, without any
particular difficulty. Between these entrances the quarries were
surrounded by sides of various slopes, but in some places perpen-
dicular, which were here and there as much as 18 feet in height. This
made it difficult for the French to regularly occupy and use them ; and
this disadvantage for the French became an advantage for the
Germans, as soon as they had reached the quarries, inasmuch as they
could nestle close up to the high sides and keep the inner spaces
under fire. It was also possible from the mound to bring a heavy fire
to bear upon the main road, which shut in the quarries to the north,
at a range of about 200 yards.
When our success at St. Hubert was realized by the 33rd, the
portions of that regiment (the 2nd Battalion and the 1st and 2nd
companies) which were in and to the south of the gravel-pits, rose
up, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel von Knobelsdorf, for a
common rush upon the quarries. During this the 6th and 7th
companies found themselves on the left flank, received an annihilating
fire on their flank from Point du Jour, and were driven hack ; what
remained of them, rushing past the gravel-pits, did not stop until they
had returned to the wood. On the other hand, all the other companies
penetrated into the quarries, the 5th and 8th in the front, and the
1st and 2nd on the south. This was somewhere between 2.45 and
3 p.m. The occupation of the quarries and the direction of the fire
was then so carried out that the French abandoned the large southern
section as far as the mound, and later on gave the latter. Thus, at
about 3.30 p.m., the Germans were really in possession of the whole
of the quarries, and thus a very great tactical success was obtained
in the decisive direction. When General Frossard realized the bearing
of this loss, he ordered the quarries to be re-captured. There were
infantry ready for this purpose, who attacked in force and completely
ran over the 33rd. The direction of the French attack made it quite
clear why St. Hubert was not disturbed by the shock, and why
Hasse’s and Gniigge’s Batteries were not lost. For General Frossard
(at 4 p.m.) cared less about driving the Germans from St. Hubert
than he did about guarding his one vulnerable spot. The 33rd fell
back again into the wood. When they reached the line of the gravel -
pits, followed closely by the French infantry, they were suddenly
struck by a heavy infantry fire from the edge of the wood. This came
L60
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
1
from detachments of the 60th, and from portions of the 33id, who
had remained behind or had already been broken.. The fire of these
disordered detachments exercised a demoralizing influence upon the
unlucky 33rd. It may easily be conceived that they were seized with
a panic, and in their flight drew with them other detachments of the
60th and 33rd. K . ■,
The quarries remained until about a little before i p.m. m the
possession of the French infantry. After that, by the executions of
various officers, whose names are intentionally not mentioned, it had
been found possible to collect small detachments together , the 33rd
alone, at 5 p.m., recovered possession of the gravel-pits which had^
before been lost. From 5 up to a little before 7 p.m., various bodies of
other fractions of troops flowed in to them j first the 30th, which, as
we know, had stopped the French charge of 4.30 p.m., but had then
broken up altogether, and then, after the attack of the 32nd Brigade,
the 40th Regiment. General Frossard’s great counter-attack, which
took place at 6.30 p.m., passed down the slope between the quarries
and St. Hubert. As soon as the officers who were with the above-
named troops in the gravel-pits observed this, they collected together
detachments of the three regiments, and flung them energetically upon
the quarries. Their success was complete. General Frossard had
drawn all the infantry, except a weak detachment, out of the quarries
for his attack, so that at this moment the quarries were not well
defended. The 33rd, 39th, and 40th now again took possession of the
large southern portion of the quarries as far as the mound, and
remained in occupation of it until night.
After the French attack (between 6.30 and 7 p.m.) had been
broken up, the greater part of the French, not knowing of this success
of the Germans, rushed back towards the quarries. The 40th and the
39th, who were on the German left, swung round towards the
northern side of the quarries and turned their fire upon the flying
Fi*ench, who were now in their turn seized with such a panic that
they broke away in all directions like frightened and hunted deer.
Some of them ran straight towards the patches of wood, where they
were shot down or captured at a little distance from the edge. After
the 40th and the 39th had thus cleared their front, they again formed
front to the north (which the 33rd had up to this time not changed),
and thus renewed their communication with the latter, and occupied,
the mound of which we have spoken. The above-mentioned panic of
the French caused General Frossard to collect all that remained of his
infantry who were still fit to fight 5 the detachments, which consisted
of all sorts of regiments, now commenced uninterrupted and hot
attacks upon the 39th, 40th, and 33rd. But the French were too
much exhausted to be able to form a strong column of attack, and
they now fought only in sections and companies. Nevertheless, they
repeatedly succeeded in getting to within fifty paces of the Germans,
but were each time repulsed. By this time it was quite 8 p.m., and
it began suddenly to become somewhat dark. I have not been able
to ascertain the strength of the 39th, 33rd, and 40th, Of the 33rd
there were engaged in this struggle of heroes men of six sections
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANGE RAVINE,
161
belonging to the 1st, 5th, and 8th Companies; altogether perhaps
about 250 or 300 rifles were in action, but probably less rather than
more.
During this struggle parts of the Jagers and of the 54th had also Arrival of
extended from the north against the quarries. At this critical 2nd
moment the same fatality which reigned on the other side of St. the! 7th.
Hubert overtook the defenders, who were proud of their success, and
determined to hold on to their advanced and victorious position.
Since the new-comers did not know that the quarries were in the
hands of the Germans, the 39th, 40th, and 33rd suddenly received a
couple of volleys from the rear, fired by the above troops of the 2nd
Corps. These were followed by a continuous fire of skirmishers, while
at the same time a hail of bullets fell among them from the French.
At this moment the noise of the fire drowned everything, and no
voice could make itself heard. From the left rear, and from the north,
the brave men in the quarries received a continuous and hot fire,
which was mingled with the roll of drums; and now at last the captors
of the quarries realized that the fire and the drums were from our
side. The remnant of these brave troops endured with resignation
the reverse fire of their own friends, and still held their front against
the enemy, in order to ward off their ceaseless attacks. They tried to
make themselves audible by all shouting together “ Prussians ! ” but
this was of no use ; the fire on their rear still continued.
While this was going on, fire and drums were heard from the Arrival of
south of the quarries also. This was, of course, the 73rd, who were the 73rd *
arriving from the direction of the Mance mill. Some officers now
determined to go to the right and left towards the German troops, in
order to give them information with regard to the state of the action.
; Those who went to the right (south) failed to find the 73rd, for,
knowing nothing of the success of the detachments who had captured
the quarries, General von Glumer had first stopped their attack, and
had then drawn them back into the wood. The officers who went to
the north were more fortunate. They first came upon the 2nd company
of the 2nd Jagers, then upon a part of the 4th company, and then upon
the 5th and 11th companies of the 54th. When they had made these
troops understand how matters were, they led into the quarries the
2nd and part of the 4th companies of the 2nd Jagers and the 11th
company of the 54th. After receiving this reinforcement (at 8.30 p.m.)
these troops felt that together they were strong enough to hold the
position. Steps were taken with this object, whilst a confused roar
continued towards the north, until at 9.30 p.m. the call, “ Cease
firing ! ” was taken up in the darkness and repeated along the whole
front. The fire now gradually ceased along the entire line, and when
the Germans fired no more, the enemy also were silent, as if they had
heard the same bugle-call. It was then realized how much the
defenders needed rest. Was it not now the moment when at last the
order for the 2nd Corps, to simply advance to the front, would have
been right? In three minutes they might have been in the enemy's
position I The officers of the 33rd, 39th, and 40th assembled their
troops after 10 p.m., in order then to lead back their band of heroes
M
162 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
to the rendezvous of the other units. An examination made on the
following day showed that there were more than a hundred dead
French between fifty and a hundred paces before the small front
(towards the east). If it be desired to form an opinion as to the
greatness of this effect, these losses must be compared with those of
the whole of the French 2nd Corps. What the troops of the 39th,
40th, and 33rd did here, wearied and thinned as they were by the*
long struggle, can only be compared with the deeds done in the
churchyard of Beaune la Roland, which I hope some day to describe
—if God will leave me my sight. Of all the deeds of valour done
on the battle-field on this day this was the greatest, and it was the
most important tactical event, for it directly opened a dooi to
victory for the 1st Army; but the door was not seen and not used.
Almost the whole of the official narrative deals with St. Hubert,
thou «h the fifty-nine companies which were at that point did not, after
the capture of the farm, shoot fifty French. With respect to the heroes
of the quarries of Rozerieulles,and with regard to the tactical importance
of their capture of that post and their long occupation of it, and as to
their action in a direction which was decisive (and had, moreover, been
expressly laid down beforehand by Moltke), the Official Account says
not one single word ! Why not ? What I now present as the real
truth is the result of inquiries which have extended over years, and
ofj extensive correspondence with various individuals. Ought it
not to have been possible to derive these facts from the official
history of the troops? Why has not this deed of heroism, a thing
which is always rare, been written in words of fire — but simply,
plainly, and distinctly — for the encouragement of the generation
which is growing up ? Indeed, I feel this deeply ; but since I must
say nothing, I mention this for those who can appreciate it. ^
Owing to the great distance from the quarries of Rozerieulles to
the positions of Generals von Steinmetz and von Zastrow, any report
that the quarries were at 7 p.m. in German hands would, even if an
effort had been made to send one, have arrived too late. No such
report was made, nor was there any effort to make it, nor was it,,
directly, the duty of the swarms of skirmishers to make it. Their
leaders are not to be blamed for the omission. On the other hand.
General von Zastrow was certainly to blame, in that he did not take
care that everything of importance from the direction Mance mill-
quarries of Rozerieulles was at once reported. He does not appear to
have realized that this was a tactical point. If a regiment of Ulans
could remain for a long time deployed to the east ot the wood, why
could not individual officers, of the General Staff, or adjutants, have
been posted in that direction, who might from thence have watched
everything with tactical eyes, and who could have reported to the rear ?
This, indeed, should have been their place during the whole battle, and
not to the west of the wood of Gravelotte. When the very simplest
maxims and rules are absolutely neglected, no plan can possibly be
carried out. In this case the troops had no idea beforehand what they
were intended to do, nor had the superior leaders any notion where
the troops were, or of what we had captured or what we had not
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANCE RAVINE.
163
captured. There was no connection between the fighting-line and the
leaders, and both of them were groping in the dark ; and yet in peace,
under such circumstances, report after report is sent in, even when
everything can be plainly seen, and on such important matters as to
whether a hare or a partridge is put up. If a system of communica-
tion had been arranged beforehand, General von Steinmetz must have
known of the first capture of the quarries at 3 p.ra. ; but he and
General von Zastrow knew no more about that than they did about
the second capture. If the first capture had been known, then at last,
even with such leaders as they had, masses of troops could have been
pushed forward in good time and in the decisive direction, for such a
fact as that must have given eyes to the blind. Perhaps the reason
that this greatest deed of heroism of the troops has been passed over
in silence, has been that it was feared that thinking men might at once
be led by such events to express their thoughts about our “ leaders.”
The troops, indeed, did all that they could to show their leaders the
road to victory ; but the leaders no more saw this than they under-
stood Moltke’s order. Under such circumstances, the attack of the
2nd and 7th Corps took place in entire ignorance of the true situation
of the battle, and of how nearly the tactical decision had been brought
about, at 7 p.m., by the capture of the quarries of Roserieulles. The
assailants did not know whether St. Hubert and the quarries were
ours, and the leaders did not know either; and thus by the measures
which were actually taken even this success was brought in jeopardy.
In spite of all, fate seemed at one moment to be inclined to be
favourable to us ; for when the attack against the front and flank
was at last commenced, and, more by chance than by intention, closed
1 in upon the quarries (the 2nd Jagers and the 54th being to the north,
and the 73rd to the south of the band of heroes), that moment had
h arrived. But it was not recognized, and the offended coquette
therefore turned her back on us, and punished General von Glumer
I with blindness. This shall be shown later on.
During these events another awful circumstance occurred. After The catas- en-
tile battle of the 16 th of August, the severely wounded of the French M° 0 gador.
' were carried to the various buildings and farms in the neighbourhood
I of the field; for example, into Rezonville, Malmaison, and Mogador.
When the German head-quarters had taken up their position between
Malmaison and Mogador, these two points were fired on by the
1 French artillery which stood near Leipzig; for the mass of men and
horses which made up the German head-quarters formed an enticing
target. Mogador was really a field-hospital, though the Geneva flag
was certainly not flying on it ; but every room and corner was filled
with wounded. The unlucky victims of the preceding battles seem,
perhaps owing to want of foresight and of organization, to have been
abandoned by the French medical staff at the beginning of the battle
of the 18th of August, so that there was no longer any communication
between these unfortunate people and the outer world, and the
German head-quarters had no more knowledge of these particulars
than had any other German commander or body of troops. After a
large number of French shell had fallen quite close to the German
head-quarters, Mogador caught fire. This sort of thing is by no
means unusual in a battle, and anything which will burn is allowed
to burn, since every one has more important work m hand than to
extinguish fires. This was especially the case on this particular flank
with its various and exciting events. Since the French hospital
personnel was not on the spot, the wounded were left to themselves
and were burnt, with perhaps the exception of some lew among them.
A few days later the remains of the charred bodies were found, these
sufferers belonged to units of the French Guard and 2nd Corps. JNo
fault can be found with Bazaine with regard to this matter, since at
the time when his wounded were brought into Mogador the battle of
the ICth was still undecided, and his dispositions for that of the Ibtn
could not yet have been determined on. The reader must decide as
to whether it was not really the duty of the French leader to withdraw
the wounded out of the zone of action before the retreat ol the 1 /Mi,
since in the event of a fresh action they must be absolutely within
the zone of fire. It might have been possible to do so with some
little method, and the order to fall back to the neighbourhood ol Metz,
in order to renew the struggle, was given in the night between the
16th and 17th of August. Even if mitigating circumstances can be
pleaded in excuse for not having evacuated this field-hospital, 1
must still remain a terrible reproach to the French medical stan
that their own helpless wounded were either forgotten or deserted,
with the result that, after they had suffered from wounds, they
further met their death by fire.
Since the 54th formed in order of march when they passed along
the main road, the depth of the column was consequently increased,
and this caused some delay for the rear troops of the 3rd Division.
The commander of the main body of the 3rd Division, General von
Koblinski, was full of impatience to get on, and therefore allowed the
main body to continue in movement. In consequence of this the ~nd
and Fusilier Battalions of the 14th, and the 1st and Fusilier Battalions
of the 2nd, came up close to the column of march of the 54th, as they
pressed on to the south of the main road. This was an additional
misfortune; since when, in consequence of the circumstances which
have been narrated, the terrible scene took place in the night on the
‘ slope of Point du Jour, this column of march pushed on to the front
through it all, and the 54th, the 39th, and the 2nd Jagers were all
; mixed together, and, without producing any tactical effect, became
crowded together in such confusion that the masses were here again
piled up one on the other, and fell on each other like surging waves.
T hank God that at least the last regiment of the division the 42nd,
was still on the west of the defile! This was our punishment for
allowing the units to follow each other without any interval, and for
our want of experience in the conduct of a night action. This example
plainly teaches us how necessary intervals are for an orderly advance
of troops into action. If the correct intervals had been kept, the two
battalions of the 14th and of the 2nd might have extended quietly on
the slope, for they would not have been disturbed by the events
which had already taken place there, and it might then have been
Arrival of
the main
body of
the 3rd
Division.
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANOE RAVINE.
165
possible to carry out a decisive charge with drums beating and with
the troops well in hand. On the contrary, individual battalions and
companies now rushed into the whirl of battle, and again the advance
was made with compact masses, which had become mere drops by the
time they reached the firing-line. Thus was the attack of the 3rd
Division broken up, since there were now already eight battalions
of it out of hand and incapable of being directed. The four battalions
on the right spread out from each other like a fan, and the four on the
left remained in the rear of each other, so that the Fusilier Battalion
of the 14th moved against the quarries of Rozerieulles, and the 2nd
Battalion against Point du Jour, followed by the 1st Battalion of the
2nd, whilst General von Barnekow (of the 16th Division), being
troubled about the loss of order, held back the Fusilier Battalion of
the 2nd at the quarries of St. Hubert as a temporary reserve. When
the confusion had somewhat abated, the Fusilier and the 1st Battalions
of the 2nd moved on, but took the direction on the bend of the road.
In the mean time the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd had come up in rear
of the Fusilier Battalion, so that there were then four fresh battalions
crowded one behind the other at this point. It was now 9 p.m., and
the enemy’s line could be distinguished only by the flashes of fire. It
was impossible to judge exactly how far off it was, but at moments
when all was still French voices and words of command could be
fairly plainly heard. It was therefore intelligible that various
companies should endeavour to press forward into the main position,
where they saw the ruins of Point du Jour and of Moscou standing
out in front of the flames; but all these attacks, which were undertaken
without any unity, fell to pieces a short distance before their goal.
At this time of the senior generals the following were assembled Arrival of
at St. Hubert: — von Franzecky, von Barnekow, von Hartmann nfvision.
(of the 3rd Division), Hann von Weyhern (of the 4th Division), and
a large number of commanders of brigades and regiments. They
consulted as to what should now be done, since the attack of the
3rd Division might be considered as a failure, and at once committed
another error. The small space was filled closely with„ masses of
troops belonging to three corps. If it were considered that the enemy
was still capable of assuming the offensive, the proper thing to do
would have been to have got all the burnt-OTjLt slag into order and to
have systematically withdrawn the troops before leading fresh troops
into the crowd ; for the last fresh battalions which had come up were
strong enough to ward off an attack. The orders given were very
different. Not only the 42nd Regiment, but even the 4th Division,
received orders to follow on, although the officers of the staff could no
longer see one another, and although they must have felt sure that
there was no room for the troops to extend.
In consequence of this the 42nd Regiment first moved off, and that
in the direction Point du Jour-bend of the road. The columns were
able to advance only very carefully. When they formed line of
columns to the south of St. Hubert, they began to fall into confusion.
They certainly succeeded in passing through the firing-line ; but this
was the end of it, and the commander was “ eompellea to leave the
166 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
regiment in line of columns of battalions, with the 2nd Battalion on
the left, the 1st in the centre, and the Fusilier Battalion on the right.
On their right, towards the north, rested the before-mentioned mass
o£ columns.
At about 9.30 p.m. the 21st and the 61st Regiments began also to
deploy near St. Hubert, with a view to taking up a position to the
south of that place, and of advancing thence to the east. Later on
these were followed again by the 9th and 49th Regiments (of the
7th Brigade), so that by about 10.30 p.m. twenty-four fresh battalions
were massed on a front of about 1350 yards : how this was done no
one can say. If we take the remains of the 8th Corps at St. Hubert,
which had been increased to fifty-nine companies, twelve companies
(the 39th) of the 7th Corps, four companies (1st Battalion of the 77th)
which had closed up to their right to the 3rd Division, and again six
companies of the 33rd, and seven of the 60th, we shall find that there
were forty-eight battalions in a space about a mile in width and
1100 yards in depth. Has anything like this ever been seen? By
about 10 p.m. the Germans had reduced themselves to a defenceless
state, since they could no longer move in such a manner as to be
capable of fighting. This was indeed a most dangerous situation ; but
the enemy was so exhausted that it was possible to make the very
worst errors close in front of the muzzles of his rifles without suffering
any punishment. This is quite evident when we consider the
circumstances which occurred with reference to the 7th Corps.
Why were these masses brought up in the dark? In order to
attack! Why did they not attack with the twenty-four fresh
battalions ? Those who understand what is meant by “ moral
strength ” can easily answer this question. Tactically considered, the
most unfavourable situation conceivable had been brought about, and
by 10 p.m. nothing remained in hand, for at that time there was at
this spot no reserve worthy of the name, since these masses were
defenceless. They were no better than a wall made of stones, which
have no power of motion in the wall. They had no longer any value
as reserves, since they were all “ committed to action.” They had
endured all crises, from the enemy, from the darkness, from disorder
and from panic, and this while in actual contact with the enemy,
and distant only from 200 to 300 yards from his main position. If
any one dares to use the word “ reserves ” in this 1 case, let him
remember these facts, and not allow himself to be befooled by
pedantic nonsense. He will then learn something from tactics, and
will condemn the tactical principles of those who gloss over errors.
We must now once more ask the question, Why did not the twenty-
four fresh battalions of Pomeranians rush in without a shot upon their
enemy, who was at this very moment being attacked from the right,
and who was, moreover, tired out and far inferior in numbers ? We
hear so much said of “dash,” and especially of “Pomeranian clash,”
and also of “ charging in without firing a shot,” and of the “advan-
tages of night fighting.” In this instance there were only 200 or
300 yards to cross, and the troops were massed ; thus the zone of fire
had been passed, and the masses were still closed up. If it was
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANCE RAVINE.
167
possible to remain massed at from 200 to 300 yards from the enemy’s
front until 6 a.m. on the 19th — for eight whole hours — while here
and there they were under heavy fire with their arms at the shoulder,
why did not the troops get across this 300 yards with drums beating,
and without a shot, using their bayonets, or the famous “ Pomeranian
butt” — all which would at the most have taken three minutes ? We
should have lost no more men than we did during the eight hours.
It was — I dare to say it — because no one understood how to fight.
They did not know how to fight as skirmishers or in columns or in
closed lines ; and this event, more than any other, was really a sign of
the bankruptcy of our tactics. Three corps, composed of Pomeranians,
Poles, Hanoverians, Westphalians, Rhinelanders, Brandenburgers,
Thuringians, East Prussians, and Magdeburgers, could not gain their
object, because, setting aside the mistakes of the superior leaders, no
one knew how to fight. No one can say a word against this state-
ment, nor against this other, that by about 10 p.m. the troops had
been practically reduced to a defenceless state.
That there was sufficient moral strength remaining is proved by
their endurance through the eight hours ; but it is not sufficient that
the moral strength is there ; it must be made use of.
It was decided at Malmaison, when it was found that the enemy Assembly
remained quiet and men had begun to recover their breath, to with- ana 8th ^
draw the infantry of the 7th and 8th Corps, and to hold the slope Corps,
during the night with the 2nd Corps. This was a confession that
the attack had failed, and it distinctly placed the enemy in the
position of victor. Twenty-four massed battalions had been brought
up, and yet no one knew how to use one massed battalion in a
decisive manner ; indeed, there never was any question of an attack
by battalions. Can it be said that the German infantry knew how
to attack ? In order to carry out the above decision, the 4th Division
moved at 11 p.m. into the foremost line, having the 7th Brigade on
the right and the 8th on the left, while the 3rd Division was massed
a quarter of a mile to the rear. In the mean time the infantry of the
7th and 8th Corps fell slowly back. The retirement lasted through-
out the whole night ; indeed, on the next morning, many of the men
were still wandering about in the woods, looking for their units, and
it is indeed wonderful that, under the difficulty of the circumstances,
this operation — carried out in the night — was in general so successful
as it was.
It was not until St, Hubert had been evacuated by the troops of
the 8th Corps that Gniigge’s Battery limbered up, packed the wounded
on the limbers, and, though much crowded and hindered on the way,
fell back at a walk towards Gravelotte, at which place it joined the
artillery of the 7th Corps at midnight. Since the arrival of the 2nd
Corps the battery had only fired a shot now and then, and had then
entirely ceased firing and quietly held on, until, in good order and
completely under the command of its leader, it as a body abandoned
the position which it had held with so much honour, glory, and
The infantry of the 7th and 8 th Corps withdrew for the most part
168 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
in disorder and without any leaders, and, curiously enough, here again
the stormers of St. Hubert, the 67th and the 8th Jagers, preserved
the best appearance and order. The only one of the larger units of
troops which left the field of battle to some extent in close order was
the 39th. In the direction of La Folie the infantry of the 8th Corps
there present remained during the night in contact with the enemy.
As for the rest, the 8th Corps assembled somewhat to the north of
the main road, and the 7th to the south of it; on the following
morning the 3rd Division also was withdrawn to the neighbour-
hood of Gravelotte.
As we know, the 9th Hussars divided themselves into three
detachments. The first (half of the 4th and the reserve squadron) had
bolted to the rear; the 1st squadron, after its futile charge, had taken
up a position in rear of the 39th; and two and a half squadrons
remained near St. Hubert. When the first troops were withdrawn
from the hill, the hussars fell back at the same time ; and during the
night all the three detachments came together at Gravelotte, without,
however, knowing anything whatever about the 8th Corps. The
“ Regimental History of the 9th Hussars ” says that the regiment was
assembled at 11 p.m., but I think it must have been an hour later.
When the retirement began, various regimental bands, which had
remained behind to the north and south of the main road, began to
play. Some of them played, “ Heil dir in Siegerkranz ; ” * and others,
“ Nun danket alle Gott.” f If the matter had not been so serious, and
if it had not been a question of the highest feelings of our inner life, one
might have felt inclined to regard this as a parody. At any rate, the
troops entered upon this last act with music, and came back from
it with music, which was a bitter irony for tacticians; and for such
tacticians it was a formal celebration of slaughter of the first class.
And, indeed, this terrible night scene, taken with the many which
had preceded it, might well call up the recollection of the most awful
events of the world's history; for both the highest leaders and the
troops were filled with awe as they abandoned this patch of ground
— and they were filled, above all, with consuming uncertainty.
of h the ttack C0nse( iuence of the measures taken by General von Zastrow,
7th Corps, only four battalions of all the infantry available had attacked from
the Bois de Yaux. Of these, the 1st Battalion of the 77th chanced
upon the direction of the gravel- pits, and eventually on Point du
Jour, and there thus remained only the three battalions of the 73rd
(joined later on by the 1st and 4th companies of the 13th) still
available for a simultaneous attack. General von Osten led these,
with tactical correctness, to the south of the quarries of Rozerieulles,
and against the main road, which there forms a salient angle; but
it was too late. The commander of the division, Lieutenant-General
von Gliimer, who was there present, stopped these battalions, who
were advancing well, and, on account of the “ darkness,” drew them
back to the edge of the wood, where they remained almost out of
* “Hail to thee wearing the wreath of victory ! ” the Prussian National anthem, which
is set to the same air as “ God save the Queen !”
t “ Now all thank God ! ” (Luther’s hymn).
THE STRUGGLES IN THE MANCE RAYINE.
169'
action. To the right of these three and a half battalions, and
almost at the same time with them, five battalions (the 7th Jagers,
the 2nd and Fusilier Battalions of the 13th, and the 1st and 2nd
of the 53rd), had pressed forward, and got within about 150 yards
of the main road. The movement of these eight and a half
battalions took place at a favourable moment, in so far as the
enemy had shortly beforehand commenced his offensive from Point
du Jour; while the quarries of Rozerieulles were then for the greater
part in our possession, and the 2nd Corps was deploying in the same
direction, but against the front. Though it was not possible to make
the movements of the two corps simultaneous, yet their attacks by
chance took place at about the same time; and this explains why
from this time forward the attitude of the enemy was passive and
timid. But how much greater would the result have been if about
fifteen battalions, who were on the spot, had been brought earlier
into action in the direction which was now followed by the 7th Corps !
In that case, indeed, we should have made our w T ay into the main
position — if, at least, General von Gliimer would have allowed the
troops to pursue their way, instead of drawing them back as he did.
They would then have come in contact with the captors of the
quarries of Rozerieulles, who, as is known, endeavoured in vain to
get touch to the right, since in the mean time the 73rd had fallen
back. After the troops under General von Osten began to retire,
the enemy made two or three short counter-attacks against the
battalions further to the right ; but these were all repulsed, and
resulted only in a halt of the Germans. Just then a movement began
along the whole line, the 2nd Battalion of the 13th being at the most
about 100 yards from the enemy. Unfortunately, here also a guiding
hand was wanting, and the attack came to a halt, the troops lying
down, although it was dark, and the consequent transition to a fire-
fight was the beginning of the end. With the exception of the 2nd
Battalion of the 13th, who at a distance of 100 yards from the enemy
kept up a steady fire-fight until the following morning, the battalions
turned back to the edge of the wood. Here, also, there could be no
question of a simultaneous attack, and only one solution was possible,
“ to dash on with drums beating into the rough and tumble.” But
the “rough and tumble” would not have been so bad; at least,
Lieutenant-Colonel (as he then was) von der Busche, of the 2nd
Battalion of the 13th, was of opinion that a decided attack with the
troops who were then on the spot would have without doubt suc-
ceeded, and would have drawn after it the capture of the position
of Point du Jour. Von der Busche was certainly in a position to
form a judgment on this point.
Thus, in spite of Moltke’s order of 10.30 a.m., no one up to
10 p.m, had understood how to carry out anything of importance
in the decisive direction which had been clearly laid down by
Moltke, and thus the French continued to hold their positions in
front of the 7th Corps. No one can maintain that the enemy’s fire
was the cause of this, since the losses of the 7th and of the 2nd Corps
were small, considering the task allotted to them. Moreovei', no
170
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
real attack was made by either the 2nd or the 7th Corps, and this
was solely the fault of the higher leaders ; since even at 10 p.m. — if
they had had any energy or reasonable sense — such an attack should
have been made.
As far as regards the assembly of the troops, the 8th Corps
succeeded during the night in re-forming most of the units of
command, and in placing itself in a suitable tactical condition. The
7th Corps, on the other hand, remained still scattered; the 27th
Brigade was in camp in close order near Gravelotte, to the south of
the main road, and in their neighbourhood were the three battalions
of the 77th and the Fusilier Battalion of the 53rd (belonging to
the 28th Brigade) ; in front of Rozerieulles were the three battalions
of the 73rd and the 1st of the 13th (which belonged to the 25th
Brigade); farther to the right were the 7th Jagers, the 1st and
2nd Battalions of the 53rd, and the 2nd and Fusilier Battalions of
the 13th (belonging to the 28th and 25th Brigades); while still
farther to the right was the 26th Brigade. The artillery and cavalry
of the 8th, 7th, and 2nd Corps remained as a whole at the points
where they had stood during the battle.
The enemy The measures which have been described placed the Germans
theposf- * n a P os ^ on to, if necessary, renew the struggle in the early
tion. k morning of the 19th of August in fairly good order, and from points
close in front of the muzzles of the enemy’s rifles. In rear of the
2nd Corps were nearly the whole of the 8th Corps, and a great
part of the 7th. But there was no question of a fresh struggle,
for the enemy abandoned Moscou at 3 a.m., and Point du Jour at
5.30 a.m., while at 6 a.m. the enemy’s positions were occupied by
the German 4th Division.
( 171 )
VIII.
MOLTKE AFTER THE BATTLE.
General von Moltke had watched the last struggle on the slope Moitke’s
of Point du Jour, and rode back at 10.30 p.m. with the head-quarters feelhlgs *
in the direction o£ Rezonville. The impression which he had gained
of the fight of the 1st Army was not favourable; on the contrary,
the general seemed by no means pleased to leave the field of
battle. But he did so with the firm determination that, after the
assembly of the 8th and 7th Corps had taken place under cover
of the 2nd, a decision must be arrived at in the very early morning
of the following day. Much which the day had brought forth
could have given no pleasure to the general; but he had at least
seen what had taken place with the 1st Army, while he knew
how matters there stood, and that in any case the battle was all
over for the night.
Affairs were very different with regard to the 2nd Army. St. Ennce
Privat had fallen at about the time that the 2nd Corps extended Charles!
against Point du J our, and the enemy had soon afterwards abandoned General
Amanvillers also. Moreover, Prince Frederic Charles had already f n te d mmetz ’
taken steps to destroy the communications in the valley of the Moitke’s
Moselle (the order of the 12th Corps at 11,45 a.m.), and had thus ^a! nal
acted entirely in the spirit of Moitke’s intentions. The prince had
then remained present at the struggle until it had completely ceased,
and at 8.30 p.m. had already issued suitable orders for the night.
Owing to the great distance between St. Privat and Gravelotte,
the report of Prince Frederic Charles on all these matters did not
reach General von Moltke on the field of battle, and did not indeed
find him until during the night at Rezonville. On the other hand,
the prince also had received no further orders from Moltke, but
had fought out the battle quite independently. In this he received
the very greatest assistance from the commander of the 12th Corps ;
but the glory of the victory of St. Privat fell principally to the
account of Prince Frederic Charles, and not to that of Moltke. For
even though Moltke (at 10.30 a.m.) bad prescribed a turning attack
to the prince, yet this was done from false premises, while the
prince, without any further aid from any one, understood how to
adapt Moitke’s ideas to vastly different conditions and in the
best manner possible. He even went further than Moltke, since
already, at 11.45 a.m., he of his own accord ordered the communica-
tions in the Moselle Valley to be destroyed, repeated the order
1
172
TWENTY-I’OTJB HOUBS OP MOLTKE’S STBA.TEG-Y.
II
IS ' *- '
Li, ■
at 3.45 pan., and at 6 p.m. ordered infantry to push forward into*
that valley. Though the prince at first failed through some omis-
sions, etc., yet he redeemed this by his activity, his circumspection,,
and his wise orders, and further by his development of Moltke’s
original idea, so that he in fact won both battles. The prince was
on this day a model of a general, and one who need not fear
comparison even with a Napoleon. He, by his measures, changed a
day which would otherwise have been lost into the most decisive
turning-point of the whole war, for without St. Privat there could
have been no Sedan, etc. His circumspection and activity — ever
striving to carry out as completely as possible Moltke’s original
idea — warm our hearts, just as General von Steinmetz repels us with
his awkwardness and his misplaced energy. General von Steinmetz
entirely failed to understand Moltke on the 18th of August; indeed,
if he had wished to do everything in his power to make Moltke’s.
original idea an absolute failure, he could have done nothing worse
than what he did. That is, of course, out of the question; but the
fact must weigh heavily against Steinmetz as a general. It needs
great strength of character to realize how those below us utterly
fail to understand us, how those above us entirely refuse our advice,
with a result such as this, namely, an indecisive tactical situation,,
and yet to keep silence, and to bear all in patience and forbearance,
strong in the conviction that time will bring the truth to light.
Such were the circumstances in which Moltke found himself, when
he turned his horse’s head towards Bezonville. Could he hope
for anything better from the 2nd Army ? Might he not there also
be misunderstood ? Would not it be even worse there, since that
was the strategical flank; and might not matters there have so
completely changed since 5 p.m., when Moltke received the last
report from the prince, that the directions of the chief of the staff
would have arrived too late ? The uneasy hours which Moltke
lived through, from 5.30 p.m. until the report of the victory reached
Bezonville, must have shown him plainly the disadvantages of a
faulty selection of the standpoint for the commander-in-chief; other
considerations may, however, be of far greater force than the laws
of war.
Moltke must have felt, as he rode away, that the battle was
indecisive, and that it must be renewed on the 19th. The head-
quarters went, as we have said, to Bezonville, the staff* of the
1st Army to Gravelotte, and that of the 2nd to Doncourt. Prince
Frederic Charles, at 5 a.m. on the 19th, despatched the chief of the
staff of the corps to Caulre farm — a sign that he recognized the
strategical situation, as also appears from the explanations which
General von Stiehle gave with the order of the prince. In this he
said that on the 19th it would he a question “of entirely shutting
in the enemy, and of cutting him off from all communication with
the outer world.” It is evident that Moltke’s original idea was
entirely followed and worked out by the prince; he actually brought
pressure to bear from the left flank, and it was possible thence
on the 19th to more and more complete the turning movement.
- V' '. 'I ' n
MOLTKE AFTER THE BATTLE.
178
whereas the condition of affairs in which the 1st Army had broken
•off the action led as directly to a frontal attack as did the various
circumstances of the 18th. In the 1st Army the general idea had
not been grasped, and therefore the mass of the troops had never
been placed at the decisive point ; that is to say, for an attack on
the flank from the Bois de Yaux. Prince Frederic Charles went
from Caulre farm to Rezonville, at which place, in the mean time,
the whole extent of his victory had become known. After a report
had arrived from the 1st Army also with regard to the retreat of
the enemy, the preparations for shutting in the hostile force were
.at once commenced — the original idea was thus entirely carried out.
In this matter Prince Frederic Charles had again fortunately
•anticipated Moltke, since at 5 a.m. an order with verbal explanations
had already been issued by him with a view to this blockade. The
•original idea of the battle belongs to Moltke, and to Moltke only.
The execution of this idea, by skilful, wise, and far-seeing employ-
ment of circumstances which differed from those contemplated by
the order of battle, and which were only clearly discernible at a
later period, is due on the other hand to Prince Frederic Charles,
and to him alone. The victory of St. Privat of itself entailed the
evacuation of Point du Jour and the victory of Gravelotte. The
new idea, to shut in the enemy, and also its immediate execution,
was shared by Frederic Charles and Moltke; the former had first
given it expression in a definite form at 5 a.m. on the 19th of
August, though his order, given at 8.30 p.m. on the 18th, contained
the same idea. The day of Gravelotte was the most successful
in the life of the prince, a real day of triumph as a general,
and no human power can deprive him of his reward. By the
victory of St. Privat the prince saved General von Steinmetz from
a painful position, since the consequences of this victory made
themselves felt at Moscou and at Point du Jour before midnight
on the 18th; the French left flank abandoned their gloriously
•defended positions in order to avoid the results of this victory, and
not from any dread of the masses of men who were heaped up in
•their front. The irritability of General von Steinmetz was excited
.anew by having to share his victory with the prince. In addition
to the serious question which had already arisen as to “ Moltke and
Steinmetz/’ there was now a second as to “Prince Frederic Charles
and Steinmetz/’ of which the end was the recall of the latter.
General von Steinmetz submitted a memorandum on these two
“disputes” to the Emperor William I., which the general wished
to publish after the emperor had read it. William I. read the
memorandum, but did not consider any publication desirable, and
so informed General von Steinmetz. The latter was too good a
soldier not to see that such a wish was a command, and the greater
praise is due to him for this, inasmuch as the Official Account of
the battle of Gravelotte heaps up abundant blame on the general
for matters with regard to which he committed no fault. Steinmetz
•consequently went to his grave exposed and blamed before the
•whole of his .contemporaries. It required no little self-restraint to
m
174
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
bear this, and to allow himself to be publicly held up to blame
without defending himself. General von Steinmetz was strong
enough to exercise this self-restraint ; and though the conviction
which he felt, that history would some day exonerate him, was
erroneous, this fact has no power to alter my opinion. The general
was found wanting — and badly wanting — on the day of Gravelotte,
but he has found no defender against the unjust and unfounded
blame which was thrown upon him.*
# The motives of the two “ disputes ” have nothing in common with
this matter, since all that General von Steinmetz ordered and
neglected from 3 p.m. on the 18th of August, would alone fully justify
his recall from the command of the 1st Army, and in this respect the
judgment of the Official Account calls for no alteration ; for this
purpose there is no need to await the publication of the Memoirs.
But how would the 18th of August have turned out if, regarding the
two army commanders, we suppose the 1st Army in the place of the
2nd? It is impossible to imagine what would in this case have
happened on the German left and in the centre ; but it is certain that
Prince Frederic Charles, if he had been on the German right, would
have fully understood how to carry out Moltke’s order of 10.30 a.m.,
and would have turned the enemy's flank on this part of the field also.
It seems to me certain that he would have found ways and means to
carry on the frontal attack in the same manner as that of the 3rd of
July, 1866, and he would, moreover, by strongly pressing the front,
have prepared and carried through the main attack from the south
against the enemy's left flank. This shows clearly how much depends
* The accusations and imputations made against Steinmetz in the Official Account are
as follows: — , . , ,
“ General yon Steinmetz, watching from the Gravelotte heights the course of events in
advance of his own front during the forenoon, had first awaited the development of the
struggle on his left, as prescribed (?) by the instructions which he had received ” (?)
(part iv. p. 70). •
According to the order of 10.30 a.m., General von Steinmetz was to attack simulta-
neously with the 2nd Army (p. 16 ) ; to this was verbally added by General von Sperling ;
“ General von Steinmetz is not to attack until the 2nd Army on his left flank has gone
farther in advance (!) and is in readiness to co-operate ” (!) (p. 16).
“ The 7th Corps is at first to maintain a defensive attitude” (4 a.m. on the 18th of
August). “ Upon the 7th Corps will devolve, in the first instance, the duty of protecting
the movements of the 2nd Army against any hostile enterprises from the side of Metz”
(order for operations of 2 p.m. on the 17th, part vi. p. 1).
“ At this time (1.15 p.m.) General von Steinmetz received the guiding directions issued
after the commencement of the action at Yerneville, in which General von Moltke again
prescribed a delaying attitude to the 1st Army, while still permitting the preparation of
the attack by artillery ” (part vi. p. 71).
“The leading idea (of the guiding directions) was for the right wing and centre of the
German army to hold the main forces of the adversary in check, until the left wing of the
2nd Army had thoroughly cleared up the situation on his lines of retreat, and, in.
the event of the French forces making a stand to the west of Metz, until it had surrounded
their left flank from the north” (part vi. p. 102).
“ The original task of the 1st Army, that of drawing the adversary upon itself (?), was
fulfilled, and by the impetuosity of the troops even in a certain extent exceeded (?). For
whilst the 7th Corps, in accordance with its former instructions (?), had in general limited
itself to maintaining those places which it had originally occupied, the 8th had, with the
capture of St. Hubert, moved close up to the enemy’s main positions. The French must
therefore have expected an attack at any moment upon their left wing, and kept in
consequence their reserves in rear of the centre (?) until it was too late (?) to support the?
right wing” (?) (part vi. p. 110).
MOLTKE ABATER THE BATTLE.
175
I upon the personal value of the leader of an army, and that the best
ideas remain ideas only, if the commander of an army does not know
how to work them out. A general of the importance of a Moltke
requires, in order to carry out his ideas, executive officers with wide
views, men who know how to “ read events ” in his manner. In
Frederic Charles Moltke found such a general, but not in Steinmetz.
The battle of St. Privat-Gravelotte was a strategical battle, and Sfc. Privat-
was really as good as won from the moment when the strategical ^sa ° te
movements into the battle had been carried out, and when the German strategical
armies had completed their change of front to the right. In spite of battle *
the serious negligence and the evil episodes which took place, the
change of front to the right was carried out, and Moltke was thus
enabled to select the form of attack which he always preferred — a
p frontal attack combined with a turning movement against one or both
flanks. There can be no doubt that he intended to turn both flanks,
that is to say, the execution of the battle was thought out with
reference to turning both flanks, though naturally the enemy’s right
was the main object of all efforts. Prince Frederic Charles cleared up
Moltke’s errors with regard to the extension of the enemy’s position,
and only when this had been done was that possible which Moltke
intended. Some people now say that it was not necessary to attack
the French after the German change of front to the right had been
completed, and to thus expend 20,000 men in order to win the battle.
Now, if 20,000 men were lost, this is not the fault of Moltke, but of
the Prince of Wiirttemberg, of General von Steinmetz, etc.; but
whether the battle was necessary after the change of front to the
right had been completed, is not a reasonable subject for discussion.
The situation of the war pressed for decisive action, and, even leaving
this out of the question, it is psychologically foolish to demand that
‘two armies, of which one wishes to hinder the other from carrying
out its intentions, can remain for a long time in front of each other
without fighting. When men are standing opposite to each other
within rifle range, the situation will admit of no delay. If any one
thinks so, he ought not to have anything to do with the art of war,
for under such circumstances human nature impels men to come to
blows, and no discipline in the world can avert it; so that the most
that could be obtained would be, that one would be forced into the
struggle at an unseasonable moment. If it be said that the French
army could not remain long in their position, and that they must very
soon either retire through the valley of the Moselle or attack the
Germans, in order to open a way by the lines of retreat which they
had lost, in which case the Germans would not have found it
necessary to attack a specially prepared position, hut would have
been themselves attacked — such statements show an absolutely childish
way of looking at things. A situation of such tension as existed in
the evening of the 17th of August must result in a battle ; and yet
these theorists now refuse to accept the very result towards which
every effort and great exertions were directed i And if it be said that
Bazaine could not wait long, but must soon have attacked, I say that
it is better " to lay down the law than to allow it to be dictated to us.”
ft j '
176 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
On this nointwe now know that Bazaine’s measures were governed
SSSSSE
ohkf of the general staff quit. extraordinary exertions, even leaving
^ :nrc S «a“n' taS^nd'^Se up the no,
direction^ whde then ^blfto^ook atte'thoTaii. of
t “se £££*. werearried out, and tiro troops suffer^
LTnf Jnt of g anything ; they W« »* E™
S Strategical
tporint 2 a correct choice of ,
.as it was in this case, not only js^he^possxb l ty g ,
but also that of co-operation. One h , a ® hi quite sure of such !
under one; great considerations, such as
assistance as is capable ot dea 0 incorrect to maintain
armies and corps a " e qp C ° t ^ ei ^ e “4i betwVen the head-quarters and
this case. In any ca have been so completely lost
the 2nd Army after 5 n*. of such things,
as was the case. B ufcltl ® a | re d finem ’ eil ts, for example, not to speak
■SUE?- c»o? m "C was the c.se on the 18*
i ° f A Sfe reached Rezonville after 11 p.m. He spoke ^J 1 ® 011
lUe ' way there j, which is intell^ible on undergone on
'“‘ft the middk°of th “ right iffi Mousson. Then arrived the
S* : f J von steinmetz, of which mention has been made.
Moltke sot up at 3 a.m., and answered the general’s note at 4 a.m.
X wffich the head-quarters started for Flavigny. On their arrival
ffiStorito the place was found to be fell o wounded so that^it
was onlv with difficulty that a small garret was found for tne King,
Go wWh the monarch finished the night. By far the grea ei par
MOLTKE AFTER THE BATTLE.
the head-quarters remained during the night in the open air. Under
such circumstances did Moltke himself await the reports from Prince
Frederic Charles, in a state of uncertainty which can be imagined,
but, as was always the case with him in the most critical situations,
in perfect calm. Indeed, under these overwhelming circumstances, he
even took his regular sleep, which is a remarkable sign of the sound-
ness of his nerves and of the strength of his mind. When the victorious
message of Prince Frederic Charles arrived after midnight, the chief
of the general staff received it with his peculiar outward equanimity ;
and, as if he had been sure of it all along, at once drew up the
dispositions for reaping the fruits of the great success, so that the
whole situation was ready to be laid before the king in the early
morning of the 19th.
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
TACTICAL CONCLUSIONS.
Just as the head-quarters of the 2nd Army to a certain extent — in
their case fortunately — escaped from control, and went their own way,,
so the troops in that part of the field of battle of which we have been
speaking escaped from their commanders, and this under circumstances
such (for instance, in the case of the 3rd Division) as necessitated
their being kept in hand. Most conspicuous of all is the distressing-
fact that out of fifty-seven battalions only once were four battalions
(the three of the 72nd and one of the 40th) led well in hand to the
attack ; and even as regards this instance I am still doubtful, since I
cannot clearly make out whether two' battalions did not first attack,
followed again by the other two. If we survey the whole space, about
1100 yards square, brigades, regiments, and battalions were everywhere-
entirely broken up, and out of whole brigades only companies mixed
together and in confusion came up to the actual shock. Gallantly as
these behaved, the attacks almost always ended in our repulse. It
is not possible to count the number of the different “ advances/' as we
have learnt euphemistically to call them, which were made ; but there
were at least a hundred ! Since I have already, while relating the
main phases of the battle, criticized the principal mistakes, I will say
little more here, in order to avoid repetitions.
When a number of sportsmen stand round a rabbit-burrow, and
the rabbits are bolted out of the burrow, he must be a bad shot
who cannot hit them. This was exactly the case here. The main
road was the burrow, the sportsmen who had surrounded it were
the French, while the part of the ferret was played by the “ tacticians/'
Every child can see that, it was quite natural that the troops, when
they bolted out of the burrow, should be dashed back again. But'
not only were masses of infantry driven through this bolt-hole from
midday until late at night, but the same was done to masses of*
cavalry and artillery ; indeed, they were all driven into it and through
it at the same time, and were thus all made defenceless for the
moment. It is impossible really to say that a “ reconnaissance ” was
needed, since, when a battle is in full blast, that stage may be taken
to be past. - But if then the masses of cavalry (1st Division), and
of infantry (2nd Corps), were to be driven through the bolt-hole,
the superior leaders and the commanders of the units (divisions)
ought to have gone beforehand to the points where the columns were
to extend, so that they might be at hand when the troops themselves.
TACTICAL CONCLUSIONS.
179
came up. This was especially necessary in the case of the commander
of the 1st Cavalry Division, but instead of this he stuck himself in
the middle of the column ; only one officer did rightly in this respect,
this was the commander of the artillery of the 7th Corps.
Of the 7th Corps the massed artillery alone was correctly employed,
as was also (on the whole) the 8th Corps, with the exception of the
:32nd Infantry Brigade, which, in my opinion, should have taken the
direction of Leipzig ; but this point is open to dispute. The employ-
ment of the infantry of the 8th Corps contrasts favourably with that
of the 7th and 2nd Corps. If it was impossible to always keep the
fighting intervals of the corps, there was, at any rate, no need to
push the 27th Infantry Brigade into the zone of the 8th Corps, or
to mix up the 39th Regiment with the 29th Infantry Brigade ; the
29th and the 30th were directed well on the whole; at any rate,
they advanced into the battle in the desired direction, re-formed after
they had captured the woods, and then pressed forward stage by
stage until St. Hubert fell. They also took up some sort of a fire-
position, although this at a later phase was very little suited for
the requirements of such a position. Generals von Wedell, von
Strubberg, and von Weltzien showed themselves to be wary tacticians,
who correctly appreciated the facts, and made correct dispositions;
the arrival of General von Strubberg at the fork of the yalley towards
La Folie-Leipzig was of special importance. Moreover, the capture of
St. Hubert, in spite of the obstacles, could scarcely have been better
prepared and carried out by the two brigades who moved on that spot.
The pushing on of the reserve (31st Infantry Brigade) was right
' as regards the time selected ; that it did not do all that von Goeben
intended was not his fault, but was due to Generals von Steinmetz
and von Zastrow, who sent the cavalry and the artillery in the same
direction at the same moment. The conduct of the struggle was,
as regards the 8th Corps, generally good, and this under .difficult
■circumstances, while the fight of the 15th Division was fine of the
most glorious episodes in the history of war. Indeed, all the later
efforts together really did nothing more than this division did by
itself. The reinforcement of the 15th Division with the 16th, by
pushing it in by brigades, is not exactly normal, but it cannot be
blamed under such trying circumstances ; moreover, it brought about
no appreciable disadvantage. .
The pushing forward of the 9th Hussars over the Manee Ravine
was a tactical mistake ; the arrival of the reserve horses at this very
moment was a real fatality.
The massing of the troops in and near St. Hubert, such as took
place from 5 p.m., was under all circumstances an error. There was
no proper occupation of the farm and its neighbourhood, nor was
any effective fire-position for infantry obtained. All the steps taken
later increased the effect of this original mistake; nothing was done
to remove it, and nothing to mitigate it ; no superiority of fire was
therefore obtained, and it might have been possible to abstain with
advantage from the wild attacks which only brought about repulses.
For it is well known that no attack can in these days hope for
MiS* , , v '
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180 TWENTY-FOXJR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
success unless a previous superiority of fire lias been obtained, while
in this case there were no modifying circumstances. Nevertheless,
company after company was sent forward, always in the same direc-
tion, without having even attempted to obtain any effect from infantry
fire ; for this reason they all ended badly.
That no effort was made to obtain a. superiority of fire is strikingly
proved by the French losses, for the whole of their 2nd Corps lost,
only 27 officers and 670 men, and Lapasset’s Brigade 4 officers and
60 men, or a total of 761.* Add to this Aymard’s Division, 45 officers*
and 900 men; Metman’s Division (half of), 16 officers and 300 men;
1 officer and 20 men of the Voltigeur Regiment of the Guard;,
altogether 2043, including 93 officers.
The repeated and strong attacks of the French from Point du.
Jour were to a certain extent successful, but only because our infantry
had no fire-position, otherwise a repeated and complete rout of our
infantry could not have taken place. These successful counter-
attacks also show us how weak the fighting power of swarms of
skirmishers is, for they were swept away like dust by the repeated
charges, having exhausted themselves by their incessant independent
attacks in small bodies. So far, however, as under such circumstances
it is possible to discuss the system of a superior command with
reference to a fixed object, there was real “leading ” in the 8th Corps,,
though the 7th Hussars on the left were a little rash !
From the moment when the Generals von Steinmetz and von
Zastrow commenced their independent action, mistake after mistake
was made, so that one fault really succeeded another. It would
lead us too far if we now endeavoured to set forth the whole list
of them. Neither general understood Moltke’s order for the battle,,
and they both neglected all preparations for an attack in the direction
in which alone it could be successful, and which had been clearly
prescribed by General von Moltke, namely, from the Bois de Vaux..
When the main idea is not understood by leaders of this high rank,,
it follows that their measures will miss the mark. But, nevertheless,,
there has never been a case where the whole of the infantry of
an army-corps has been so completely broken up and crumbled to
atoms without a plan and without an object, as was the case in this
instance with the 7th Corps. This is want of judgment indeed, and
we might use a strong expression for this method of action. Let
the reader choose this expression for himself! As a matter of fact,
General von Steinmetz and General von Zastrow made themselves,
powerless by what they did, neglected to do, or left undone. By
the nature of things, their infantry must have brought about the
decision, and no express order was necessary to tell them this. But
they nowhere had anything entirely under their control, though
after 5 p.m. three-quarters of the whole of the infantry of the 7th
Corps might have been standing somewhere in front of Rozerieulles in
readiness to strike. Surely something might have been done with them.
Matters grew worse, and terribly worse again, when General von,
* Diet de Lonlay says: *• Verge’s Division, 4S0 men; Bastoul’s Division, 160; Lapasset’s-
Brigade, 60. Total, 700 men.”
TACTICAL CONCLUSIONS.
181
St.einme.iz received the disposal of the 2nd Corps. The dispositions
which he then ordered form a counterpart to the celebrated order
to pursue, and it actually happened that 48 battalions (including the
riff-raff) were posted in the darkness upon a piece of ground 1100
yards square, and in front of the muzzles of the enemy’s rifles, without
its ^ being possible for them to count upon any support from the
artillery. This was no fire-position, and it was, moreover, impossible
to fire any more. But in spite of all this the enemy’s position might
have been captured ; indeed, it must have been carried if it had been
stormed. When we think of our discipline, we wonder why the
24 fresh battalions did not 'advance for three minutes energetically to
their front ; . and why, instead of this, they held their ground for
eight hours in front of the enemy’s muzzles ? A little energy would
have done it all, and yet our swaggering books are brimful of deeds
of heroism and of “ dash.”
It would have been easy at about 8 p.m. to have brought about
a decision from the Bois de Yaux, if the eight battalions who were
there had known of the capture of the quarries of Kozerieulles, and if
there had been any system of leading. But neither in the 7th, nor
afterwards in the 2nd, Corps was it possible to rise to the level of any
timely action ; and the attack of the former, which began favourably,
was stopped by express order on account of the “ darkness.” The
soldier can only die, alike in the darkness or in the light of day ; but
he ought to die victorious.
The causes of the repeated panics have been narrated ; from them
the soldier may learn that, in making his dispositions, he must deal
with this evil enemy, against whom, as the “ white, red, and blue
shoulder-straps ” teach us, no one is always secure.
That St. Hubert was taken was due to the two arms, the German
infantry and artillery; that it was held was due to the artillery
alone, since it allowed no opportunity to the French batteries to
steadily bombard that farm. If that had taken place, we should not
have seen 59 companies of infantry assembled there ; they would have
scattered apart in all directions.
The general success of the 1st Army in the battle of Gravelotte
was terribly small. The whole of three corps were emplo 3 7 ed against
little more than as many divisions, of which part (the 2nd French
Corps) had been much weakened by loss, and yet only the advanced
position of the enemy was won.
The struggle of the 1st Army had no special influence upon
Marshal Bazaine’s employment of his reserves, since by 3 p.m. he had
already allowed the greater part of them to move off towards St.
Privat, and had sent only one brigade against the 1st Army ; at the
end of the battle he still had another brigade and the cavalry at his
disposal The battle of Gravelotte shows better than that of St.
Privat how strong, under present conditions, is a defence which has
been prepared beforehand ; for this reason we should study the former.
This is also evident in the centre, between the two battles, where the
German 9th Corps fought with success against the true mass of the
enemy, whose flanks were relatively weak.
1 : - . ■ ' : it .> . ■■
mm
182
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
As compared with the loss of 2043 men by the 2nd and 3rd French
ps, the Germans lost —
Officers. Hen.
Tlie 8th Corps ... ... ... 174 3066
„ 2nd Corps ... ... — 50 1189
,, 7th. Corps ... •.* ••* 36 785
„ 1st Cavalry Division ... ... 7 88
These figures speak for themselves, and indeed hardly ever have
French troops fought more gloriously than did the 2nd Corps, which,
at the beginning of the battle, really consisted only of the remnants
left by the battles of Spicheren and Vionville ; and it thus in truth
■enforced its own will, and frustrated the intentions of the Germans. .
With regard to the details of the German loss, it was heaviest in
the 15th Division, in which, according to the Official Account, it
.amounted to 125 officers, 2206 men, and 47 horses. The 8th Jagers,
ing of St. Hubert, received fire not only in their front, but also on
their left flank, and even in their rear. That these troops nevertheless
remained fit for action until dark is an honourable proof of their
good spirit.
It may in general be noted that infantry whose attacks failed,
such as the 60th, the 33rd, and the 29th, suffered the heaviest loss.
Compared with this loss, that of the four battalions of the 32nd Brigade,
who under General von Barnekow carried out the only united attack
of the day, was quite insignificant. It amounted altogether to /
officers and 104 men, and in this is included the casualties in the
two other battalions of the 40th. Under such circumstances there
really seems to have been no reason for their retirement.. The 9th
Hussars lost 14 men and 32 horses, and the 1st Cavalry Division left-
177 horses on the field. Of the 7th Corps only the 39th and 73rd
Regiments suffered loss worth mentioning, namely, 4 officers and 124
men, and 3 officers and 164 men, while the corps artillery for reasons
easily intelligible— lost 8 officers, 72 men, and 130 horses. ^ It is only
necessary, indeed, to examine the losses of the 7th Corps in order to
form an opinion that there could have been no question of their
having been properly handled.
( 133 )
r
STRATEGICAL CONCLUSIONS.
Marshal Bazaine neither wished to be driven away from Metz, nor
to be driven back upon it. General von Moltke, as has been stated,
wished simply to drive him back into it. Marshal Bazaine carried
out his will as regards the former point, but not with respect to the
latter; and it was not until he found himself forced back into the
fortress that the possible consequences became visible to him. Bazaine’s
twofold object led to energetic fighting on both flanks, to two battles,
connected on the German side by a loose, and on the French side by
a firm centre. Since, however, the battle of St. Privat has been
repeatedly discussed from a tactical point of view, I have not con-
sidered it tactically in this work. On the other hand, I had to
describe the battle of Gravelotte in full detail ; this was still maiden
ground..
When relating the tactical details of the battle of Gravelotte, the
strategical importance of the battle of St. Privat must come to the
front. If Moltke’s one object was attained, it followed that he must
bring both his enemy’s objects to naught; indeed, it was possible to
hope that thus both the field-army and the fortress would together
fall into our hands.
Moltke’s greatest success — which consisted of the operations round
Metz up to the end of the battle of the 18th I of August — has never
been properly appreciated. The catastrophe which formed the close
of the passage of arms at Sedan has up to the present day exercised
a far greater effect — even upon professional soldiers. We there, with
a comparatively small sacrifice of men, obtained a great and obvious
success upon the field of battle, combined with a rare political victory.
For this reason both the intelligent and the unintelligent public,
when the two battles are compared as to their value, laud Sedan a
hundred times for once that St. Privat-Gravelotte is praised. The
clear blue eagle-eyes of General Moltke saw differently; "Cut oft*
from our communications, we must win victory by our fire.” This
show% distinctly how highly Moltke himself estimated the success of
the 18th. This was the turning-point of the whole war, of which
everything else was only the consequence, which the great leader did
not altogether anticipate, but of which he yet knew how to take
advantage at the right moment.
The military and political centre of gravity of France was iii
Bazaine’s army; if it were removed, the war was as good as won.
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184 , ' TWENTY-FOUE HOURS OF MOLTKE’S STRATEGY.
-and the settlement of accounts was only a question of time, Owing
to the streams of blood which had to flow around Metz in order to
secure the extinction of Bazaine’s army, the German nation has never
rightly appreciated the full value of these events, the names of the
battles are not popular, and even if this were not the case, a result
which has once had its birth in blood cannot be erased from the page
of history. But the professional soldier ought to approach the con-
sideration of the value of such events with a calm and quiet mind.
The great Moltke had up to the 18th of August to deal with
quite other and far greater difficulties than those which he conquered
between the 23rd of August and the 2nd of September. For those
ydio can judge, the two are, in my opinion, 'sufficiently distinct. In
spite of “ friction and obstacles/’ and of a constant struggle against
the want of intelligence in those under him and against respect for
those over him, Moltke really worked out the same task at Gravelotte
as he did la^er at Sedan; the latter is only the fully developed idea
of Gravelotte-St. Privat. As at Sedan, so on the 18th of August two
armies had to quit their lines of communication, and to change front
in the one case to the north,, and in the other to the east; and this
in a narrow space, after weighing various contingencies. Everything
was more favourable for the operations at Sedan, and, above all,
Moltke had then two generals under him, who understood him and
anticipated his washes ; whereas, up to the 18th of August, one of them
had to he constantly held back, while the other had equally to be
somewhat pushed on. The latter certainly fully cancelled the pro-
portion of blame which was his due, while the former was by his action
~at Gravelotte finally and for ever struck out of the list of leaders in
war; but Gravelotte-St. Privat is, and will continue to be, Moltke’s
grandest feat. Moreover, the battle of Gravelotte teaches us that the
best strategy can have no result if the tactics are faulty.
THE END.
i BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS,
LONDON AND BECCLES.
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